Rentabilidad y disfuncionalidad de la construcción “comunican mal”

Rubén Weinsteiner

 

La construcción “comunican mal”, es siempre un recurso utilizado en alegato propio, que intenta instalar la percepción de, “hacemos mucho, o hacemos bien, pero como comunicamos mal, la gente no se entera o no lo percibe”.

Es un recurso utilizado por muchos gobiernos, yo diría que casi todos en algún momento recurren a él.

Como recurso autoindulgente tiene una eficacia limitada, en términos de la intervención en la subjetividad de los sujetos de elección. Quizás pueda revelar mayor eficacia en términos de darle tranquilidad al emisor y al espacio del mismo, pero a un costo muy alto, ya que le obtura la posibilidad de intervención y resolución de los problemas. 


Bielsa no simplifica


Hace algunas semanas estaba mirando un partido del Leeds contra el Wolves, el Leeds perdió en Elland Road 1 a 0, en un partido donde quizás no mereció perder. Al finalizar el partido y ya en la conferencia de prensa, un periodista le preguntó a Bielsa porque creía que el Leeds había jugado mal, cuando en realidad, el partido fue muy parejo y Wolves llegó 2 veces al arco del Leeds.

Bielsa le respondió que Leeds no había jugado mal y continuó con un análisis: el volante de contención de su equipo no había anticipado al 10 de Wolves, dejándole metros, panorama y posición territorial para que el volante de creación llegara con mayor soltura al área rival. Esta desfasaje desacomodo sistemáticamente a la defensa de su equipo y en uno de los ataques le convirtieron.

La diferencia entre el “jugaron mal” y el “cinco no lo anticipó al 10 ni en territorio ni en el trámite del juego” es clara. La segunda opción permite intervenir sobre la realidad y modificarla, la primera, convoca a la resignación automática.

La primera definición carece de complejidad, rigor y análisis, La segunda requiere observación, compresión, creatividad y proactividad.


En momentos difíciles, la crítica general y emocional bloquea el análisis y la intervención. La observación y el señalamiento funcional abre la instancia del cambio. 


Por altura, en los corners nunca iba a cabecear, me quedaba en la puerta del área, esperando el despeje para pegarle al arco. Un técnico solía repetirme, que no sabía patear, que era un burro pateando. Otro, vino y me dijo: “ud patea bien, lo que pasa, es que tiene que mirar que el arquero camina lateralmente hacia el lado opuesto de donde viene el corner, si ud le pega al palo al que va, se la van a atajar, si le pega al palo de donde viene el córner, lo agarra a contrapierna al arquero y es más difícil que se la ataje.

Detectar, definir y proponer acciones puntuales y concretas, evitando simplificaciones y generalizaciones, es lo que se impone en momentos difíciles.

El gobierno nacional se encuentra en una situación compleja, herencia, pandemia, tensiones fuertes co el poder real, contradicciones internas, la subjetividad en disputa, en una puja brutalmente asimétrica y la incertidumbre como constante.


Y entonces

Retomando el ejemplo del Leeds, creo que sería muy positivo que el “volante de contención” anticipe al volante de creación del rival, en territorio y en juego, limitando las opciones del adversario y tomando la iniciativa. Una especie de Carlos Corach, que marcaba la agenda en la puerta de su casa y condicionaba el spin mediático del día.

Es necesario construir un diálogo eficaz y proactivo con los sectores medios.

Hace falta dar el debate con la hoja de ruta del otro en la propia mano.

Plantear un discurso posterior a la grieta. Posterior no en términos temporales, sino estructurales. Es decir que contenga y valide motivaciones, deseos, miedos, necesidades insatisfechas y broncas de ambas partes.

Plantear un discurso de poder que lejos de negar la grieta o descalificarla, la obsolotice.



Rubén Weinsteiner


El #CatchUp de las nuevas demandas en el #VotoJoven



Rubén Weinsteiner

Los segmentos constituidos por variables blandas se ordenan como el resultado de la articulación de nuevas demandas. Las personas demandan nuevas cosas y los que demandan las mismas nuevas cosas se agrupan funcionalmente en nuevos microsegmentos aunque esas personas sean muy diferentes entre sí, desde las variables más duras, determinando cruces, que plantean escenarios novedosos y lleno de oportunidades.

Frente a las nuevas demandas se impone, primero la escucha activa, la lectura interpretativa y la producción de nuevas subjetividades en términos de los nuevos problemas y las nuevas soluciones con las consiguientes promesas.

Intervención

El proceso de intervención consiste en: 1) lectura e interpretación de las demandas 2) caracterización y problematización discursiva 3) descripción de personajes y responsabilidades 4) planteo de promesa-solución.

La problematización de las situaciones e identificación de los personajes resulta esencial porque muchas personas pueden atribuir fenómenos a causas diversas o justificar el status quo problemático.

Responder a las nuevas demandas es construir el discurso, desarrollando un imput de lectura de esas nuevas demandas de los nuevos microsegmentos, para desplegar un output que se constituye en la promesa de nuestra marca política.

Ese discurso debe organizar las percepciones de la realidad, para poder plantear la problematización de la misma.

El Problema

Las realidades en si mismas no constituyen “el problema”, hasta que no se las organiza.

Las demandas no se constituyen en un proceso automático y natural, sino que se definen por la subjetividad enmarcada en los mecanismos primarios de referencia, que nos permiten construirnos una idea clara e inmediata de cómo leer la realidad a través de nuestro encuadre cognitivo (cognitive framing).
No hay un marco, hay una acción de encuadrar, de enmarcar la realidad.

Para intervenir sobre la subjetividad de los sujetos de elección hace falta conectar con su estructura de marcos cognitivos. Si nuestro discurso no esta alineado con los marcos de nuestro público, este lo rechazará o directamente no lo comprenderá, no lo sentirá, no le hará consonancia.

Es por eso que la lectura de las nuevas demandas y la construcción de la narrativa de la marca política adaptada a esas demandas puede y debe intervenir sobre ese encuadre cognitivo.

Esto es; alguien puede pensar que viajar mal en el transporte público es normal, que “es así”. Que los subtes son incómodos. La mirada crítica permitiría pensar que quizás los subtes son incómodos, porque no vienen con la frecuencia que deberían, y no vienen con la frecuencia que deberían porque no hay suficientes vagones, y que no hay suficientes vagones porque no se producen en el país y no hay recursos para importarlos, porque los recursos se gastan en otras cosas, y que si se gastaran en mejorar el transporte público todos podríamos viajar “como seres humanos” en el subte.

Que en un contexto de desempleo altísimo, un despedido puede pensar que el no estuvo a la altura, en un escenario de alta inflación que no se esfuerza para ganar lo suficiente o en una recesión profunda que no tiene habilidades para llevar adelante su pyme.
Alguien podría pensar que es normal que si uno tiene ganas de orinar, estando afuera, es normal tener que aguantarse porque es así, o hay que entrar a un bar, pedir un café e ir al baño. El pensamiento crítico podría llevarlos a pensar que todas las personas tienen la necesidad de orinar y que debería haber baños accesibles y próximos para que la gente orine.

Lo mismo con el acceso a los alimentos a precios posibles (comer hay que comer), a la salud, a la indumentaria, con las condiciones laborales, etc.

Por otra parte, una cosa es necesitar algo y otra es ser consciente de esa necesidad. O desear algo y no ponerlo en el nivel de emergencia, es decir obturar el deseo detrás de justificaciones o narrativas limitantes. Ya sea propias-históricas de falta de merecimiento o aptitud, o externas de la cultura dominante o el clima de época.

Para esto resulta esencial la construcción de nuevos significantes. Hay que ponerle nombre a los problemas y nombre a las soluciones.

El lenguaje es una construcción humana que a la vez construye al ser humano y es el órgano constitutivo del pensamiento de subjetivación, percepción y apropiación de la realidad.

Proceso de problematización

a) Diagnóstico del problema y nominación.

b) Corporización de los actores e intervención de los mismos en el proceso problematizador en términos de causa y efecto

c) Acción, expectativa, solución

El Naming del problema

Hay cosas que existieron siempre: el bullyng, el grooming, las start ups, etc. Pero recién cuando las denominamos, podemos darle entidad y operar sobre ellas en el plano de la realidad. El naming del problema debe constituirse en significante y conectar heterogeneidades diversas para poder ser horizontal, en lugar de "divide y vencerás", decimos, "agrupa y vencerás" el problema debe aglutinar, juntar, hacer confluir

El problema debe tener un nombre, y los actores también.

Instalado el problema en el imaginario y en la agenda, resulta ineludible para todos los sectores de la vida política y social, y los nombres, tanto del problema como de los actores, pasan a ser asumidos por todos los jugadores. De eso se trata la construcción de la hegemonía cultural.

Una vez que las nuevas demandas se problematizaron, hace falta construir la promesa de la marca política, el output.

La construcción de la promesa de marca en función del problema requiere de

1) Innovación

2) Diferenciación

3) Segmentación

Innovación para plantear soluciones disruptivas, novedosas y que no hayan sido implementadas hasta ahora.

