Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues


 Rubén Weinsteiner

Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out in views on race, climate and the role of government





No longer the new kids on the block, Millennials have moved firmly into their 20s and 30s, and a new generation is coming into focus. Generation Z – diverse and on track to be the most well-educated generation yet – is moving toward adulthood with a liberal set of attitudes and an openness to emerging social trends.

On a range of issues, from Donald Trump’s presidency to the role of government to racial equality and climate change, the views of Gen Z – those ages 13 to 21 in 2018 – mirror those of Millennials.1 In each of these realms, the two younger generations hold views that differ significantly from those of their older counterparts. In most cases, members of the Silent Generation are at the opposite end, and Baby Boomers and Gen Xers fall in between.2

It’s too early to say with certainty how the views of this new generation will evolve. Most have yet to reach voting age, and their outlook could be altered considerably by changing national conditions, world events or technological innovations. Even so, two new Pew Research Center surveys, one of U.S. teens ages 13 to 17 and one of adults ages 18 and older, provide some compelling clues about where they may be headed and how their views could impact the nation’s political landscape.

Only about three-in-ten Gen Zers and Millennials (30% and 29%, respectively) approve of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president. This compares with 38% of Gen Xers, 43% of Boomers and 54% of Silents. Similarly, while majorities in Gen Z and the Millennial generation say government should do more to solve problems, rather than that government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals, Gen Xers and Boomers are more evenly divided on this issue. For their part, most Silents would like to see a less activist government.

When it comes to views on race, the two younger generations are more likely than older generations to say that blacks are treated less fairly than whites in the United States today. And they are much more likely than their elders to approve of NFL players kneeling during the national anthem as a sign of protest.

The younger generations are also more accepting of some of the ways in which American society is changing. Majorities among Gen Z and the Millennial generation say increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S. is a good thing for society, while older generations are less convinced of this. And they’re more likely to have a positive view of interracial and same-sex marriage than their older counterparts.

As a recent Pew Research Center report highlighted, Gen Z is the most racially and ethnically diverse generation we have seen, but this isn’t all that’s driving the attitudes of this generation when it comes to issues surrounding race and diversity. There are significant, if more modest, generational differences on these issues even among non-Hispanic whites.
Roughly a third of Gen Zers know someone who uses gender-neutral pronouns

While Generation Z’s views resemble those of Millennials in many areas, Gen Zers are distinct from Millennials and older generations in at least two ways, both of which reflect the cultural context in which they are coming of age. Gen Zers are more likely than Millennials to say they know someone who prefers that others use gender-neutral pronouns to refer to them: 35% say this is the case, compared with a quarter of Millennials. Among each older generation, the share saying this drops: 16% of Gen Xers, 12% of Boomers and just 7% of Silents say this.

The youngest generation is also the most likely to say forms or online profiles that ask about a person’s gender should include options other than “man” or “woman.” Roughly six-in-ten Gen Zers (59%) hold this view, compared with half of Millennials and four-in-ten or fewer Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents.

These findings seem to speak more to exposure than to viewpoint, as roughly equal shares of Gen Zers and Millennials say society should be more accepting of people who don’t identify as either a man or a woman.

Members of Gen Z also stand out somewhat in their views on the role social media plays in modern news consumption. These teens and young adults are much less likely than older generations to say the fact that more people are getting their news from social media is a bad thing for society – 39% of Gen Zers hold this view, compared with about half among each of the older generations.
Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out on some key issues

While they are young and their political views may not be fully formed, there are signs that those in Generation Z who identify as Republican or lean to the Republican Party diverge somewhat from older Republicans – even Millennials – in their views on several key issues. These same generational divides are not as apparent among Democrats.

On views about race relations, Gen Z Republicans are more likely than older generations of Republicans to say that blacks are treated less fairly than whites. Among Republicans, 43% of Gen Zers say this, compared with 30% of Millennials and roughly 20% of Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents. Gen Z Republicans are also much more likely than their GOP counterparts in older generations to say increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S. is a good thing for society. On each of these measures, Democrats’ views are nearly uniform across generations.

In addition, the youngest Republicans stand apart in their views on the role of government and the causes of climate change. Gen Z Republicans are much more likely than Republicans in older generations to say government should do more to solve problems. And they are less likely than their older counterparts to attribute the earth’s warming temperatures to natural patterns, as opposed to human activity.

While younger and older Americans differ in many of their views, there are some areas where generation is not as clearly linked with attitudes. When it comes to the merits of having more women running for political office, majorities across generations say this is a good thing for the country. Majorities in each generation also say that, on balance, legal immigrants have had a positive impact on the U.S.

This analysis is based on a survey of 920 U.S. teens ages 13 to 17 conducted online Sept. 17-Nov. 25, 2018, combined with a nationally representative survey of 10,682 adults ages 18 and older conducted online Sept. 24-Oct. 7, 2018, using Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel.3 Findings based on Generation Z combine data from the teens survey with data from the 18- to 21-year-old respondents in the adult survey.
Gen Zers and Millennials share views on politics and policy; large generational gaps among Republicans

When it comes to views on political issues and the current political climate, younger generations have consistently held more liberal views than older generations in recent years. Today, members of Generation Z hold many similar views to Millennials, and both tend to be more liberal than older generations.

Seven-in-ten Gen Zers say the government should do more to solve problems in this country, while just 29% say the government is doing too many things that are better left to individuals and businesses. Gen Zers are slightly more likely to favor government activism than Millennials, and significantly more likely than older generations: 53% of Gen Xers, 49% of Baby Boomers and 39% of Silents favor government involvement over businesses and individuals.

Among Republicans and those who lean to the Republican Party, the generational divides are even starker. Roughly half (52%) of Gen Z Republicans say they think the government should be doing more to solve problems, compared with 38% of Millennial Republicans and 29% of Gen Xers. About a quarter of Republican Baby Boomers (23%) and fewer GOP Silents (12%) believe the government should be doing more.

Among Democrats, however, these generational divides largely disappear. Roughly eight-in-ten Gen Z (81%) and Millennial Democrats (79%) say the government should do more to solve problems, as do about seven-in-ten Democratic Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents.

Gen Zers’ views about climate change are virtually identical to those of Millennials and not markedly different from Gen Xers. About half in all three generations say the earth is getting warmer due to human activity. Boomers are somewhat more skeptical of this than Gen Zers or Millennials. Members of the Silent Generation are least likely to say this (38%) and are more likely to say the earth is warming mainly due to natural patterns (28%) than are Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers.

Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out from older generations as the least likely to say the earth is warming because of natural patterns – 18% say this. By comparison, 30% of Millennial, 36% of Gen X and roughly four-in-ten Boomer (42%) and Silent Generation Republicans (41%) say the same. Almost no generation gap exists among Democrats in views on this issue.

When it comes to views of Donald Trump, there are sizable generational divides, particularly among Republicans. Nine-in-ten Republicans in the Silent Generation approve of the job the president is doing, as do 85% of Baby Boomer Republicans and 76% of Gen X Republicans; smaller majorities of GOP Millennials (65%) and Gen Zers (59%) think he’s doing a good job.

Younger generations also have a different view of the U.S. relative to other countries in the world. While pluralities of nearly all generations (with the exception of the Silent Generation) say the U.S. is one of the best countries in the world along with some others, Gen Zers and Millennials are the least likely to say the U.S. is better than all other countries. Only 14% and 13%, respectively, hold this view, compared with one-in-five Gen Xers, 30% of Boomers and 45% of Silents.

Roughly three-in-ten Gen Zers and Millennials say there are other countries that are better than the U.S.

In their views about the general direction of the country, Gen Zers are mostly downbeat, but they’re not alone in that assessment. Among Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers, two-thirds or more say things in this country are generally going in the wrong direction. About six-in-ten Boomers (61%) say the same. Members of the Silent Generation have a less negative view (53% say things are going in the wrong direction).

Today’s 13- to 21-year-olds are only slightly more likely than Millennials to say ordinary citizens can do a lot to influence the government in Washington (53% of Gen Zers say this vs. 46% of Millennials). And their views on this issue don’t differ much from those of Gen Xers, Boomers or Silents (50%, 58% and 58%, respectively, say citizens can have a lot of influence on the government).
Stark generational gaps in views on race

Younger generations have a different perspective than their older counterparts on the treatment of blacks in the United States. Two-thirds of Gen Z (66%) and 62% of Millennials say blacks are treated less fairly than whites in the U.S. Fewer Gen Xers (53%), Boomers (49%) and Silents (44%) say this. Roughly half of Silents (44%) say both races are treated about equally, compared with just 28% among Gen Z.