Diferenciarse, porque todo lo que no es diferente es invisible. Sino es diferente no hay impacto, no hay mucho lugar para la emoción que impone la novedad, lo desconocido, lo nuevo. No se trata de convencer con viejos argumentos, se trata de vencer emocionalmente con nuevas subjetividades.

Segmentar para hablarle a cada uno y llegarle a cada uno con esas nuevas demandas que definen esos nuevos segmentos.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Subjetividad del discurso y relaciones de poder en el intercambio



Rubén Weinstener



Se le cuestiona a Jakobson la extensión que le da al término código, nosotros preferimos diferenciar: emisor frente a receptor, hablante frente a oyente, locutor frente a alocutario, enunciador frente a enunciatario...

Crítica de este esquema

Podemos señalarle a Jakobson no haber considerado suficientes elementos y no haber intentado hacer un esquema algo más complejo con el fin de que el mapa" se aapte mejor al "territorio*.

Alusión que repite Korzybski y que vale para todo tipo de producción discursiva: "El mapa no es el territorio".

El código


Problema de la homogeneidad del código

Es inexacto, que los dos participantes de la comunicación, hablen exactamente la misma "lengua". "Si ubicamos mil personas delante de mil sillas, declara Pottier, podemos obtener un millón de veces el término silla". Esta observación, señala el hecho de que los signos son necesarios al mismo tiempo que arbitrarios, ya que en el intercambio se juegan relaciones de poder y muy a menudo es el más fuerte quien impone al más débil su propio idiolecto.

Toda palabra quiere decir lo que yo quiero que signifique, pero al mismo tiempo "Toda palabra quiere decir lo que quiere decir", hay un sentido en la lengua.

Hablar es precisamente procurar que coincidan esas dos intenciones, esos dos querer decir.

Llamaremos competencia de un sujeto, a la suma de todas sus posibilidades lingüísticas, al espectro completo de lo que es susceptible de producir y de interpretar.

Llamaremos universo del discurso al siguiente conjunto:
1/ situación de comunicación
2/ limitaciones estilístico-temáticas.

Finalmente proponemos, con respecto al modelo de Jakobson, estos dos principios de enriquecimiento: Las competencias no lingüísticas y paralingüísticas, en las dos esferas del emisor y del receptor, agregamos: sus determinaciones psicológicas y psicoanalíticas, que desempeñan un papel importante en las operaciones de codificación/decodificación.

Sus competencias culturales o enciclopédicas, el conjunto de los conocimientos implícitos que poseen sobre el mundo e ideológicas, el conjunto de los sistemas de interpretación y de evaluación del universo referencial que mantienen con la competencia lingüística relaciones tan estrechas como oscuras y cuya especificidad contribuye todavía más a acentuar las divergencias idiolectales.

REFORMULACIÓN DEL ESQUEMA DE LA COMUNICACIÓN

Presentamos a continuación, tras estos comentarios, la reformulación del esquema de Jakobson que aquí proponemos:



Nos parece imposible disociar las competencias lingüísticas y paralingüísticas (mímica y gestos) en la medida en que, , la comunicación es multidimensional para transmitir las significaciones, los apoyos fonemáticos y paralingüísticos.

La importancia de los comportamientos paraverbales se manifiesta, entre otros, en el hecho de que es la dirección de la mirada del hablante lo que define prioritariamente al oyente en la comunicación oral y aún de manera más decisiva que el empleo del "tú" o "vos" lingüístico.

Llamamos universo del discurso a algo extremadamente complejo y heterogéneo, que abarca: los datos situacionales, y en particular la naturaleza escrita u oral del canal de transmisión, y la organización del espacio comunicacional, objeto de la reflexión proxémica.
Las restricciones temático-retóricas que pesan sobre el mensaje que se va a producir.

Autocriticas


Nos parece que nuestro modelo de la comunicación verbal, al darle un lugar a las otras competencias a las cuales se incorpora la competencia lingüística, y a los diferentes factores que mediatizan la relación lengua/habla y permiten la conversión de una en otra, hace ciertos aportes positivos al modelo de Jakobson.
Pero aún no es más que un esquema- demasiado estático.
Esta presentación no muestra ciertas propiedades características de la comunicación verbal:

La reflexividad: el emisor del mensaje es al mismo tiempo su primer receptor.
La simetría: el mensaje verbal pide generalmente una respuesta, es decir que todo receptor funciona al mismo tiempo como un emisor en potencia, la simetría implica que la respuesta se efectúe con la ayuda del mismo código.

Observación


Nuestro esquema supone que cuando uno habla el otro escucha en silencio y viceversa, es decir que los dos enunciados desempeñan alternativamente los papeles de emisor y receptor. Esta simplificación abusiva es en rigor aceptable en lo que concierne a los comportamientos verbales propiamente dichos en los que tal situación suele ser la más normal.

La complejidad de las instancias emisora y receptora


Esta presentación sólo da cuenta del caso más simple, y más raro, de la comunicación:
el de la comunicación dual (cara a cara).

El destinatario o alocutario (que puede ser singular o plural, real o ficticio), se define por el hecho de que es explícitamente considerado por el emisor L (lo que atestigua el empleo del pronombre de segunda persona y/o la dirección de la mirada) como su compañero en la relación de alocución. Por lo tanto, las operaciones de codificación están parcialmente determinadas por la imagen de ellas que se construye .

El amisor puede preocuparse, por la presencia en el circuito de la comunicación de destinatarios indirectos que, sin estar integrados en la relación de alocución, funcionan como "testigos" del intercambio verbal e influyen a veces en él de manera decisiva (ejemplos de chistes, discursos políticos, etc.).

Finalmente, en todo mensaje existen receptores adicionales y aleatorios, cuya interpretación del mensaje el emisor no se podrá prever, pero uno puede estar preparado para ser mal interpretado.

1) En este esquema el emisor y el receptor se enfrentan y sus esferas respectivas son como dos burbujas impermeables que se cuidan bien de intersectarse.

Todo receptor es al mismo tiempo un emisor en potencia, y que en la competencia cultural de los dos miembros de la comunicación es necesario incorporar la imagen que se forman de ellos mismos, que se hacen del otro y la que se imaginan que el otro se hace de ellos: no se habla de un destinatario real, sino a aquello que se cree saber de él, mientras que el destinatario decodifica el mensaje en función de lo que él cree saber del emisor.

Los dos interlocutores no se contentan con tomar por turno la palabra, teniendo en cuenta las imágenes que se han formado el uno del otro; hay una modificación recíproca de los protagonistas del discurso a medida que se desarrrolla lo que ciertos teóricos denominan como "interacción", donde también juegan los esquemas y relaciones de poder

Las competencias se interseccionan cuando tienden a adaptarse una a la otra en el curso del intercambio verbal, cada una modelando su propio código sobre el que, según se presume, posee el otro.

La comunicación se basa en este ajuste más o menos logrado, de los sistemas de referencia de los dos enunciadores.

2) la ideología, es un sistema de contenidos que se manifiesta en toda clase de comportamientos semiológicos, está en todas partes, sobretodo en contenidos lingüísticos.

3) el status del referente es complejo. Es exterior al mensaje pero envuelve a la comunicación. Éste se refleja en la competencia ideológica y cultural de los sujetos, es decir, en el conjunto de conocimientos que poseen y de representaciones que se han construido de él.

4) el canal es el soporte de los significantes, soportes éstos a su vez de las significaciones.
Al mismo tiempo funciona como un filtro suplementario sobre las elecciones lingüísticas.
La naturaleza del mensaje varía con la del soporte.

5) el universo del discurso incluye los datos situacionales y restricciones del género. Sus límtes son borrosos.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Latino voters’ interest in presidential race is mixed, and about half are ‘extremely motivated’ to vote

Latino voters are less likely than all U.S. voters to say they are extremely motivated to vote in the upcoming presidential election, with the Latino electorate expressing less interest overall in the presidential campaigns.


About half of Latino registered voters (54%) say they are extremely motivated to vote this year, compared with two-thirds of U.S. voters overall (69%). Meanwhile, a lower share of Latino voters (58%) than U.S. voters (69%) say they have given a lot of thought to the candidates. And compared with U.S. voters, a slightly lower share of Latino voters say it really matters who wins, 73% vs. 78%. In 2016, Latino voters also reported lower levels of interest in the election and in voting than U.S. voters overall.

A record 32 million Hispanics are projected to be eligible to vote in 2020, making up 13% of all U.S. eligible voters and exceeding for the first time the number of Black eligible voters in a presidential election. (Explore our interactive maps and tables to see Latino eligible voters by state and congressional district.)