The patterns are similar after controlling for race: Younger generations of white Americans are far more likely than whites in older generations to say blacks are not receiving fair treatment.

Younger generations also have a different viewpoint on the issue of NFL players kneeling during the national anthem as a protest. Majorities among Gen Z (61%) and the Millennial generation (62%) approve of the protests. Smaller shares of Gen Xers (44%) and Baby Boomers (37%) favor these actions. Members of the Silent Generation disapprove of the protests by a more than two-to-one margin (68% disapprove, 29% approve).

Gen Zers and Millennials share similar views about racial and ethnic change in the country. Roughly six-in-ten from each generation say increased racial and ethnic diversity is a good thing for our society. Gen Xers are somewhat less likely to agree (52% say this is a good thing), and older generations are even less likely to view this positively.

Younger Republicans again stand out in this regard. Half of Gen Z Republicans (51%) say increased racial and ethnic diversity is a good thing for the country. This compares with 38% of Millennial, 34% of Gen X, 30% of Boomer and 28% of Silent Generation Republicans. Among Democrats, there is widespread agreement across generations.

Though they differ in their views over the changing racial and ethnic makeup of the country, across generations most Americans agree about the impact that legal immigrants have on society. On balance, all generations see legal immigration as more positive than negative. Across most generations, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say legal immigrants are having a positive impact. However, within Gen Z there is no partisan gap on this issue.

When it comes to views about how careful people should be in using potentially offensive language, members of Gen Z are divided over whether people need to be more careful or if concerns about political correctness have gone too far. Some 46% of Gen Zers say people need to be more careful about the language they use to avoid offending people with different backgrounds, while 53% say too many people are easily offended these days over the language that others use.

Gen Zers’ views are only modestly different from those of Millennials and Gen Xers on this topic: 39% and 38%, respectively, say people need to be more careful about the language they use, while about six-in-ten say people are too easily offended these days. Interestingly, members of the Silent Generation are closer to members of Gen Z in their views on this topic than they are to Boomers, Gen Xers or Millennials.
Gen Z and Millennials have similar views on gender and family

Since they first entered adulthood, Millennials have been at the leading edge of changing views on same-sex marriage. In 2014, when a narrow majority of all adults (52%) said they favored allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally, 67% of Millennials held that view. Today, members of Generation Z are just as likely as Millennials to say allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry has been a good thing for the country (48% of Gen Zers and 47% of Millennials hold this view). One-third of Gen Xers say this is a good thing for the country, as do 27% of Baby Boomers. Members of the Silent Generation are the least enthusiastic (18% say this is a good thing).

Relatively few Gen Zers or Millennials (15%) say same-sex marriage is a bad thing for society. Boomers and Silents are much more likely to view this change negatively (32% and 43%, respectively, say this is a bad thing). Across generations, about four-in-ten say allowing gays and lesbians to marry hasn’t made much of a difference for the U.S.

In other ways, too, Gen Zers and Millennials are similar in their openness to changes that are affecting the institutions of marriage and family. Roughly half (53%) from each generation say interracial marriage is a good thing for our society. Gen Xers are somewhat less likely to agree (41% say this is a good thing), and older generations are much less likely to view interracial marriage positively. Relatively few across generations say this trend is bad for society; majorities of Silents (66%) and Boomers (60%) say it doesn’t make much difference, as do 53% of Xers.

When it comes to couples living together without being married, roughly two-thirds of each generation (with the exception of Silents) say this doesn’t make much of a difference for society. About one-in-five Gen Zers and Millennials say cohabitation is a good thing for society – higher than the shares for older generations. Fully 41% of Silents say this is bad thing for the country, as do about a quarter of Boomers.

Compared with their views on cohabitation, the youngest generations have a more negative assessment of the impact of single women raising children: 35% among Gen Z and 36% of Millennials say this is a bad thing for society; roughly four-in-ten Gen Xers and Boomers and 48% of Silents say the same. About half of Gen Zers and Millennials say this doesn’t make much difference for society, while relatively few (15%) view it as a good thing.
Across generations, majorities say financial and child care responsibilities should be shared

In their views about gender roles within couples, members of Generation Z are virtually identical to Millennials and Gen Xers and quite similar to Baby Boomers. Large majorities in all four groups say that, in households with a mother and a father, the responsibility for providing for the family financially should be shared equally. About one-in-five Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers – and a quarter of Boomers – say this responsibility should fall primarily on the fathers. Very few say mothers should be mostly responsible for this. Silents are the outliers on this issue: 40% say fathers should be mostly responsible for providing for their families financially, while 58% say this responsibility should be shared between mothers and fathers.

For the most part, there are no notable gender gaps in views on this issue; the Silent Generation is the exception. Among Gen Zers, Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers, male and female respondents are largely in agreement that mothers and fathers should share family financial responsibility. Among members of the Silent Generation, roughly half of men (49%) but 33% of women say fathers should be mostly responsible for providing for the family financially.

Large majorities (84% or more) across generations say that responsibility for taking care of children should be shared by mothers and fathers in households with two parents. Some 13% among Gen Z say this responsibility should fall mainly to mothers; similar shares of each of the other generations say the same. Very few say raising children should fall mostly to dads. Male and female respondents across generations have similar views on this issue.
Widespread enthusiasm across generations for more women entering politics

A majority of Americans, regardless of generation, view the increasing number of women running for public office as a positive change for our society. Roughly two-thirds of Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers say this is a good thing, as do 61% of Boomers and 55% of Silents. About four-in-ten in the Silent Generation (39%) say this trend doesn’t make much difference for society, somewhat higher than the share among the three youngest generations (roughly three-in-ten).

There are significant gender gaps on this question, with female respondents expressing much more enthusiasm about the growing number of women running for office in each generation except the Silents. Among Gen Zers, 76% of young women, versus 57% of young men, say the fact that more women are running for office is a good thing for society. The pattern is similar for Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers. However, among Silents, roughly equal shares of men (57%) and women (54%) say this is a good thing.
Gen Zers most likely to say forms or online profiles should offer gender options beyond ‘man’ and ‘woman’

The recognition of people who don’t identify as a man or a woman has garnered increased attention amid changing laws concerning gender options on official documents and growing usage of gender-neutral pronouns.

There are stark generational differences in views on these issues. Generation Z is the most likely of the five generations to say that when a form or online profile asks about a person’s gender it should include options other than “man” and “woman”; a 59% majority of Gen Zers say this. Half of Millennials say forms or online profiles should include additional gender options, as do about four-in-ten Gen Xers (40%) and Boomers (37%) and roughly a third of those in the Silent Generation (32%).

These views vary widely along partisan lines, with generational differences evident within each party coalition, but sharpest among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. About four-in-ten Republican Gen Zers (41%) think forms should include other gender options, compared with 27% of Republican Millennials, 17% of GOP Gen Xers and Boomers and 16% of Republican Silents. Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, half or more in all generations say this, including 71% of Gen Zers and 55% of Silents.
Gen Zers and Millennials have similar views on treatment of people who don’t identify as a man or woman

When it comes to how accepting society in general is of people who don’t identify as either a man or a woman, the views of Gen Zers and Millennials differ from those of older generations. Roughly half of Gen Zers (50%) and Millennials (47%) think that society is not accepting enough. Smaller shares of Gen Xers (39%), Boomers (36%) and those in the Silent Generation (32%) say the same.

A plurality of the Silent Generation (41%) say society is too accepting of people who don’t identify as a man or woman. Across all generations, roughly a quarter say society’s acceptance level is about right.

Again, there are large partisan gaps on this question, and Gen Z Republicans stand apart to some extent from other generations of Republicans in their views. Among Republicans, about three-in-ten Gen Zers (28%) say that society is not accepting enough of people who don’t identify as a man or woman, compared with 20% of Millennials, 15% of Gen Xers, 13% of Boomers and 11% of Silents. Democrats vary little by generation in shares holding this view.
Generations differ in their familiarity and comfort with using gender-neutral pronouns

Gen Zers and Millennials are much more familiar than their elders with the idea that some people may prefer gender-neutral pronouns: 74% of Gen Zers and 69% of Millennials say they have heard “a lot” or “a little” about people preferring that others use gender-neutral pronouns such as “they” instead of “he” or “she” when referring to them, with about three-in-ten saying they have heard a lot about this. Most Gen Xers (62%) also have heard a lot or a little about people preferring gender-neutral pronouns.