How we did this


To explore Hispanic voter engagement in this year’s presidential election, we surveyed 11,929 U.S. adults, including 1,347 Hispanic registered voters, from Sept. 30 to Oct. 5, 2020. Everyone who took part is a member of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

A record number of Americans have voted before Election Day, and it is possible overall U.S. voter turnout will reach historically high levels in 2020. Latinos have typically voted at lower rates than U.S. voters overall. In 2016, 48% of Latino eligible voters said they voted, a similar share to 2012 and lower than the 61% of all U.S. eligible voters who cast a ballot four years ago. (Eligible voters are adult U.S. citizens, whether registered to vote or not.)


Engagement varies among some groups of Hispanics who are registered to vote. College graduates are more likely than those with some college education or less to say they are extremely motivated to vote (68% vs. 50%), have given a lot of thought to the presidential candidates (71% vs. 54%) and that it really matters who wins (80% vs. 71%).

Higher shares of Latino registered voters ages 50 and older than those 18 to 49 are extremely motivated to vote (65% vs. 48%), have given a lot of thought to the presidential candidates (68% vs. 52%) and say it really matters who wins (80% vs. 68%). These differences by age are also seen among all U.S. voters.

 

Rubén Wensteiner


Microsegmentación definida por variables blandas en el voto joven: lo que los jóvenes hacen más que lo que son




Por Rubén Weinsteiner


Los segmentos constituidos por variables blandas se ordenan como el resultado de una articulación de demandas. Las personas demandan cosas y los que demandan las mismas cosas se agrupan funcionalmente en microsegmentos auqnue sean muy diferentes entre sí, determinando cruces a veces disrutptivos, que plantean escenarios novedosos y lleno de oportunidades.

Cambia, todo cambia

Los sujetos de elección jóvenes son volubles y esperan grandes cambios. Los sujetos jóvenes siempre esperan que algo ocurra, que algo cambie, que los represente, sentir consonancia emocional e intelectual y poder identificarse.

Esos cambios esperados, articuados en imágenes, se constituyen en la demandas que los ordenan como microsegmento, y se satisfacen con ideas y emociones que asumen el rol de promesa y perspectiva de futuro de la marca política.

La imagen es a la vez un recuerdo, un deseo y una anticipación (Joseph H. Smith, Duelo e historicidad humana)

Esa imagen-demanda es una re-creación de una satisfacción pasada, vivenciada o no, siempre deseada y añorada, ahora nuevamente querida y anticipada.
Reason why

El sistema de preferencias en el #votojoven no se articula por la autopista prometida, sino por la perspectiva planteada de cómo se van a sentir los votantes con la autopista construida. La autopista sirve para más gente visite tu ciudad, poder visitar nosotros más lugares, estar más cerca, ir más a lugares más rápido, para llegar más temprano a jugar con tu hijo, para conseguir otro trabajo más lejos, aumentar las ventas, que un hotel se llene, que hermanos se vean más, que visites mas a amigos, padres etc.

El que y el para que

Nunca confundir el qué, con el para qué. La emoción del reason why (para qué), se constituye en atajo cognitivo vía imagen traducida en perspectiva emocional, para fundamentar la promesa de la marca política

Los jóvenes demandan cosas de un poder determinado, y ese poder determinado no puede absorber todas las demandas de un segmento. Y los jóvenes requieren un poder que satisfaga todas sus demandas, por lo tanto esos poderes no puede constituirse en una contrapartida coherente de esos segmentos. La demanda requiere la totalización y como no la encuentra en un solo segmento se parte, pidiéndole las mismas cosas a diferentes poderes.

Los segmentos jóvenes comienzan a atomizarse y cruzarse, porque le piden cosas similares a diferentes poderes. Algunos le piden al gobierno nacional, otros al provincial, o a la iglesia, a los sindicatos, a las organizaciones ambientales, a la oposición, al tercer sector, a la justicia, a los sindicatos, a las auutoridades de la universidad, club, etc.

Este es el mecanismo que determina la constitución de microsegmentos cruzados definidos por variables blandas.

Microsegmentación definida por variables blandas

En ningún sector se observa tan claramente la dinámica de la microsegmentación como hacia el interior del #votojoven. Porque los jóvenes, son más flexibles, adoptan nuevos intereses, cambian, se enamoran más fácilmente y más rápido, se sienten parte de nuevos colectivos ipso facto, se juntan, se agregan, se separan, se vuelven a agregar, se comprometen mucho más rápido que los mayores.

El nuevo escenario impone microsegmentar al interior del voto joven por variables blandas (focos de pertenencia, pertinencia e interés tribal), no tanto por variables duras (edad, años de escolaridad, lugar de residencia, religión), es decir, por lo que los jóvenes hacen más que por lo que los jóvenes son.

El joven quiere ser parte de algo, revelar y ejercer pertenencia y pertinencia, compromiso hacia una agrupación, entorno de un grupo musical, de una tribu urbana, de un grupo de amigos, barra, banda, club, tribu de seguidores, fieles, creyentes, etc.

La cultura que viene propone una microsegmentación transversal, donde se cruzan los microsegmentos y agrupan a personas diferentes a través de diversos aglutinadores , y los ponen en escenarios diferentes a los protagonizados por la generación de sus padres.

Cuando microsegmentamos, más que pensar en lo que decimos debemos enfocarnos en a quien se lo decimos. La microsegmentación por variables blandas debe objetivar lo que los jóvenes hacen, lo que demandan y a quien se lo demandan, para poder interpelar , impactar y acumular con eficacia en el microsegmento objetivo.

En el voto joven, los microsegmentos, los colectivos, las tribus y las agregaciones, se despliegan en forma transversal, priorizando el deseo, por sobre la necesidad. La marca política como intermediaria debe legitimar esos deseos y hacerse cargo de los mismos. El sistema de preferencias en el #votojoven se resuelve por emoción y deseo, mas que por utilidad y necesidad.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Large Shares of Voters Plan To Vote a Straight Party Ticket for President, Senate and House

Some races do not include candidates of both major parties (for example, a few districts in California have two Democratic and no Republican candidates). Excluding these handful of races where there are not two major party candidates running does not meaningfully impact the conclusions of this report, but they have been included in the analyses presented here.

Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addressees. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.




In an era of increasing partisanship, split-ticket voting continues to be rare in U.S. politics. With control of the Senate at stake on Nov. 3, just 4% of registered voters in states with a Senate contest say they will support Donald Trump or Joe Biden and a Senate candidate from the opposing party.

In voting for both the House and Senate, partisanship prevails. About eight-in-ten of voters (78%) say they will vote (or already have voted) for either Biden and the Democratic House of Representatives candidate (43% of all voters) or Trump and the Republican candidate (35% of all voters) in their congressional district.

Only 4% of registered voters say they plan to vote for Biden and the Republican candidate for House in their district or Donald Trump and the Democratic House candidate. This is little changed from four years ago. It is more common for voters to say they plan to vote for a third-party candidate for president (or less commonly, for the House) and a major-party candidate for the other race. Still, only 6% of voters say they plan to cast their ballots this way.

Similarly, among those living in states with Senate races, the largest share of voters say they plan to vote for both Biden and the Democratic Senate candidate (42%) or Trump and the Republican Senate candidate (38%) in their state. A recent analysis of U.S. Senate elections since 2012 shows how rare it is for a Senate race to go a different way from a state’s votes in presidential elections. In 139 regular and special elections for the Senate since 2012, 88% have been won by candidates from the same party that won that state’s most recent presidential contest.

This analysis of split-ticket voting is based on Pew Research Center’s recent national survey, conducted Sept. 30 to Oct. 5 among 11,929 U.S. adults, including 10,543 registered voters in which Biden garners support from 52% of registered voters and Trump is supported by 42%. The survey used information about respondents’ locations to present survey-takers with the names of the candidates running in each congressional race.
Modest demographic differences in split-ticket voting

Majorities of every major demographic group in the electorate are voting for the same party’s candidate in the presidential election and the congressional election in their district. The share of voters in any major demographic group that casts a ballot for both a Republican and a Democratic candidate in these elections is usually less than 5% across major demographic groups.

Straight-ticket voting mirrors presidential voting patterns. Men are more likely than women to vote for Republican candidates in both the House and presidential elections, while women are more likely to support Democratic candidates in both.

White voters are substantially more likely than voters of other racial and ethnic backgrounds to vote for Republican candidates in both the congressional and presidential elections.

The share of voters casting a straight-ticket Republican ballot in these elections increases steadily with age. Only 22% of Gen Z voters are voting this way, compared with nearly half (47%) of Silent Generation voters.

Gen Z and Millennial voters are also more likely than voters in older generations to support third- or fourth-party candidates for president; 13% of Gen Z voters favor non-major party candidates for either House or president, as do 9% of Millennial voters. Thus, larger shares of voters in these generations split their votes for president and the House. But just 3% of Gen Z voters and 4% of Millennials favor Biden and a Republican House candidate or Trump and a Democrat. That is comparable to the shares of older voters who divide preferences on a partisan basis in voting for president and the House.

Voters with a bachelor’s degree or more education are much more likely to vote a straight Democratic ticket in these races than are those with less education. There is no relationship between education and Republican-Democratic split-ticket voting; equal shares of voters (4%) across different levels of educational attainment vote this way.