There is less awareness of this among older generations. Still, half of Boomers and 45% of Silents say they have heard at least a little about gender-neutral pronouns.

Gen Zers are also the most likely among the five generations to say they personally know someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns, with 35% saying so, compared with 25% of Millennials. Each of these younger generations is more likely than Gen Xers (16%), Boomers (12%) and Silents (7%) to say they personally know someone who prefers that others use gender-neutral pronouns when referring to them. This generational pattern is evident among both Democrats and Republicans.

In addition to their greater familiarity with gender-neutral pronouns, Gen Zers and Millennials express somewhat higher levels of comfort with using gender-neutral pronouns, though generational differences on this question are more modest. Majorities of Gen Zers (57%) and Millennials (59%) say they would feel “very” or “somewhat” comfortable using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone if asked to do so, including about three-in-ten (32% of Gen Zers, 31% of Millennials) who say they would be very comfortable doing this. By comparison, Gen Xers and Boomers are evenly divided: About as many say they would feel at least somewhat comfortable (49% and 50%, respectively) as say they would be uncomfortable.

Silents are the only group in which more say they would feel uncomfortable (59%) than say they would feel comfortable (39%) using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone.

There are wide party gaps on this measure across generations. Within each generation, Democrats come down on the side of feeling comfortable, rather than uncomfortable, using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone if asked to do so. In contrast, for each generation of Republicans, majorities say they would feel uncomfortable doing this.

Across generations, knowing someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns is linked to comfort levels in using these pronouns. Three-quarters of Millennials and about two-thirds of Gen Zers, Gen Xers and Boomers who personally know someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns say they would feel very or somewhat comfortable referring to someone with a gender-neutral pronoun. Those who don’t know someone are roughly 20 percentage points less likely to say the same (51% of Gen Zers, 54% of Millennials, 46% of Gen Xers and 48% of Boomers who don’t know someone say this).

Rubén Weinsteiner

Audiencias de audiencias disparan significados sobre nuestras marcas en el #votojoven



Rubén Weinsteiner


Rubén Weinsteiner

No se trata de lo que vos decís, se trata de lo que ellos dicen. Esta regla es la base de construcción en la Web social.


Nosotros podemos construir nuestra narrativa, que debe ser una propuesta de valor. Pero esa construcción pasa a formar parte de una nueva modulación horizontal y colectiva inserta en la macro coversación 4.0 donde juega lo que la gente dice de nosotros, de nuestra marca, corporativa, personal o política


Dada la simetría entre las marcas y los públicos, que también producen contenidos, la construcción de la narrativa de la marca, su posicionamiento, el diseño de su identidad, su personalidad, su simbología, en definitiva la carga de significados de la marca para ser disparados por esta, se da por una conversación entre audiencias de audiencias. Esa conversación es constante y en tiempo real, se da todo el tiempo, y queda vía Google abierta y disponible para todo aquel que busque información sobre la marca.

Ya no se da el formato one to many-one on one: uno hacia muchos, y luego cada uno de esos unos, a otros. En la Web social se da el formato de one-one to many. Conversaciones de uno a uno que son escuchadas por millones y son amplificadas por cada uno de los componentes de esas audiencias multitudinarias.

Un problema que se presenta en este nuevo formato constructivo es la labilidad y el caos en la conformación de liderazgos y referentes en esas audiencias, donde la visibilidad parcial de los emisores genera una ponderación relativa. Como no sabemos mucho sobre los que emiten las opiniones, más que la identidad digital que podamos googlear, podemos atribuirle una ponderación positiva a alguien no muy inteligente, por ejemplo.


El hecho de tener acceso a las herramientas, no significa que siepre tengamos algo interesante para decir. Estudiando los trending topics de Twitter del último año, y el desarrollo de los mismos, llegamos a la conclusión que: nunca hay que subestimar el poder de los tontos en los grandes grupos.

Mi punto de distribución de la narrativa, no tiene preeminencia en términos de poder de fuego por sobre los prosumidores, (consumidores y productores de información) que son las audiencias. Es por eso que tengo que generar una historia lo suficientemente eficaz, y conseguir la atención y la confianza de las audiencias, para que sea redistribuido y viralizado. Y una vez lanzado el mensaje, saber que será disparador de una conversación en la cual la pérdida de control es una constante. Solo mi capacidad para estar atento, auditar, contener y liderar, construyendo legitimidad y poder en tiempo real, me va a permitir sostener, direccionar y blindar mi marca personal, corporativa o política, en esa conversación entre millones, donde todo lo dicho queda en Google para siempre.

Tribus urbanas y nuevas demandas en el #votojoven







Una experiencia con tribus urbanas en la ciudad de Salta

Rubén Weinsteiner

El concepto de tribu urbana fue utilizado por primera vez por el sociólogo Michael Maffessoli en 1990.


El sentido que se le atribuye reviste cierta utilidad a la hora de aludir a las nuevas formas de sociabilidad y agrupamiento entre las personas jóvenes, y a las modalidades en que dichos grupos se apropian del espacio urbano.

Maffessoli afirma que una tribu urbana es un grupo de individuos que se comporta de acuerdo con estéticas y valores similares. Se trata en general de jóvenes que se agrupan buscando una identidad diferenciada, nuevas formas de expresión frente al proceso de homogenización cultural, de consumos, preferencias, vestimenta, que se produce en las grandes ciudades.

La vestimenta,la estética, las preferencias en relación con la música y otras formas del arte, los rituales en torno a estos gustos y la particular apropiación del cuerpo, des espacio físico y de sentar agenda en las Corrientes culturales jóvenes, son rasgos centrales de las tribus. La asociación con lo tribal se basa, entre otros aspectos, en la importancia que tienen para estos grupos los rituales y lo relacionado con los aspectos simbólico-ceremoniales.

Para Maffessoli las tribus urbanas son comunidades emocionales que expresan una nueva forma de sociabilidad. Se sustentan en la satisfacción del sentimiento de pertenencia y sensación de proximidad espacial.

La forma de sociabilidad de la tribu urbana tiene que ver con insertarse en un grupo sobre la base de compartir códigos estéticos, rituales, formas de escuchar música, lugares propios. El principal valor es el de la pertenencia. En la tribu urbana, el individuo siente que juega un papel en el grupo y no es solamente parte de la gran masa de la sociedad.



No podemos decir que toda la juventud esté tribalizada. Pero, a pesar de que son grupos pequeños, tienen una importante significación en la medida en que producen visibilidad e instalan modas, formas comunicativas y tendencias.


La influencia de las tribus urbanas adquiere una dinámica de audiencias de audiencias, potenciando mensajes, simbologías y ritualidades, discursos, tendencias y sistemas de preferencias.


Las tribus urbanas han sido objeto de atención mediática en los últimos años. Sin embargo, pocas veces son descriptas con la complejidad que requiere el abordaje y, en muchas ocasiones, se han hecho evidentes los prejuicios y estereotipos a la hora de analizar el tema.


Implementamos en la ciudad de Salta junto al Intendente Miguel Isa, y a través de la Secretaría de Juventud de dicho municipio, liderada por la Dra Mariam Farfán, el programa “Puente Urbano” pensado como una instancia de acercamiento, reconocimiento e integración, de jóvenes salteños que integran distintas “tribus urbanas”, a partir de la legitimación de los diferentes colectivos como tales, de su aporte cultural y del respeto y valoración de la otredad como tal.

Los jóvenes integrantes de las diferentes culturas urbanas, se ven expuestos a diferentes problemáticas basadas en prejuicios, disposiciones normativas que requieren revisión, y falta de conocimiento, reconocimiento y legitimación de lo que hacen.

Está situación, sumada a las problemáticas típicas de la edad, pone a estos a jóvenes en un lugar rechazo, de crítica, de marginación y en muchos casos de acoso y persecución. Esta situación sitúa a los jóvenes a la defensiva, lesiona su autoestima, su creatividad, condicionando fuertemente la formación identitaria, estableciendo un quiebre entre ellos y el resto de la sociedad, a quien perciben como hostil.

Las demandas estaban ahí, sujetos de 16 años en adelante, todos sujetos de elección, planteaban en forma pasiva, nuevas demandas, hasta ese momento nunca escuchadas.

No se trata de que los integrantes de estas tribus cortaran calles, o ni siquiera que llevaran sus demandas a los medios. Las demandas estaban latentes, miles de jóvenes sufren la persecución policial, el mirar para otro lado del estado, el desprecio y hostigamiento de familiares, docentes, medios, etc.

Teníamos por un lado jóvenes apasionados, talentosos, cultores de artes interesantes, que quieren ser reconocidos, legitimados y hasta poder transmitir esas artes a otros.

La articulación con las fuerzas de seguridad, brindarles un espacio para practicar y otro para desplegar sus artes, el marco y los medios del estado para desarrollarse, la legitimación para ser reconocidos y valorados, fueron instancias que permitieron lanzar en forma exitosa este programa al que llamamos “Puente urbano”, porque sentíamos que constituía un puente entre las culturas clásicas del mainstream y establishment, y las culturas de las tribus urbanas.

Muchas veces los adultos ven a jóvenes vestidos de manera “extraña” y uniforme, en una plaza, en la calle y muchas veces se generan cuestionamientos, críticas, risas, miedos, de parte de estos adultos, y hostigamiento hacia estos jóvenes por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad.

Estos jóvenes lejos de cometer algún delito, desarrollan una actividad cultural, que les permite reconocer y reconocerse, desarrollarse individual y socialmente de manera positiva y encontrar un marco de pertenencia y pertinencia.

Dentro de esas culturas observamos el desarrollo de talentos y saberes, que derribados los prejuicios y el acoso, pueden articularse de manera exitosa como manifestaciones culturales, artísticas, espirituales y de desarrollo personal hacia el conjunto de la sociedad.

Estas culturas urbanas, revelan pasión por lo que hacen, disciplina, vocación, compromiso y una gran capacidad de trabajo.
Miguel Isa fue el primer Intendente del país en reconocerlos e ir hacia ellos.

Este programa apunta a identificar elementos favorecedores de una relación entre estos jóvenes de las tribus urbanas y diferentes estamentos del estado, en este caso de la ciudad de Salta.


Ejes del programa "Puente urbano":


No postular formas legítimas de ser joven, asociadas a un criterio de normalidad. Desarmar la explicación binaria entre un supuesto modelo de normalidad y otro —el de las tribus urbanas— que se apartarían de esa norma.

Difundir, dar a conocer y mostrar el abanico amplio de posibilidades y la diversidad que existe dentro de las culturas urbanas.

Comunicar que los y las jóvenes tienen distintas maneras de sociabilizar y de insertarse en sociedad, de usar el tiempo libre, así como al mercado laboral, al universo de las relaciones familiares o a la educación. Y que todas ellas son legítimas.

Favorecer la representación de diversidad de modos de vida y estéticas que adoptan las personas, sin ser presentadas como “fenómenos” o rarezas.

No asociar de manera prejuiciosa a las tribus urbanas con la violencia, la droga, el delito ni con forma alguna de amenaza social.

Estas problemáticas sociales deben ser analizadas en la complejidad de su génesis y no circunscriptas a la adopción de determinados hábitos por parte de los y las jóvenes.

Es necesario analizar y comprender el desarrollo y proliferación de las tribus urbanas con las nuevas formas de sociabilidad y de afirmación de la identidad en las grandes urbes. Generar enfoques complejos y enriquecedores que permitan leer el fenómeno inscripto en las actuales condiciones sociales, culturales y económicas de la vida en las ciudades.


Evitar el uso efectista de imágenes y términos atemorizantes que refuercen una idea de peligrosidad en torno a estos grupos. Por el contrario, recomendamos favorecer su reconocimiento como parte de la sociedad y la cultura en la que vivimos.

Pensar la problemática de la apropiación de cuerpo y de las estéticas que se adoptan desde una perspectiva que tome en cuenta la sociología y la antropología urbana, contactando a los especialistas en la temática que puedan ayudar a reflexionar desde sus particulares enfoques.


El programa apunta a incluir la multiconvergencia de situaciones en la vida de la tribu urbana con la flexibilidad necesaria para adecuar las intervenciones, tomando en cuenta tres categorías de la realidad juvenil: los adolescentes y su desarrollo hacia la vida adulta; las manifestaciones juveniles de oposición cultural y social; y la creación de una nueva cultura y organización social de estos grupos.

En la zona 3 del Programa de Presupuesto Participativo, en el barrio Juan Pablo II, los jóvenes de las tribus urbanas presentaron la propuesta de construir una pista de Skate para entrenar, capacitar y para realizar exhibiciones. Los jóvenes presentarona la idea, se debatió y finalmente los vecinos aceptaron la propuesta.


El Imaginario social joven se nutre de la producción de significaciones colectivas que conceptualizan su realidad y encarnan nuevas demandas en los diferentes segmentos jóvenes

Los jóvenes plantean constantemente nuevas demandas, que sino las escuchamos, entendemos e incorporamos, quedamos fuera del mercado como oferta de marca política para el voto joven.

Los jóvenes transitan la vida, entre normas y pautas rígidas, que rodean deseos, utopías, frustraciones, prohibiciones, injusticias, etc. Normas y pautas que prohíben o determinan que las cosas sean de una determinada manera y no de otra.



Una pauta es una regularidad efectiva de la acción social, es una forma, una conducta, una manera de actuar que se da y repite en un contexto social. Una norma es una regla que establece como obligatorio hacer algo de una determinada manera. Sino lo hacés así, se te castiga.



La tensión entre pautas propias y normas ajenas en el segmento jóven, sobredetermina la necesidad de la mutación, del cambio. El joven pone en emergencia conductas “asociales”, que violan normas, y que muchos viven y practican subterráneamente; constituyendo "lo que viene", "la próxima cultura" más que una contracultura.



Ese cambio no necesariamente se traduce en la política, por eso la rebeldía, la tensión y las nuevas demandas se pueden abordar desde la política pero generalmente tienen que ver con un espectro multidimensional.

Entre los jóvenes, en esta generación, la dimensión política, es una dimensión más entre muchas otras. Y esto para las marcas políticas genera una complejidad importante ya que cambiaron los sistemas de compromiso e involucramiento de los jóvenes. En el pasado, cuando la política era un eje central de los sujetos jóvenes, era el ámbito donde promover cambios, a las marcas políticas y a los partidos les era más fácil motivar y estructurar el compromiso de el largo plazo porque, en definitiva, los jóvenes vivían para la política.



En los segmentos jóvenes, es más importante lo que dicen otros jóvenes, dentro o fuera de la tribu, por afirmación o por negación, que lo que dicen los padres, los profesores, los medios, el gobierno, la religion, la ley, etc. Si los jóvenes cumplen con lo que está bien para los padres, medios, profesores, religión o gobierno, incumplen con lo que está bien para los pares y viceversa. “No tomes, no fumes, no entables relación con gente peligrosa, estudiá mucho, no gastés en cosas superfluas, no te acuestes tarde, no tengas amigos que anden en cosas raras, buscate una pareja así y así” consejos sobre la vida sexual, las relaciones, el trabajo y finalmente la política.

De esta manera, los jóvenes, gestionan el conflicto entre lo que está bien para los padres y lo que está bien para los pares, y así, de esa manera, responder a dos expectativas diferenciadas.Este conflicto se salda a favor de la tribu, salvo que la coercitividad punitiva impida esa instancia.

La demanda implícita es que sea aceptado lo inaceptable dentro de las condiciones objetivas, pero que como dice la marcha de la bronca de Pedro y Pablo, “haré de cualquier modo” .

El discurso en el voto joven, para colonizer subjetividades y acumular, debe quebrar el punto de vista, construido por los procesos de standarización, limites y estereotipia de los mensajes de los medios, estructurados siempre con mecanismos repetitivos, que en realidad se constituyen como un control destinado a evitar la irrupción de mensajes nuevos y disruptivos.

En el voto joven, el planteo y enrolamiento en una visión disruptiva es excluyente, como esencial el lenguaje llano, concreto, sin eufemismos, ambigüedades ni sofisticaciones innecesarias.

La conformación de la demanda agregada, conlleva una legitimación implícita y demandada de valores, sentimientos, necesidades, deseos y aspiraciones, colectivas tribales. Esa legitimación se constituye en el corazón de la demanda agregada joven.

La demanda agregada, a través del reconocimiento y la identificación con la tribu en tanto colectivo ordenador , es el eje de la racionalidad instrumental del voto joven. Para el joven, identificación es amor, para los adultos mayores identificación, es solo empatía.

El abordaje de la demanda agregada joven, como un sistema dinámico y complejo, es una de las precondiciones para cualquier construcción discursiva, políticamente significativa, para la interpelación y colonización de subjetividades dentro del segmento 16-34, el 38% del electorado.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Tinelli comparó a Macri con Yiya Murano y se sumó a las críticas al Lawfare

Vinculó a Macri con los aprietes de la AFIP y hasta insinuó que el ex presidente era el jefe de una banda que presionaba jueces.