Lower-engagement voters – those who say they have given less than “a lot” of thought to the presidential race – are more likely than others to split their tickets between the Republican and Democratic candidates in the presidential and congressional elections in their districts, though it is still very uncommon (6% of lower-engagement voters vs. 3% of those who are paying a lot of attention to the race).

These lower-engagement voters are much more likely to support minor-party candidates in either the presidential race or the congressional race in their district (14% of those who are paying less than “some” attention to the race vs. 5% of those who are paying “a lot” of attention).

Among all registered voters, Democrats hold an edge in congressional elections, with 46% of voters saying they will vote (or have already voted) for the Democratic candidate in their district and 40% saying they support the Republican candidate. About one-in-ten voters (11%) are not sure whom they will support.

Trump voters and Biden voters overwhelmingly say they support the same party’s candidate for the congressional race in their district (83% of each say they will support a candidate of the same party). Voters who support minor-party candidates for president are about evenly divided in their vote for the House of Representatives (29% support the Democrat and 31% support the Republican).

Trump supporters and Biden supporters living in districts with an opposite-party incumbent are slightly more likely to split their tickets than those living in districts with a same-party incumbent or an open-seat contest. Trump supporters in districts with Democratic incumbents and Biden supporters in districts with Republican incumbents are also more likely than those with same-party incumbents to say they are undecided in the congressional race.

Overall in states where there is a Senate contest, support for Senate candidates is roughly evenly divided. The share of voters supporting the Democratic candidate (45%) in their state is similar to the share supporting the Republican candidate (43%), and 8% of voters say they aren’t sure at this point whom they will support.

Similar to the elections for the House of Representatives, overwhelming shares of voters who are supporting Trump (88%) and Biden (84%) say they are also supporting the same-party candidate for Senate, while those who are supporting a minor-party candidate are more divided (27% support the Democratic candidate in their state and 35% support the Republican candidate).

Unlike in the House elections, there is less evidence that incumbency has any effect on split-ticket voting in these higher-profile Senate races.

El #DiscursoDePoder de la #MarcaPolítca en tiempos de crisis



Rubén Weinsteiner


Discurso de poder

El discurso político debe organizar las percepciones que queremos construir en la cabeza de la gente. Esas percepciones tienen que ver con la valoración y ponderación de la realidad y con el posicionamiento de nuestra marca política.

El Poder es la potencialidad de acción. Es una construcción que consiste en una percepción que determine que A puede hacer x.

El discurso político tiene tres tipos de destinatarios básicos:

a) El co destinatario: el militante, el convencido
b) El para destinatario: el sujeto sobre el cual pretendemos colonizar subjetividades.
c) El contra destinatario: el adversario político-ideológico, el competidor electoral.

Los tres grupos deben ser micro segmentados para poder intervenir de manera precisa y quirúrgica.

El discurso de poder, es decir la construcción de la percepción de un determinado problem y la construcción de la percepción de que podemos hacer algo determinado para resolverlo tiene características específicas para cada uno de estos tres grupos.
Mientras para el primero, el militante la percepción debe tener más mística, religiosidad y compromiso, con para el destinatario se impone una intervención que lea la cancha del otro, sus percepciones y pueda intervenir desde sus presupuestos y paradigmas emocionales. En el caso del tercer grupo, el antagonista es usado basicamente para afirmar lo que uno no es, por lo tanto es distinto a. La visibilidad comienza en la diferencia y la identidad se consolida a partir de ella.

Reset

Cuando tiene lugar una crisis profunda, económica, social o política, o las tres juntas, se produce un reseteo en términos de los sistemas de preferencias.

El 2001 fue un reset profundo. Votantes que jamás hubieran votado por el peronismo, se hicieron kirchneristas, y hoy no imaginan votar a alguien no peronista. Progres que veían a Macri como un límite, se hicieron macristas, el espacio público se volvió a poblar de actores, los jóvenes volvieron a la política.

Estos contextos constituyen un escenario ideal para marcas políticas innovadoras.

Las demandas se renuevan y resignifican, por eso hace falta segmentar por variables blandas, por pertinencia y pertenencia, no tanto por lo que la gente es, sino por lo que hace, lo que le interesa, lo que la motiva, lo que desea.

Esta segmentación etnográfica 4.0 se ve potenciada por la big data, y nos permite intervenir como nunca con un discurso de poder potente.

Responder a las demandas es construir el discurso.

Desarrollar un imput de lectura de esas nuevas demandas de los segmentos determinados por la estrategia y desplegar un discurso de promesa de output que se constituye en el reason why de nuestra marca política.

Ese discurso debe organizar las percepciones de la realidad, para poder plantear la problematización de la misma.

Las realidades en si mismas no constituyen “el problema”, hasta que no se las organiza.

Que haya una caída fuerte del salario, crezca el desempleo, cierren pymes, la inflación de devore el poder adquisitivo del salario o un la recesión destruye la actividad, no hace que la gente salga a la calle o vote contra alguien per se.

Quizás un gobierno logre que la población culpe a la pesada herencia, o a la corrupción o que pasaron cosas, o a la mala suerte por estos hechos.

La atribución del significado reptiliano-emocional a hechos objetivos no es unívoca. Y esa interpretación es el campo de batalla por la subjetividad.

Esa subjetividad consiste en lograr el insight del sujeto de elección sobre los mecanismos de causa-efecto de políticas y problemáticas, aún las no tipificadas.

El proceso de construcción del reason why del problema es:

a) Diagnóstico del problema y nominación.

b) Corporización de los actores e intervención de los mismos en el proceso problematizador en términos de causa y efecto

c) Acción, expectativa, solución

El Naming del problema

Hay cosas que existieron siempre: el bullyng, el grooming, las start ups, etc. Pero recién cuando las denominamos, podemos darle entidad y operar sobre ellas en el plano de la realidad. El naming del problema debe constituirse en significante y conectar heterogeneidades diversas para poder ser horizontal, en lugar de "divide y vencerás", decimos, "agrupa y vencerás" el problema debe aglutinar, juntar, hacer confluir

El problema debe tener un nombre, y los actores también.

Instalado el problema en el imaginario y en la agenda, resulta ineludible para todos los sectores de la vida política y social, y los nombres, tanto del problema como de los actores, pasan a ser asumidos por todos los jugadores. De eso se trata la hegemonía cultural.

Esto se da cuando un diario de derecha liberal habla de "capitalismo salvaje" o cuando le preguntaban a Margaret Tatcher, sobre cuál había sido el mayor logro de su gobierno y respondió: Tony Blair (teniendo en cuenta que Blair representaba a la izquierda laborista, pero compartía los presupuestos del liberalismo económico).

Hay un problema, no es producto de los desastres naturales o que pasaron cosas, o culpa de otro, hay causas y responsables, hay soluciones.

Un ejemplo claro lo constituye "La Guerra del gas" en Bolivia. Durante muchos años Bolivia tuvo una grieta de 3 sectores: los europeos, los indigenas, la izquierda mestiza. Ninguno confiaba en el otro, los europeos de Santa Cruz veían a los otros 2 grupos como atrasados, los indigenas se sentían discriminados e invadidos por los europeos y rechazaban el socialismo del MAS, porque entre los aymarás y los quechuas la propiedad privada era un pilar fundamental. Los socialistas rechazaban a los europeos por racistas y a los indigenas por no aceptar el socialismo.

En 2002 Evo Morales hizo el primer intento de juntar por primera vez a los indigenas y a la izquerda y obtuvo el 20% de los votos. Pero el salto lo dio en 2003 con la llamada "Guerra del gas", ahi encontró el significante aglutinador y lo dotó de significados, para juntar a todos los opositores con "El gas no se vende". De un lado quedaron los que querían privatizar el gas y del otro lado los que querían nacionalizarlo. Tres años más tarde Evo llegaría al poder con otro significante aglutinador "Viva la Coca". Un significante que planteaba lo autóctono contra las imposiciones de EE.UU. con la guerra contra los cultivos de Coca. A partir de allí la lucha por la construcción del problema, y la construcción del significante aglutinador la dieron los europeos, que plantearon la lucha contra "la dictadura" "el centralismo" "el atraso", planteando el autonomismo como solución al problema y promesa de marca política.

La respuesta de Evo fue construir "el pueblo indigena contra la derecha transnacional y traidora" y sancionar después de un referéndum una nueva constitución con tres pilares:

1) Estado plurinacional (integración, legitimación y reivindicación de los indigenas)

2) Estado soberano (lucha contra las multinacionales)

3) Estado autonómico ( con esto les robó uno de los reason whys a los europeos)

Con el último punto golpeó fuerte a la oposición.

Hoja de ruta
1) Construcción de "el problema"
2) Agrupación de realidades heterogéneas en torno al significante
3) Naming
4) Actores
5)Solución

La construcción del "problema" es el paso más estratégico en la construcción del discurso.
El imput en el discurso y la construcción del output transformado en "reason why" es la diferencia entre comunicar y construir una marca política, es decir, es la diferencia entre que vos quieras lo que yo tengo y que yo tenga lo que vos querés.

El discurso de poder es organizar las percepciones en función de que la gente sienta, crea, esté convencida que A puede hacer x. 


Rubén Weinsteiner

Latino voters have growing confidence in Biden on key issues, while confidence in Trump remains low

As Election Day nears, Hispanic registered voters in the United States express growing confidence in Joe Biden’s ability to handle key issues like the coronavirus outbreak, with women and college graduates especially confident. By contrast, Hispanics’ views of Donald Trump on major issues are largely negative and mostly unchanged from June. These views of the 2020 presidential candidates come as most Hispanic voters continue to hold bleak views of the nation and its economy after months of widespread job losses and illness due to COVID-19, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted Sept. 30-Oct. 5.


About two-thirds of Latino registered voters say they are somewhat or very confident in Biden to tackle five issues asked about in October, with confidence in Biden higher on every issue since June. The share with confidence in Biden to handle the public health impact of the coronavirus outbreak is up 8 percentage points, 71% in October vs. 62% in June. The largest increase – 15 points – came on confidence in Biden’s ability to bring the country closer together, a margin of 70% vs. 55%. Meanwhile, 66% have confidence in Biden to make good decisions about economic policy, up from 58% who said so in June. In an earlier survey this summer, Latino voters said the economy, health care and the coronavirus outbreak were three of the most important issues to their vote for president.

U.S. registered voters overall also express growing confidence on Biden on these issues, though the increases were more modest and confidence was lower than among Latino voters. For example, 57% of U.S. voters say they have confidence in Biden to handle the public health impact of the coronavirus outbreak, up from 52% in June.


How we did this


Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans view the upcoming 2020 presidential election and the presidential candidates. For this analysis, we surveyed 11,929 U.S. adults, including 1,347 Hispanic registered voters, during the last week of September and the first week of October 2020. The survey was in the field when Trump announced, early on the morning of Oct. 2, that he and first lady Melania Trump had contracted COVID-19.

Estimates of Hispanic eligible voters in battleground states are based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2018 American Community Survey provided through Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the University of Minnesota.

Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.


Latino voters have significantly less confidence in Trump on these issues. Fewer than half say they are somewhat or very confident that he can handle the five issues, with views on most largely unchanged since summer. Only about three-in-ten Latino voters (29%) say they are confident that Trump can handle the health impact of the coronavirus outbreak. A higher share (44%) are confident that Trump can make good decisions about economic policy. Notably, a declining share of Latino voters say they have confidence that the president can bring the country closer together – 20% in October, down from 28% in June.

Among all U.S. voters, confidence in Trump on these issues is also mostly unchanged, though Americans overall have more confidence in the president than Latino voters. Four-in-ten U.S. registered voters (40%) say they have confidence in Trump to handle the health impact of COVID-19, and 30% have confidence that Trump can bring the country closer together. These shares are little changed from June.

A record 32 million Hispanics are projected to be eligible to vote in 2020, a total that for the first time exceeds the number of Black eligible voters in a presidential election. Hispanic voter turnout has historically lagged that of other groups, though turnout spiked among Hispanics and other groups for the 2018 midterms and approached levels normally seen during presidential election years. Even so, Hispanics made up only 8% of all voters in 2018, compared with 10% in 2016. (Explore our interactive maps and tables to see Latino eligible voters by state and congressional district.)
Biden leads among Hispanic voters


Biden holds a 34-point advantage over Trump among Latino eligible voters, far larger than Biden’s 10-point lead among all U.S. voters. In the new survey, 63% of Latino voters say they would vote for Biden or lean toward voting for him if the election were held today, while 29% say they would vote for Trump or lean toward voting for him. In 2016, Latino voters had similar preferences, according to exit polls and a Pew Research Center study of validated voters.

Among Hispanic voters, a higher share of college graduates than those with some college experience or less say they favor Biden, 69% vs. 61%. Meanwhile, 67% of Hispanic women voters and 59% of registered Hispanic men say they prefer Biden.

More Latino voters who support Biden say their choice is more of a vote against Trump than it is a vote for Biden, 59% vs. 40%.

At the same time, Hispanic voters who back Biden are sure about their choice, with 86% saying they are certain they will vote for him – similar to the share among all U.S. voters who support Biden. However, only 57% of Hispanic voters who prefer Biden say they are extremely motivated to vote, a lower share than among the 72% of Biden supporters nationwide.
Hispanic voters in battleground states


Biden holds a narrower lead over Trump (54% vs. 37%) among Latino registered voters in nine “battleground” states – Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.

Stronger Hispanic support for Trump in battleground states reflects the group’s large population in Florida, where Cuban Americans have helped shape a Hispanic electorate that leans more Republican than Hispanic voters nationwide.

The nine battleground states together have more than 6.3 million Hispanic eligible voters – defined as adult U.S. citizens – and Florida alone (3.1 million) accounts for half of the total. The next largest state is Arizona, with nearly 1.2 million Hispanic eligible voters. In both states, Hispanics make up a fifth or more of all eligible voters – 20% in Florida and 24% in Arizona.

The remaining battleground states, with a combined 2 million Hispanic eligible voters, have smaller but still notable Hispanic electorates. For example, Pennsylvania (521,000), Michigan (261,000) and Wisconsin (183,000) each have sizable numbers of Hispanic eligible voters that can play a role in swinging close elections. In 2016, the presidential contests in these states were decided by a combined total of 77,744 votes.
Impact of COVID-19 on Hispanics

The coronavirus has disproportionately harmed the personal finances of Hispanics, with Hispanic women experiencing the largest job losses of any racial or ethnic group, regardless of gender. About half of Hispanics (53%) say they or someone in their household has been laid off or taken a pay cut because of COVID-19, compared with 42% of all U.S. adults. Since the outbreak started in February, significant shares of Hispanics say they have used money from savings or retirement funds to pay bills (43%), had trouble paying bills (37%), gotten food from a food bank (30%) or had problems paying their rent or mortgage (26%).

Latinos have also experienced disproportionate health impacts from COVID-19. As of mid-August, about one-in-five Latino adults (22%) said they have had a positive coronavirus test (7%) or were “pretty sure” they have had it (15%). By contrast, 14% of all U.S. adults said they have had a positive test (3%) or were pretty sure they have had the virus (11%).


In the new survey, the Hispanic voter groups most confident that Biden can handle the public health impact of the coronavirus outbreak include women (80%) and college graduates (79%). By contrast, lower shares of Hispanic male voters (61%) and Hispanic voters with some college education or less (68%) say they are somewhat or very confident in Biden.

Hispanic voters have far less confidence in Trump’s ability to handle COVID-19, though there are some differences by education. Especially low shares of Hispanic voters who are college graduates (22%) say they have confidence in Trump to handle the public health impact of the coronavirus outbreak, compared with 31% of those with some college education or less. Meanwhile, 26% of Hispanic women voters and 33% of Hispanic male voters have confidence in Trump to handle the outbreak.
Few Latinos view the economy as good, although there is optimism for the future


Roughly three-in-ten Latino registered voters (29%) rate economic conditions in the country as excellent or good, up from 20% in June, but lower than the 35% of all U.S. voters who say so. For Latino voters, the share remains far below the 49% who gave a positive rating to U.S. economic conditions in January, about two months before President Trump declared a national emergency on March 13 due to COVID-19.

Hispanic male voters have a more positive view of the nation’s economy than Hispanic women voters, 34% vs. 23%. Differences also exist by education among Hispanic voters, with 31% of those with some college education or less rating the economy as excellent or good, compared with 22% of college graduates.

Among Biden supporters, only 14% of Latino voters rate the U.S. economy as excellent or good.

Hispanics have some optimism about the future of the economy. About half of Hispanic voters (53%) say they expect economic conditions will be better a year from now, while 30% say conditions will be about the same and 16% say they will worsen.

Older Hispanics have more optimism on this measure than younger Hispanics. About six-in-ten (60%) Hispanic voters ages 50 and older say U.S. economic conditions will be better a year from now, compared with about half (48%) of Hispanic voters ages 18 to 49. Somewhat similar shares of men (57%) and women (49%) among Hispanic voters say economic conditions will have improved in a year. There was no difference by education levels among Hispanic voters, with about half of college graduates and those with some college experience or less saying the economic conditions will be better in a year.
Most Latino voters say they are ‘fearful’ about the state of the nation


Roughly two-thirds of Latino registered voters (68%) say they are fearful about the state of the nation. Meanwhile, 45% of Latino voters say they are hopeful. These views are similar to those reported in June, and similar to those among U.S. voters overall. Latino voters across demographic groups express similar levels of fear when thinking about the state of the country. By contrast, levels of hope for the country among Latino voters vary by gender and education levels.

About half of Hispanic men registered to vote (51%) say they feel hopeful about the state of the country, compared with only 36% of Hispanic women voters. Meanwhile, 37% of Hispanic voters with a bachelor’s degree or more say the feel hopeful, while 47% of Hispanic voters with some college experience or less say the same.