Marcelo Tinelli criticó a Mauricio Macri y lo vinculó a los "aprietes" de la AFIP después de que se conocieran maniobras del organismo que perjudicaron a Cristóbal López. Además cuestionó el exceso de las prisiones preventivas.

Tinelli mantuvo una relación oscilante con Macri. Durante la campaña de 2015 pareció estar más cerca de Daniel Scioli, pero una vez que asumió como presidente se acercó al ex titular de Boca. El primer encuentro, en 2016, sirvió para limar asperezas entre ambos, luego el ex Presidente le ofreció ser candidato de Cambiemos.


En ese ínterin se reunió con varios referentes del peronismo federal. Muy cercano a Sergio Massa también se vio con Florencio Randazzo y Miguel Ángel Pichetto, sin embargo nunca se decidió a candidatearse.

Tras la salida de Macri del poder, Tinelli volvió a ponerse de la vereda de enfrente. Se sumó a la Mesa contra el hambre que convocó Alberto y asistió al discurso inaugural del Presidente en el Congreso.

Días atrás publicó una foto en su cuenta de Instagram en donde se lo ve a Massa dándole una palmada en la espalda en la apertura de sesiones legislativas. Circuló otra imagen del conductor charlando con sus otrora enemigos de La Cámpora Andrés Larroque y Máximo Kirchner junto a Federico Otermin, titular de la Cámara de Diputados bonaerense.

"Mientras Yiya Murano desde el exterior nos da recetas de las masitas que tenemos que comer, me pregunto leyendo esto de las encarcelaciones por presiones de algunos medios a los jueces, y los cierres y quiebras de empresas por aprietes a la AFIP, si todo esto lo lideraba alguien", escribió el conductor en su cuenta de Twitter.

La referencia a Macri, que el miércoles participó de una charla en Nicaragua, y su comparación con la "Envenenadora de Monserrat" marcan la distancia de Tinelli con el ex Presidente. Incluso se pregunta si no fue el jefe de una banda que, al menos, se dedicaba a presionar empresas y decidía las prisiones preventivas de ex funcionarios kirchneristas.

Poco antes se había mostrado sorprendido al descubrir "maniobras del anterior gobierno para perjudicar a empresas, a sus dueños y a todos los trabajadores" publicadas por Ámbito.

En la nota se explica una denuncia de la Sindicatura General de la Nación contra la AFIP por haber forzado la quiebra de Oil Combustibles, una empresa de Cristóbal López que hasta hace 3 años era socio de Tinelli en la productora Ideas del Sur.

The marketing of political marketing



Rubén Weinsteiner

Abstract 

 

Has political marketing been over-marketed? This article ± taking a definition of political marketing that (controversially) excludes news management and ``spin’’ control ± does not seek to ``prove’’ that it has, merely to suggest that the impact of marketing in politics is not directly analogous to its effectiveness in business because of differences between a business context and a political one. We argue specifically that political marketing programmes can sometimes do harm, and two case studies ± from Canada and Britain ± are examined to illuminate this. The claim is that marketing is thus less relevant in politics, both at the level of description and prescription. The broader aim of the article is to sensitise students and researchers alike to the differences in commercial and political contexts, differences of which practitioners must be aware if they are to utilise political marketing to its best advantage.

Has political marketing been over marketed?

To question whether the field of political marketing has itself been over- marketed may seem untimely, both since political marketing is far from being universally accepted among political scientists at the conceptual level, and because of its obvious attractions as a normative-rational model of what is occurring in electioneering to-day, particularly in the USA. But its advocates such as Kotler (1999) have a tendency to perceive the political and commercial contexts as essentially similar. We, however, seek to suggest that media and the press, with their own agendas of information manufacture, are often more influential on public opinion than political advertising and other communication techniques of commercial derivation. Marketing is a business discipline whose relevance lies primarily in business: we should not assume that political contexts are invariably analogous to business to the extent that methods can be imported and used with equal effect.

However, the genre ``political marketing’’ may be seen to function at several levels, since it is both descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive, in that political marketing analyses provide us with a structure of business derived labels to explain, map, nuance and condense the exchange dynamics of an election campaign; offering the possibility of new perspectives for interpreting elections. But it is also prescriptive. Implicitly or explicitly, many academics have been saying that this is something parties and candidates ought to do if they are to fulfil their mission of winning elections. ``Political marketing’’ may now be a recognised sub-discipline, but it is also a recommendation.

It is this prescriptive status that this article questions, not in the sense of doubting that the application of political marketing has clear value as an organising concept, but rather to claim that this value has certain limitations. ``Political marketing’’ is seldom, alone, a panacea. The claim of this article is that its proponents may sometimes downplay the fact that they advocate a volatile weapon that can on occasion harm those who employ it. The foundation, though not the proof, of such a claim is established through the use of two historically significant case studies, the British General Election of 1992 and the Canadian General Election of 1993.

Politics and the marketing concept

There are of course many apparent parallels between the selling of politicians and the selling of certain products. Most obviously, politics sell an abstract and intangible product; it is value laden; it embodies a certain level of promise about the future, some kind of attractive life vision, or anything whose satisfactions are not immediate but long-term, vague and uncertain. Vendors of products which share the above characteristics will have legitimate things to say to politicians and the analogies are with promise-based offers. Many of the methods used correlate with those used to sell products where information is complex or contradictory and not easily retained by the audience like insurance or finance. Thus Harrop (1990) sees political marketing as essentially a form of services marketing: marketing a party consists in projecting belief in its ability to govern (and political parties are service organisations). But there is scepticism about services and therefore parties need to reassure: they must eliminate all perception of risk. The ideal party, he claims, would be a political version of a Holiday Inn.

The rise of political marketing

Political marketing, using a definition of commercial marketing by GroÈnroos (1990) can be defined as ``seeking to establish, maintain and enhance long-term voter relationships at a profit for society and political parties, so that the objectives of the individual political actors and organisations involved are met. This is done by mutual exchange and fulfillment of promises’’ (Henneberg, 1996). The political ``product’ is some amalgam of policy, leader image, inherited memory, promise, and it is also a referendum on past performance.

Political marketing would appear to be distinguished from propaganda by its conceptualisation of voters as customers and its consequent stress on market-research-driven policy. For consumer marketers, there is no value independent of what the customer determines. The ideological turnaround of the Clinton administration in his first term is an example: ``Clinton gave people what they wanted to hear, with just the right language, words and phrases that would resonate with the American public’’ (Johnson, 1997). Nor is it something that is done just at election periods. Early in the Reagan years observers began to speak of a new political phenomenon, the permanent campaign (Blumenthal, 1982): that is, that the methods used to gain office would now be used to sustain it. Thus political marketing was accorded a new credibility: it was not merely the corpus of tricks that got government elected; it had become, in a sense, the government ± the organising principle round which policy was constructed.


Far from being universally accepted, some political scientists have treated
the concept of political marketing with condescension, Philo (1993) dismissing
what he calls a ``shallow science of imagistics’’, while for Bowler and Farrel
(1992) the marketing literature is ``an exercise in rationalising success or failure
in hindsight’’ rather than offering any theoretical insight. One does not have to
embrace political marketing in every respect to notice that most criticism is
grounded in normative models, in ideals of democratic behaviour (Jamieson, 1049 1992; Franklin, 1994).These models sometimes seem out of touch with reality,
for example the normative model of voting decision making based on objective
information and full deliberation. Voters cannot follow this model because of
the intrinsic complexity of the decision-making task; therefore they use
cognitive short-cuts and cues in order to facilitate a decision (Newman and
Sheth, 1987).


But a small group of political scientists have embraced the concept, arguing that its analyses bring distinctive strengths lacking in orthodox political science treatments. For Bartle and Griffith (2001), marketing’s contribution lies in the broader theories of demand it introduces, such as voter aspiration, and applied tools like segmentation. They argue that consumer-behaviour related models seem to grasp the complexities of voter decision-making best, although other political scientists are hostile to this approach. Scammell (1999) echoes their further argument: ``curiously, however, political science voting models seem reluctant to build in image/reputation as a major element. The standard voting model continues to rely on party identification, issue perceptions and to a lesser extent leader evaluations.’’ Harrop (1990) also stresses the importance of image in marketing’s potential contribution to political science: most studies of voting behaviour, such as Himmelweit’s consumer model, stress policy and ideology. But Harrop has argued that image is also critical ± such as competence or trustworthiness ± and it is here that the tools of marketing analysis help. Scammell (1999) also believes, following on, that an even more important contribution is the strategic focus that marketing brings, ``the prime distinctive contribution of the marketing literature . . . .it shifts the focus from the techniques of promotion to the overall strategic objectives of the party/ organisation.’’

Values and ethos

The work of these critics has value both in interpreting marketing to the political science profession and focusing our attention on what its special contribution to the study and practice of politics can be. Yet there remain differences between the political and consumer ``product’’, which lead to distinctions in the content of their marketing. Politics is concerned with affirmation of values. Thus, a political issue is not merely a product to be merchandised, but a vibrant value symbol connecting with an individual’s sense of who and what they are. In such cases, political views and decisions are part of the social self construction of the individual. Voting for a particular party can be, and certainly has been historically, a source of social identity.



Indeed this is one reason why the emotional appeal to values can be more effective politically than almost any other kind of appeal (Etzioni, 1984).

Ultimately the proposition that values in the political ``product’ are more important than those in a manufactured product can neither be proved nor disproved. Buying a consumer product is not value neutral either: with the ascent of branding, values have become more important as products/brands cease (if ever they were) to be defined by their utility function alone, and became endowed with the symbolic meanings and lifestyle associations that advertising has poured into them. Values enter many purchase decisions ± for example, environmental ones.

But it is possible nevertheless to argue that political debate today has become largely one of values. What we often mean by a political issue is a value symbol, and many such issues would not have an identity independent of what has been called the ``civil war of values’’. ``Issues’’ gain momentum because of their value symbolism. If political argument were simply about utilitarian appeals, most such debate would have been silenced long ago. The strength of this value orientation means that political partisanship is often affirmed by a moral ethos which is different from that of consumer marketing, which contains little for example that is really like negative advertising (so-called comparative advertising is a mere echo). Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996) point out that in 1992, 50 US states with 62 per cent of the voting age population suffered full negative campaigns. And what is called political marketing sometimes goes beyond even attack and distortion to actual invention. Technological resources are being used to edit truth. A 1996 study found 28 per cent of the 188 commercials scrutinised contained questionable usage of technology: ``news conferences that were never held, debates that never took place, use of audio or video to stereotype or ridicule opponents’’ (USA Today, 1996). In reality the phrase ``political marketing’’ may appear to be used as a convenient shorthand for a host of loosely related activities .

Media, complexity and turbulence

Political marketing, and political communication phenomena, are distinguished from consumer marketing also by the arbitration of an independent communications power centre, the mass or ``free’’ media which they may be able to influence but cannot control. Yet the availability of such free media is limited in most business situations: indeed many business schools do not even run courses on public relations. In politics, free media are more important. Thus political marketing has to be viewed as a complex two-step communication process that influences the consumer directly, but also indirectly through the medianship of the free media. Such media ± as with the ad-watches which have become an institutionalised feature of the US press ± comment on political marketing but in the process relay its imagery: in this dialogue between political marketing and the mainstream media the advertisements and such become political occurrences themselves. Political marketing texts may thus stand in their own right as autonomous historical events with political consequences of their own, such as the ``Daisy’’ advertisement of 1964 (O’Shaughnessy, 1990).

What is inscribed in a piece of political communication is merely the
beginning of a journey which could end anywhere, even having the reverse
consequences to those anticipated. This degree of turbulence in the political
environment ± especially during elections, the primary focus of political
marketers ± make the problem of control greater than in the business 1051 environment. In this sense, consumer marketing as an analogy may be overly static, since a business can control its image, as a party cannot: one only has to study the conservative administration of John Major in Britain (1992-1997) with its circa 50 scandals (of very varying degrees of magnitude). The fluidity of political situations is enhanced also by new communications media that have energised political pace, particularly in the condensed space of an election, so that parties and politicians can post immediate replies on the Web site when once there would have a one or two day delay for a measured response (Johnson, 1997).

Spin, rhetoric and symbolism

The British (Labour) Government has often been cited in debates on the practice, and the ethics, of political marketing. But the phenomenon of the Blairite regime also offers us the chance to seek to define the parameters of political marketing. Here we have chosen to operate a definition that places it in the realm of primarily commercially derived persuasion techniques and concepts, an organising paradigm immigrated from commerce. The term ``political marketing’’ can be used too loosely, to refer to anything from rhetoric to spin doctoring, or simply to every kind of political communication that has its genesis in public opinion research. It has become a useful hold-all for disparate entities which at an earlier phase in history would have been termed ``populism’’ or ``propaganda’, or, when used in the strictly business context, would go under headings like ``corporate communications’’ or public relations.

But what is being done to communicate the policies of the British government actually bears limited resemblance to anything which would be described by the textbooks of consumer marketing, or inscribed in its practice. Labour are specialists, certainly, in the manipulation of free media or ``spin’’, the art of affixing a desirable interpretation on to a still mobile situation, and the rhetorical and symbolic strategies that might further such manipulation. But it is comparatively rare that a business will need the arts of ``spin’’ in communicating with its public. What I think critics really mean by calling this marketing is ``political corporatism’’, with its associated activities of co- ordinating party spokespersons to be `` on message’’, the clearing of ministerial speeches with communications officers, the issuing of MPs with pagers, etc.

The suggestion in this article that news management and ``spin’’ cannot properly be called political marketing is bound to be a controversial one. For critics they are a clear part of conventional marketing, either subsumed under the category of positioning or in the related conceptual domain of public relations. In one respect in particular they have a case. To wear a contemporary brand is to make a public announcement of affiliation and therefore of trust, and when the brand seems to betray that trust ± as in the case of Nike, Gap and others who were accused of exploiting under-age labour in the third world ± public disenchantment has ultimately entailed, at least for the CEOs of some companies, the kind of public pressures and visibility more naturally 1052 associated with politics. But the level of press interrogation facing a senior politician to-day on an almost daily basis, is generally less apparent in business. To survive, a politician must also exploit the public visibility of his office by organised appeals to the media. It is those appeals that matter in terms of the political impact made, more so than the more ritualised political marketing effort: to call them the same thing is to stretch conceptual elasticity .

Participation

Marketing may not help the politicians. It may be argued that reliance on commercially derived political marketing techniques to win elections helps undermine the role of active participation in politics to-day, to the future detriment of those who employ them. Britain’s ``new’’ Labour Party, which created a substantial ``credit card’’ membership through advertising ± their membership telephone number was showcased in all its communications (O’Shaughnessy, 1999) ± was later to discover the fickleness of its new membership base. Under this argument, the virtues of political marketing for a party could be more short term than long term. Marketing may fail to engender the kind of proselytising organisation which Ellul (1973) reckons to be central to the successful working of propaganda. A part of the theory of persuasion is that we internalise our adherence by working for a cause, therefore engaging in self-persuasion and retrospectively justifying our actions. The lack of active participation in politics today (Richardson, 1995) makes for a superficiality of support, and less direct link between governors and governed. An extreme case of this was Forza Italia.

What marketers neglect

It is possible to argue that political marketers have tended to neglect some relevant concepts and techniques on offer from consumer marketing. ``Relationship marketing’’, for example, is a useful concept: it is not that politicians do not seek to build relationships with party members, or with voters, merely that the concept of relationship marketing and the literature on it would both sensitise political practitioners to the importance of that dimension and educate them with a litany of procedures and ideas for its implementation. Politicians might realise that their parties, indeed they themselves, function as brands. Again, the writings on brand loyalty (Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1993) could be of benefit ± how are brands, essentially a form of condensed meaning, sustained and how is loyalty to them kept alive?

Political marketing is offered not only as an analytic framework but also as a problem-solving tool. But its evangelists should be aware of generic criticisms of consumer marketing, for example, that research-led marketing is constricted
by the limitations of the consumer’s imagination and may not surface their
latent, unarticulated wants. Yet some original products, such as the Sony
Walkman under the leadership of Akito Mori, were actually created in defiance
of market research findings. Research convergence and producer bureaucracy
may tend to make for a uniformity in product forms and functions: the political
equivalency would be unadventurous leadership and bland policies, and both 1053 are perhaps based on an economist’s image of the consumer as having complete self-knowledge and an established and stable hierarchy of preferences.
Political marketing methodologies may also tempt us to use communication to fill the space vacated by ideas and ideology (Sherman, 1987) as with the Tories in Canada 1993: but the combination of marketing acumen and intellectual vacuity is one voters might recognise.