Among Biden supporters, 79% of Latino voters say they feel fearful about the state of the country. Meanwhile, 36% say they feel hopeful.

Latinos voters also had negative views about the nation’s direction. Only one-in-five (21%) say they are satisfied with the way things are going in the country today, a similar share to June (19%) but down from 32% in December 2019.

El diálogo emocional con los refractarios posibles


Rubén Weinsteiner


La era 4.0 en general, y las redes sociales en particular profundizaron los esquemas relacionales endogámicos. Por lo general las personas que seguimos en Instagram, nuestros amigos en Facebook y los que seguimos en Twitter, piensan parecido a nosotros. Este proceso tuvo diferentes etapas que desde lo micro podemos plantear como conflictos de resolución difícil, agresiones, toma de posiciones duras, bloqueos e interrupción de relaciones, lo que fue determinando sistemas sociales homogeneos con retroalimentación de creencias, endurecimiento de posturas, y profundización de convicciones y distancias con campamentos antagónicos.

Este esquema grietario, cuyos correlatos vemos en los resultados electorales, en los grupos de whats app, en las oficinas o en los asados, hizo que nuestros dialogos sean cada vez con los propios, con los convencidos, con los que validan y confirman nuestros marcos de referencia.

Se trata de audiencias redundantes que endurecen adhesiones y lealtades pero no cazan fuera del zoológico, no suman ni acumulan por afuera de lo que ya se tiene.

En las matrices de representación actuales, no se gana una elección por diferencias holgadas, por lo general lo que vemos, son sociedades partidas en dos con un esquema grietario fuerte como el caso de EE.UU., Brasil o Argentina o a lo sumo en tres como en España, y donde las victorias se dan diferencias cada vez más pequeñas.

En este escenario cada voto cuenta como nunca, estamos a un cuñado, un vecino, un compañero de trabajo de ganar una elección.

Para salir afuera, ver el sol y abordar a los no propios hace falta, despejar miedos, odios y boicots, desplgar templanza y empatía, curiosidad en lugar de enojo (Curious but no furious), en definitiva, dejar a la gente terminar las frases y no saltarle encima. Escuchar. Entender demandas que aún no fueron verbalizadas, para proponerle a la gente cosas que ni ellos se dijeron a si mismos, o ni siquiera saben, que quieren.

Resulta poco eficaz desde el punto de vista de la economía de fuerzas intentar abordar al núcleo duro del otro campamento. Trump suele jactarse que su voto duro no cambiaría el voto, por más que el se parara la quinta avenida y se pusiera a dispararle a la gente. Podríamos decir que lo que lo rechazan profundamente, no modificarán su sentir en ningún escenario. El núcleo duro no cambia, por eso no hay que perder tiempo. Los núcleos de adhesión son como capas de cebolla, las mas superficiales son abordables, las del centro no. Resulta clave descomponer el voto no propio blando en microsegmentos ponderados por particularidades específicas, que permitan definir cursos de acción diferenciales y específicos.

Hay que identificar la abordabilidad de los diferentes segmentos. Que “cuñado” es más permeable. El abordaje debe desplegarse en el 5/10% que no revela posicionamientos adquiridos, el segmento más fluctuante, el menos politizado y el más lábil.

Las lealtades, adhesiones, rechazos, amores y odios hacia una marca política, no se constituyen en un proceso automático y natural, de condición y reacción, sino que se definen por la subjetividad enmarcada en los mecanismos primarios de referencia, que nos permiten construirnos una idea clara e inmediata de cómo percibir, leer, sentir y organizar percepciones acerca de la realidad a través de nuestro encuadre cognitivo (cognitive framing).

El discurso de la marca política debe reconocer con vocación de inmersión acrítica los marcos cognitivos de los diferentes públicos, revelar empatía por los drivers de esos marcos cognitivos, y apropiarse de los mismos, leer miedos y demandas y problematizar para proponer, convocar, validar y esperanzar. Intervenir y comprometer desde el discurso al sujeto de elección con una perspectiva de un futuro distinto, mejor y alineado con las demandas latentes de los marcos cognitivos y que de soluciones a los mismos desde lugares nuevos.

Curioso y no furioso

La dinámica de intervención de la subjetividad es compleja. Hay que asumir que ese encuadre determina un universo de sentidos que puede producirnos incomodidad, rechazo entre un repertorio de sentimientos.

Lo primero es cambiar el chip de la furia a la curiosidad. Porque esta persona odia lo que para mi es bueno? Si me cambio de lugar quizás lo vea diferente? Como puede defender lo que para mi es indefendible? Son preguntas esenciales e inevitables si queremos intervenir sobre la subjetividad del “cuñado”.

Se trata de dejar de “hablar entre nosotros”, dejar de ver quien es más nosotros que el otro y hablar con el otro. Que 50 militantes puristas endogámicos se conviertan en 50 evangelizadores

La dinámica del one to one, a diferencia del one to many, permite leer las reacciones, modificar, hacer rapport, manejar los tiempos y convocar emocionalmente en forma intensa a una persona y fijar un anclaje.

Secta o Iglesia

Hay dos diferencias entre una secta y una iglesia.

Ante todo el pragamtismo y después la voluntad de sumar y no encerrarse.

Para ser iglesia y no secta hace falta abordar de manera eficaz a los posibles no propios, no con la idea convencer, sino de vencer emocionalmente.

¿Cómo?

No hay un marco, hay una acción de encuadrar, de enmarcar la realidad. El marco es nada, enmarcar es todo.
Si nuestro discurso no esta alineado con los marcos de nuestro público, este lo rechazará o directamente no lo comprenderá, no lo sentirá, no le hará consonancia.

1) Escuchar: absorber, dejar venir, no cortar, dejar que el otro pueda descargar su energía basada en el rechazo, que es miedo encubierto.

2) Conceder y acordar: reconocer, aceptar fallos y debilidades, no fijar certezas, sino sembrar dudas. Disolver el miedo. Al abordar microsegmentos de resistencia blanda, ese miedo es también blando, abordable y sensible a intervenciones. Empatía, curioso y no furioso para asumir el miedo del otro y entender el significado funcional del prejuicio e internalizar para intervenir. El otro no nos odia, sólo tiene miedo, y eso tiene solución.

3) Resignificar: poner en crisis y otorgar nuevos significados y anclajes, plantear un compromiso compartido, de suerte común. Estamos todos arriba del mismo barco. Insight: en comunicación política, lo único que no podemos decir, es aquello que queremos decir, el otro tiene que hacer el click

Rubén Weinsteiner

Trump, Biden Supporters Divided in Views of 2020 Election Process – and Whether It Will Be Clear Who Won


A ballot drop-off box outside a Los Angeles library on Oct. 5.

A large majority of voters say it is important for Americans to know who won the presidential election within a day or two of Election Day. But just half say they are very or somewhat confident that this will happen, including nearly identical shares who support Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

Trump and Biden supporters have deep disagreements over several other aspects of the election and voting process – including whether it will be clear which candidate won even after all the votes are counted. About three-quarters of registered voters who support Biden (76%) are confident that the country will know the winner of the presidential election after all the votes are counted, including 30% who are very confident.

A much smaller majority of Trump supporters (55%) are confident that Americans will have a clear sense of who won, with just 13% saying they are very confident the winner will be clearly known after all the votes are counted.

The new survey by Pew Research Center, conducted Sept. 30-Oct. 5 among 11,929 U.S. adults, including 10,543 registered voters, finds that Trump and Biden supporters also have very different views of the impact of the coronavirus outbreak on the safety of voting in the Nov. 3 presidential election. Among all registered voters, 79% say they are very or somewhat confident that in-person voting places will be run safely, without spreading the coronavirus. But just a third are very confident that the coronavirus will not be spread at in-person voting sites.

Majorities of both Trump (91%) and Biden supporters (70%) are at least somewhat confident that in-person voting places will be run safely, without the spread of the disease. Yet while about half of Trump supporters (53%) are very confident that COVID-19 will not be spread by in-person voting, just 17% of Biden supporters say the same.

Trump supporters are more than twice as likely than Biden supporters to say they plan to cast their ballots in the presidential election in person on Election Day (50% vs. 20%). By contrast, far more Biden than Trump supporters say they plan to vote – or already have voted – by absentee or mail-in ballot (51% Biden supporters, compared with 25% of those who back Trump). Similar shares of Trump and Biden supporters (20% and 22%, respectively), plan to vote, or have voted, in person before Election Day.

For the most part, both Trump and Biden supporters are at least somewhat confident that votes cast in person will be counted as voters intended. Yet they differ sharply over whether absentee or mail-in ballots will be counted as voters intended: 77% of Biden supporters are very or somewhat confident, compared with fewer than half as many Trump supporters (36%).

Trump supporters also are more skeptical about whether mail-in ballots will be delivered in time to be counted. Only a third of Trump supporters are very or somewhat confident that ballots sent by mail will be delivered in enough time to be counted; that compares with 67% of Biden supporters who express confidence that mail ballots will be delivered in time.