Two case studies: control and interpretation

Two case studies have been chosen to illuminate the potential problems of political marketing. In the first place political marketing always carries a risk factor. We cannot control the destination of a communication text but merely initiate that voyage, for what is encoded is not necessarily what is decoded. Political marketing can provide material for a party’s enemies, including its enemies in the media, who can fix an interpretation on a text which is quite different to that which the party intended. It is through the media’s role as self- appointed election referee that much political advertising is viewed. But when, say, television news shows a slice of a political advertisement, it is framed by a comment; as, of course, are the multiple ``ad watches’’ orchestrated by the American press. It may be the case then that we can speak not of political marketing but of a media-arbitered image of political marketing.

A political marketing text can also receive unintentional readings; a message will give a content, but it can also give off a tone which undermines intent. Thus a projection of ``slickness’’ may be persuasive in a commercial context: but in politics it might suggest manipulation. In the environment of another culture the meaning might be different again ± in Peru, for example the polished, American style campaign advertisements made for Vargas Llosa were interpreted by Peruvians (most of them poor) as an index of a rich, out-of-touch candidate (Siegel, 1991). A political context complicates the interpretation of a message: a ``bold’’ attack ad might be seen not as courageous but as desperate, for example. Political advertising may be viewed as an index of a party’s corporate personality, but in the process providing unintentional reinforcement of people’s half-articulated fears about candidate or party. A text can act as a symbol to trigger inconvenient memories: thus the rejection of the Canadian Tory advertising in the case described below occurred partly because it was perceived as symbolic of the uncaring political ethos of the 1980s: the Tories were viewed as part of an era and an ethos Canadians felt they had outgrown.

The aim of the Canadian Tory advertising in their general election of 1993 was to stigmatise the leadership qualities of Liberal leader Jean Chretien: a sequence of photographs depicted him becoming increasingly confused, with the comment ``I personally would be very embarrassed if (Chretien) were to become the Prime Minister of Canada’’ (Whyte, 1994). One of these images revealed the right side of Chretien’s face, his mouth crooked from nerve injury sustained in youth. Yet the media chose to affix an interpretation on the text that said the advertisement was an attack on physical disability; thus, to be Tory was to hate people with disabilities. Television reports chose the ugliest parts of the images and the script. For most voters, their only exposure to the advertisements was through the interpretative framework attached by television. An experiment at Simon Fraser University found people reacted far more negatively to the broadcasts than to the advertisements themselves. The result of this election was devastating (Globe, 1993), and the Tories were left with just two parliamentary seats. It had become ``politically incorrect to be a Tory’’ (Whyte, 1994).

Our second case is ``Jennifer’s ear’’, an advertisement that used the story of a

sick child to attack the British Conservative Government’s NHS policy, and was shown in the second week of the 1992 UK general election campaign. Again the strategy seemed to make sense. The Conservatives were probably at their least believable when they claimed that ``the NHS is safe in our hands’’, and it was natural for Labour to seek to exploit their area of perceived greatest vulnerability. A powerful ``attack’’ advertisement at the start of the campaign would put them on the defensive where they had least to defend. Such an advertisement should not be rational but emotional, seeking to achieve the kind of resonance with viewers and media reduplication that the sinister ``Willie Horton’ had achieved in the USA. This resonance would be gained by a human story and not abstract argument. If the story was also true, grounded in fact, the power of its symbolism could sustain the entire Labour campaign.

As with the anti-Chretien advertisement in Canada, the broadcast further alienated an already suspicious media that was determinedly fault-finding. They criticised ``Jennifer’’ for accuracy, undermining that claim to truthfulness that was central to its power to persuade. Moreover the charge of ``exploitation’’ of a sick child was what actually resounded with the public, not the attack on the NHS: the child’s vulnerability worked against, not for, Labour’s advocacy. Two child actresses portrayed the allegedly true story of two little girls with ``glue ear’’, one immediately treated privately, the other repeatedly delayed on the NHS. But newspapers discovered the identity of the real child and pursued the family: nor was it clear whether the failure to treat was due to lack of resources or incompetence (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992). That week, ``Jennifer’’ constituted nearly 20 per cent of stories on both main television news programmes. ``Jennifer Bennett and her glue ear received more coverage than housing, transport, pensions, law and order, defence, foreign affairs or Europe ± indeed, than several of those put together’’ (Harrison, 1992). Harrison further argues that ``before the election the NHS had seemed Labour’s strongest suit. However, the momentum the party had built up by the middle of the campaign was never regained after the Jennifer Bennett affair broke on 25 March’’.


Thus in 1992 a political campaign that was to some observers impressive in orthodox marketing terms failed against one that appeared almost to embrace a species of anti-marketing. In particular, an apparently uncontrived gesture by Tory leader John Major, where he addressed voters in one town by standing on a soapbox, did appear to achieve that critical connectedness with the public. The soap box was conscripted as his symbol.


The marketing of political marketing



These cases suggest that television and the press are still potentially more 1055 powerful agents of political influence than political marketing via the paid or
free media. At times even a free press can conspire to present a powerful
``dominant view’’ against which all other opinion is perceived as deviant. When

opinion becomes universal among major press protagonists like this, no quantity of shrewd political marketing can probably rectify the situation. In 1992 the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock was leading at the polls. The British press ``decided to crucify him’’. From December 1991-April 1992 the relatively apolitical Sun readers registered an 8.5 per cent swing to the Tories (Mckie, 1995). Techniques used by the press to demonise the Labour Party and its leader Neil Kinnock (Seymour-Ure, 1995) included the Sun newpaper’s eight page pre-election special ``Nightmare on Kinnock Street’’, where, for example, readers were warned that loft conversions would need the approval of lesbian and gay groups on left wing councils: on election day itself the front page featured Mr Kinnock’s head within a light bulb and the headline ``If Kinnock wins to-day will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights’’ (Harrop and Scammell, 1992). Propaganda-like distortions were the order of the day. For example, The Sun in the critical ``Jennifer’s Ear’’ case presented Jennifer’s father as being opposed to Labour’s use of the story when the reverse was true.

Thus the press had become direct participants in the creation of partisan information and not mere conduits of it. The demonstrable impact of this kind of news manufacture may seem to transcend any attempts of parties to ``market’’ themselves. Under this argument, political marketing may be seen as the junior relative of press activism: this would not negate its importance, merely that its impact must be seen in the context of often more significant drivers of political influence.

Conclusion

Case studies, of course, ``prove’’ nothing, merely establish a foundation for further argument. What this article has sought to achieve is a sensitising ± for both researchers and students alike ± of the differences between contexts in which political and business managers operate. They are separate ecologies, and the aim of this piece has been to challenge notions of political marketing as universal panacea: there is no one simple, easy transport from a business context, where social values are one of a number of considerations, to the political one, where values are the core of the process. Important conceptual similarities do of course exist and the same techniques criss-cross the two domains, but this makes them related, not identical. These points are not irrelevant, since while language directs perception it also limits it. Political marketing is not exactly like commodity marketing. When we use the term ``political marketing’’ as a convenient shorthand, we see as a result some things in political exchange relationships with great clarity, but perhaps miss other significant features in the complex environment of political communication, since perception is directed only to those areas common to political and consumer marketing. The phrase is an analogy rather than an accurate scientific term, and perhaps this has been somewhat overlooked in the enthusiasm to create a new field.

Has political marketing been over-marketed? The question cannot be proven and is perhaps trivial. What is ultimately important is perhaps less the establishment of the stature of political marketing along some hierarchy, than an understanding of the contexts in which it succeeds and fails, and why.

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The marketing of political marketing

Rubén Weinsteiner

Bernbach; THINK SMALL


La revolución Bernbach

La pequeña agencia que conducía Bill Bernbach le dio al “extraño autito” una imagen de marca y personalidad que no sólo cambió la forma en que se publicitaban los automóviles, sino que también demostró que la buena publicidad podía ser aguda y entretenida. En lugar de mostrar imágenes recargadas con exclamaciones, DDB optó por la simpleza. Dave Saunders, en su libro 20th Century Advertising, lo describe así: “Era lo opuesto a la publicidad aspiracional, la antítesis del ‘sueño americano’. Los avisos de VW eran de una honestidad apabullante; con pensamientos provocativos, que trataban al lector como a un amigo inteligente”.