The new survey finds that while large majorities of voters think that the elections in their community will be run and administered very or somewhat well, they are less confident in the administration of elections throughout the country. And voters’ confidence in elections in the United States has declined since 2018 – with most of the change coming among voters who supported Republican candidates then and Trump today.

Currently, 90% of registered voters say they are very (44%) or somewhat confident (46%) that elections in their community will be run and administered very or somewhat well. But a smaller majority (62%) expects that elections in the U.S. will be administered well.

Voters were more positive in views of election administration shortly before the 2018 midterm elections. In October 2018, about nine-in-ten said they expected elections in their community (92%) and in the U.S. (81%) to be run and administered very or somewhat well.

In the current survey, large majorities of Biden (94%) and Trump supporters (88%) say elections will be administered well in their communities, though there are much wider disparities in views of the administration of elections across the country. While 72% of Biden supporters say the elections around the nation will be run and administered well, just half of Trump supporters say the same.
Other findings from the survey

Rise in share of Biden supporters who say it will be “easy” to vote. Among registered voters, a majority of Biden supporters (62%) now expect it will be easy to vote, compared with 38% who say it will be difficult. That represents a major shift in opinion since August, when just 40% of Biden supporters said it would be easy to vote. There has been less change among Trump supporters; 70% say it will be easy to vote today, up from 64% in August. Still, voters remain less likely to say voting will be easy than they were on the eve of the 2018 midterms.

Sharp divide between Trump, Biden supporters over importance of preventing those ineligible to vote from casting ballots. Barring people who are ineligible to vote from voting is much more important priority for Trump than Biden supporters. While majorities of both candidates’ supporters view this as very or somewhat important, 86% of Trump supporters view this as very important, compared with 49% of Biden supporters. And a far lower share of voters who support Trump (36%) than Biden supporters (86%) are very or somewhat confident that those ineligible to vote will not be allowed to cast ballots.

Majority of voters are confident election systems are secure from technological threats. Overall, 56% of voters say they are very or somewhat confident that election systems in the U.S. are secure from hacking and other technological threats. That is higher than the share of voters who said this two years ago (47%). Democratic voters, in particular, have become more confident; the share of Biden supporters who are confident election systems are secure from technological threats is 19 percentage points higher today when compared with supporters of Democratic congressional candidates in the 2018 midterms (53% now, 34% then). There has been less change among those backing GOP candidates in 2018 and Trump supporters today (60% now, 65% then).
Widespread agreement on importance of ensuring that people who are legally qualified to vote are able to cast ballots

Voters are in broad agreement about the importance of ensuring that all people who are legally qualified and want to vote are able to cast their ballots: Nearly all registered voters (99%) say this is at least somewhat important, including 92% who say it is very important. Sizable majorities of voters (84%) also say it is at least somewhat important that people who are not legally qualified to vote are prevented from voting, though fewer say this is very important (65%).

With the expectation that a far larger share of voters will cast their ballots by mail than in past elections comes the prospect that counting those ballots may take substantially longer than in past years. But about half of registered voters (52%) say it is very important that Americans know who won the election with a day or two of Election Day, and 82% say this is at least somewhat important.

Virtually all Trump and Biden supporters (99% each) say it is at least somewhat important that all voters who are qualified and want to vote are able to cast their ballots in the election, and at least nine-in-ten in both coalitions say this is very important.

By contrast, there is far less uniformity when it comes to the importance of people who are ineligible to vote being prevented from voting. While clear majorities of both coalitions say this is at least somewhat important (93% of Trump supporters, 78% of Biden voters), Trump supporters are much more likely to consider this very important: 86% say this, compared with about half (49%) of Biden backers.

Trump supporters also are substantially more likely than Biden supporters to say that knowing the winner of the election within a few days is important. More than nine-in-ten Trump supporters (94%) say it is at least somewhat important that the winner of the election be known within a day or two of the polls closing, including 69% who say this is very important. While most Biden supporters (73%) say this at least somewhat important, only 39% say it is very important.
Most voters are at least somewhat confident that polling places will be run safely without spreading the coronavirus

Wide majorities of American voters express confidence that those who are legally qualified to vote will be able to do so and that polling places will safely be run without spreading the coronavirus. But there is considerably less confidence that the winner of the election will be known within a few days of Election Day and that mail ballots will arrive in time to be counted.

More than eight-in-ten registered voters (84%) say they are at least somewhat confident that people who are legally qualified and want to vote will be able to cast a ballot, while nearly as many (79%) express confidence that in-person polling places will be run safely and without spreading the coronavirus. About two-thirds (66%) say they are at least somewhat confident that after all votes are counted, it will be clear who won the election, while 62% are at least somewhat confident that people who are not legally qualified to vote will be prevented from casting ballots.

While most voters express at least some confidence in these four aspects of the presidential election, relatively small shares are very confident of each. For example, only about four-in-ten say they are very confident that people who are legally qualified and want to vote will be able to cast a ballot in the election, while only 22% say they are very confident that once the votes are counted it will be clear who won the election.

Voters are less confident that the nation will know the outcome of the election within a few days of Nov. 3 or that mail-in ballots will be delivered in time to be counted, with about half saying they are at least somewhat confident these will happen (50% and 52%, respectively). Just 13% of voters say they are very confident mail ballots will be delivered on time, while a similarly slim share (15%) say they are very confident the winner will be known within a day or two of Election Day.

There are sizable gaps in confidence between Trump and Biden voters in these expectations for the election.

Though majorities of Trump and Biden voters say they are at least somewhat confident that people who are legally qualified and want to vote are able to cast a ballot, Trump voters are more likely than Biden voters to say this (93% vs. 77%, respectively). And while only about a third of Biden supporters (32%) are very confident that people who want to vote will be able to, half of Trump voters have a high level of confidence this will occur.

Trump supporters are also far more confident than Biden voters about the safety of in-person polling places: 91% of Trump voters are at least somewhat confident that in-person polling places will be run safely without spreading the coronavirus, including 53% who are very confident. Seven-in-ten Biden voters say they are at least somewhat confident this will happen, but just 17% are very confident.

In contrast, Biden supporters are more confident than Trump backers that once votes have been counted in the election, it will be clear which candidate won. About three-quarters (76%) of Biden supporters are at least somewhat confident that this will happen, compared with 55% of Trump supporters.

Biden supporters also are considerably more confident than Trump supporters that mail ballots will be delivered in time to be counted. About two-thirds (67%) of Biden supporters are very or somewhat confident mail ballots will be delivered in time to be counted; just a third of Trump supporters say the same.

The biggest difference between Trump and Biden supporters across the six items is on whether people who are not legally qualified to vote will be prevented from casting ballots: 84% of Biden voters say they are least somewhat confident ineligible voters will be prevented from voting, including four-in-ten who say they are very confident about this. In contrast, just 35% of Trump supporters say they are at least somewhat confident that those who are not legally qualified to vote will be prevented from casting ballots.

Notably, there are no significant differences between Trump and Biden supporters in their expectations about knowing the election result shortly after Election Day. Among both groups of voters, about half are confident that Americans will know the winner of the presidential contest within a day or two of Election Day. Just 16% of Trump supporters and 15% of Biden supporters are very confident the results will be finalized within days after Nov. 3.
Biden and Trump backers’ priorities, expectations about voter access

Trump supporters overwhelmingly say it is very important that ineligible voters are prevented from casting ballots in the presidential election, yet far fewer are confident that this will happen: 93% say it is at least somewhat important (including 86% who say this is very important), but only about a third (35%) say they are confident that ineligible voters will be prevented from voting this year.

Among Biden supporters, in contrast, more than eight-in-ten (84%) say they are at least somewhat confident that ineligible voters will be prevented from voting – modestly larger than the 78% who say this is at least somewhat important.

Conversely, although about three-quarters of Biden voters say they are at least somewhat confident that all voters who are legally qualified and want to vote will be able to cast a ballot, nearly all (99%) say it is important that they be able to do so. Among Trump supporters, more than nine-in-ten say both that they are confident that all eligible voters will be able to cast ballots (93%) and that this is important (99%).

Among Biden supporters, White voters are somewhat more likely than Black and Hispanic voters to say it is “very” important that all eligible voters be allowed to vote (96% of White Biden supporters say this, compared with 86% of Black Biden supporters and 90% of Hispanic Biden supporters) and are somewhat less likely to say they are very confident that this will be the case (25% of White Biden supporters vs. 45% of Black and 37% of Hispanic Biden backers).

Overall, the share of voters who say it is important for Americans to know who won the election within a day or two of Election Day (82%) is substantially larger than the share who say they are confident this will happen (50%). These gaps are present among both Trump supporters and Biden supporters, though they are wider among Trump supporters.

Nearly all Trump supporters (94%) say it is at least somewhat important to learn the results of the election quickly, while about three-quarters (73%) of Biden voters say the same. Only about half (48%) of Trump and Biden supporters (50%) say they are at least somewhat confident this will happen.
Fewer now say elections across the country will be run and administered well than in 2018

Voters largely think that elections in their area will be run well this year. Fully nine-in-ten registered voters (90%) say that elections in their communities will be run and administered very or somewhat well, little different than the share saying this in the weeks before the 2018 midterm election.

But a narrower majority of voters – 62% – say that elections across the country will be run and administered very or somewhat well this year; 19 percentage points lower than the share saying this before the 2018 midterms (81%).

In 2018, nearly nine-in-ten voters who supported or leaned toward a Republican candidate for the House of Representatives (87%) said that elections in the U.S. would be run and administered very or somewhat well. Today, 50% of voters who support or lean toward Donald Trump say this, and just 9% say elections in the U.S. will be administered very well.

In contrast, 72% of Biden supporters now say elections around the country will be run and administered at least somewhat well, only modestly lower than the 79% of Democratic voters in 2018 who said this.

There are only modest differences in these views across racial and ethnic groups, with about eight-in-ten or more White (92%), Black (89%) and Hispanic voters (84%) saying that elections in their community will be administered very or somewhat well this November. However, White voters are slightly less likely than either Black voters or Hispanic voters to say that elections across the country will be run and administered well. About two-thirds of Hispanic voters (66%) and a similar share of Black voters (64%) say elections in the U.S. will be administered somewhat or very well this November, with about two-in-ten in both groups saying they will be administered very well. Among White voters, 61% say elections across the country will be administered at least somewhat well, including 13% who say they will be administered very well.

Older voters are more likely than younger voters to say that the November elections will be administered well, both in their communities and in the country as a whole. More than nine-in-ten voters ages 65 and older (94%) say that the elections in their communities will be administered somewhat or very well, compared with 83% of voters ages 18 to 29. And about two-thirds of voters 65 and older (68%) say elections across the U.S. this November will be administered somewhat or very well, compared with 56% of those ages 18 to 29 and 57% of those 30 to 49.
Voters overwhelmingly confident in counting of votes cast in person, but are less confident about votes cast by mail

About nine-in-ten registered voters (91%) are at least somewhat confident that votes cast in person at polling places around the country will be counted as voters intended. This includes nearly half of voters (49%) who are very confident of this. Just 9% of registered voters say they are either not too confident (7%) or not at all confident (2%) that votes cast in person will be counted as intended.

A smaller majority of voters, 59%, say they are at least somewhat confident that votes cast by absentee or mail-in ballot will be counted as voters intended, including 20% who are very confident. About a quarter (26%) say they are not too confident that votes cast by mail will be counted as intended and 14% say they are not at all confident.

When it comes to votes cast in person, large majorities of both candidates’ supporters express confidence in a fair vote count. Nine-in-ten Biden voters say they are very confident that these votes will be counted as intended, as do 92% of Trump voters.

Most Biden supporters also express confidence that votes cast by absentee or mail-in ballot will be counted as intended: More than three-quarters (77%) say they are somewhat (47%) or very confident (30%). By comparison, 36% of Trump supporters say they are somewhat or very confident these votes will be counted as voters intended. And Trump backers are more than twice as likely to say they are not at all confident of this as they are to say they are very confident.

Among Trump voters, there is little difference between strong and moderate supporters in confidence in the in-person vote count. However, those who say they support Trump moderately or lean toward Trump are almost twice as likely to express confidence in the mail-in ballot count as those who say they support Trump strongly: 54% of moderate Trump supporters and Trump leaners say they are very or somewhat confident that absentee and mail-in votes will be counted as intended, compared with just 28% of strong Trump supporters.

There also are differences in views of how mail votes are counted between voters who support Biden strongly and those who back him less strongly. Strong Biden supporters are 14 percentage points more likely than moderate Biden supporters to say they are very or somewhat confident in how mail-in votes will be counted (83% vs. 69%).

Overall, a majority of registered voters (57%) say they are at least somewhat confident that both in-person and mail-in ballots will be counted as voters intended. One-third say they are confident in how in-person ballots will be counted but not how mail-in ballots will be counted.

Among Trump supporters, just over a third (36%) say they have confidence in how both types of ballots will be counted, compared with a majority (56%) who say they have confidence in in-person ballots but not mail-in ballots.

Among Biden voters, three-quarters say they are confident that both types of ballots will be counted as voters intended.

About eight-in-ten voters who plan to vote by absentee or mail-in ballot (or who have already done so) say they are somewhat or very confident that these ballots will be counted as voters intend. This includes nearly two-thirds of Trump voters (65%) and 86% of Biden voters who plan to vote this way.

Fewer than half of voters who plan to vote or have voted in person (45%) say they are somewhat or very confident in the counting of mail-in ballots. About seven-in-ten Biden voters (71%) and just a quarter of Trump supporters who plan to vote in person say this.

White voters, Black voters, and Hispanic voters express similar levels of confidence in the counting of mail-in ballots. However, White voters are sharply divided by candidate preference, with White Biden supporters 50 percentage points more likely than White Trump supporters to say they are somewhat or very confident that these votes will be counted as voters intended. Among Biden supporters, 84% of White voters say they are somewhat or very confident, compared with seven-in-ten Hispanic voters and six-in-ten Black voters.

Registered voters ages 65 and older, regardless of candidate preference, are more likely than others to say they are somewhat or very confident that mail-in ballots will be counted as voters intend.

Voters who live in states with the strictest requirements for voting by mail are less likely than those who live in states where absentee or mail-in ballots are more widely available to say that they are confident in how mail-in ballots will be counted. (See Appendix for details.)

Half of voters living in states where an excuse is required to vote by absentee or mail-in ballot say they are somewhat or very confident that votes cast by mail will be counted as voters intended. That rises to about six-in-ten among voters living in states where no excuse is required (59%) and among voters in states where all registered voters are sent an application to vote by mail (62%). Nearly two-thirds of voters living in states where all registered voters receive a ballot by mail (66%) say they are confident that votes cast by mail-in ballot will be counted as voters intended.

Among Biden voters, those living in states where all voters will be mailed a ballot are 9 percentage points more likely than those living in states where an excuse is required to vote by mail to say they are somewhat or very confident in the counting of ballots cast by mail. Among Trump supporters, this gap is 15 points.
Voters are less concerned over hacking and other technological threats to the election compared with 2018

A majority of registered voters (56%) say they are somewhat (47%) or very (9%) confident that election systems in the U.S. are secure from hacking and other technological threats. About three-in-ten (31%) say they are not too confident that election systems are secure, while 13% say they are not at all confident.

Majorities of both Trump voters and Biden voters say they are somewhat or very confident that election systems are secure, though Trump supporters are slightly more likely to say this than Biden supporters (60% vs. 53%). Roughly one-in-ten Trump voters and a similar share of Biden voters (8%) say they are very confident. And nearly identical shares of Trump voters (12%) and Biden voters (13%) say they are not at all confident that U.S. election systems are secure from technological threats.

The share of registered voters who say they are confident in the security of election systems has increased since just before the 2018 general election, when 47% of registered voters said they were somewhat (38%) or very (9%) confident.

Among voters who planned to vote for a Democratic candidate for the House of Representatives in 2018, about one-third (34%) said they were somewhat or very confident that election systems were secure. Nearly two-thirds of voters who planned to vote for a Republican candidate for the House (65%) said this.

Today, about two-thirds of registered voters (65%) say they expect voting in this November’s elections to be easy, while 35% say it will be difficult. The share of voters who expect voting to be easy is 14 percentage points higher than it was two months ago, when half said they expected voting to be easy (50%), while roughly as many (49%) said it would be difficult. Still, the share of voters expecting voting to be easy remains significantly lower than it was at this time in the 2018 election (65% today, 85% then).

The rise in the share of voters saying voting will be easy since August is largely attributable to shifting views among Biden voters. In August, more Biden voters said that voting would be difficult (60%) than easy (40%). Today, 62% of Biden voters say they expect voting will be easy.

A slightly larger share of Trump supporters also say they expect voting will be easy compared with August (70% today vs. 64% then).

While the shares of voters who expect voting to be easy has increased across most all demographic subgroups since August, there are still sizable gaps in perceptions of the voting process by age and race.

About two-thirds of White voters (68%) say they expect voting will be very or somewhat easy, including a third who say they expect voting will be very easy.

Black and Hispanic voters are less likely than White voters to say the voting process will be easy (55% and 60%, respectively).

Younger voters – especially those under 30 – are also less likely than their older counterparts to expect voting will be easy: 55% of voters ages 18 to 29 say voting will be easy, while over two-thirds of voters 30 and older say the same.

When it comes to meeting several legal requirements to vote – including being registered in time to vote, having the proper type of picture identification or signature match on file for mail ballots – the vast majority of voters say they are very confident that they will meet these requirements (94%). This includes 95% of Trump voters, and a similar share of Biden voters (94%). However, Black (91%) and Hispanic voters (88%) are modestly less likely than White voters (96%) to say they are very confident they will meet these requirements.