En DDB desplegaban lo que Bernbach denominó ‘S’s: simple surprise and smile’.Sobre esta premisa –y, obviamente la de “VW, vendemos autos” – nació “Think small” (Piense en pequeño). El formato también era simple. En el aviso aparecían fotos del producto real en blanco y negro, que ocupaban 80 por ciento de la superficie, con copies que combinaban información y humor.

Con la publicidad como bandera de presentación, el singular modelo de VW creció hasta convertirse en icono cultural, porque el mensaje que se comunicaba no era el de vender un producto, sino lo que el dueño de un Escarabajo llegaría a obtener de la marca y el producto. VW se transformó en un auto “familiar y querible” para la mayoría de los consumidores. Los grandes fabricantes locales de automóviles reaccionaron al éxito del Escarabajo y lanzaron al mercado diseños más compactos. La repercusión alcanzó igualmente a las agencias, ya que muchas comenzaron a imitar el trabajo de DDB. La campaña -Think small- de VW, ocupa –aún en estos días– el primer lugar entre las Top 100 campañas de publicidad del siglo, y su creador, Bill Bernach, ostenta el mismo puesto en el ranking de los Top 100 Advertising People que elaboró Advertising Age a fines de 1999.

La creatividad de DDB y la fama del Escarabajo fueron una buena combinación. Una de las mejores piezas de la era Bernbach es ‘It’s ugly but it gets you there’ (Es feo pero lo lleva allí). En ella aparece la nave espacial que hizo posible el viaje a la luna.

Los décadas del ‘60 y del ‘70 representaron uno de los capítulos más importantes en la historia de la publicidad. VW, a través de su comunicación global, fue una de las primeras marcas en mostrar el vehículo como elemento de placer, satisfacción y emoción. El impacto en las ventas también fue notable. En 10 años, VW había vendido cinco millones de modelos Beetle sólo en los Estados Unidos. El Escarabajo alcanzó, de este modo, popularidad tanto en América como en Europa, sobre todo entre los jóvenes, quienes asociaban el ‘Beetle’ con sus estilos de vida personal.


William Bill Bernbach nació el 13 de agosto de 1911 en el distrito de Bronx, Nueva York. Hijo de Jacob Bernbach, diseñador de la ropa de mujeres, y Rebecca Reiter Bernbach. Su aspecto era de un hombre ligero, pálido, nada atlético... físicamente inadecuado, algunos dirían. Después de completar su educación en una escuela pública, se graduó de la Universidad de Nueva York en 1932, con calificaciones altísimas, aunque al culminar sus estudios Bernbach se sintió afortunado cuando encontró un trabajo de cartero en Schenley Distillers...


Fue en Schenley donde conoció a Grover Whalen, el presidente de la Compañía, quien pronto tomó al luminoso jovencito bajo su ala. Cuando Whalen se fue para la Feria Mundial de Nueva York en 1939, Bernbach fue con él como escritor personal. Estando allá, Bernbach se encontró con el legendario diseñador Paul Rand, director de arte de la agencia William Weintraub, en cuya compañía visitaron galerías de arte y museos durante los descansos del almuerzo, y hablaban sobre el arte y los trabajos de copia en armonía. Pronto Bernbach comprendió cómo tales colaboraciones podrían liberar el trabajo creativo de cualquier agencia.



Cuando Bernbach entró en Grey Publicidad en 1945, subió rápidamente de redactor de textos publicitarios a jefe de copia del director creativo. Bernbach temió que el ascenso en Grey disminuyera su apetito para "inspirar" el trabajo, así que empezó a hablar al supervisor de contabilidad Ned Doyle y a Herb Strauss sobre abrir una nueva agencia... fue así que Doyle Dane Bernbachpudo ver la luz abrió en la 350 Avenida Madison, junto con Gage, McCann-Erickson, J. Walter Thompson, Young & Rubicam, Robinson y muchos otros.


Desde junio de 1949, cuando DDB abrió sus puertas, hasta que la leucemia se lo llevase a la tumba, Bernbach revisó cada tarea con convicción inspirada, con arrogancia (Usted no puede hacer este trabajo si usted no es arrogante, decía). Él había inventado su concepto de equipo de arte-copia para Grey Publicidad y había traído a DDB una forma, un estilo enfocado y dedicado que produjo, con justo orgullo, campañas brillantes.


Bernbach insistió en aprender cómo los productos de sus clientes se relacionan con los consumidores y qué cualidades humanas y emocionales entran en juego. El desafío se volvió en decidir cómo comunicar mejor esos elementos, en televisión e imprenta, y capturar el entendimiento y apoyo del consumidor.


Durante sus 33 años en DDB, Bernbach no sólo hizo que la agencia logre $ 1.2 mil millones en facturaciones, sino que además cambió la dinámica de la publicidad y el paisaje cultural de América; por eso, a la muerte de Bernbach, Krone dijo: "Él elevó la publicidad a arte y a nuestros trabajos a una profesión".



Pese al tiempo trascurrido y a estar en pleno siglo XXI, la figura de Bernbach todavía inspira a muchos a una jornada creativa llena de sueños: .

El conocimiento está finalmente disponible para todos., pero sólo la verdadera intuición, saltando del conocimiento a una idea, es suya y sólo suya.
Todo lo que usted escribe, todo en una página: cada palabra, cada símbolo gráfico, cada sombra, debe llevar más allá el mensaje que usted está intentando llevar.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Rubén Weinsteiner

El embudo invertido y la mente del votante




Por Rubén Weinsteiner




Resulta fundamental en el período de construcción de la visibilidad de un político, la sobresimplificación. Menos es mas.

Si le tiro a alguien cinco pelotas de tenis a la vez, no va a atajar ninguna, si le tiro una, la ataja.

Cuando entrevisto a un político por primera vez, me doy cuenta que en los primeros cinco minutos de charla, voy a aprender más de él, que lo que el votante promedio va a saber de él en los próximos cinco años.

Es tan poco lo que va poder retener el votante en su cabeza, que el plan de comunicación debe empezar por un proceso de selección. Hay que seleccionar lo que tiene más oportunidad de entrar en la mente de la gente, armar una lista de ideas, y luego cada una ellas deberá luchar duramente por su supervivencia en la lista.

El enemigo que impide el impacto de los mensajes que se envía, es el volumen mismo de la comunicación. Entendiendo el problema tenemos la solución.

Cada día, miles de mensajes de marketing político, en las calles, en los medios y en la Web social compiten por lograr un lugar en la mente del votante. Y la mente es el campo de batalla.

No hay que focalizarse en la mente del político, ni en nuestra propia mente, hay que hacer foco en la mente del votante.

Como en un embudo, donde en la boca ancha aparecen una gran cantidad de datos que se nos ocurren para comunicar, solo llega lo que consigue pasar por la salida del embudo, es decir un mínimo de información, una idea, no más.

Hay que dar vuelta el embudo y comunicar directamente lo que pasa por la salida del embudo, una parte mínima de lo que a priori queremos comunicar. Para eso hay que dejar de pensar exclusivamente en el emisor y concentrarse en el receptor, en la manera de percibir del segmento objetivo, no en la realidad del candidato, sino en las formas de percepción, ya que la realidad es la percepción.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Millennials moving back in with their parents and parents moving in with their adult children


More adults now share their living space, driven in part by parents living with their adult children


American adults are increasingly sharing a home with other adults with whom they are not romantically involved. This arrangement, known as “doubling up” or shared living, gained notice in the wake of the Great Recession, and nearly a decade later, the prevalence of shared living has continued to grow.

While the rise in shared living during and immediately after the recession was attributed in large part to a growing number of Millennials moving back in with their parents, the longer-term increase has been partially driven by a different phenomenon: parents moving in with their adult children.

In 2017, nearly 79 million adults (31.9% of the adult population) lived in a shared household – that is, a household with at least one “extra adult” who is not the household head, the spouse or unmarried partner of the head, or an 18- to 24-year-old student. In 1995, the earliest year with comparable data, 55 million adults (28.8%) lived in a shared household. In 2004, at the peak of homeownership and before the onset of the home foreclosure crisis, 27.4% of adults shared a household.

A shared household is defined somewhat differently from a multigenerational household (although the two can overlap), as shared households can include unrelated adults and adult siblings. More adults live in shared households than multigenerational households: In 2014, 61 million Americans (including children) resided in multigenerational households.



The nearly 79 million adults living in a shared household include about 25 million adults who own or rent the household. An additional 10 million adults are the spouse or unmarried partner of the head of the household. Another 40 million, or 16% of all adults, are the “extra adult” in the shared household. This share living in someone else’s household is up from 14% in 1995.

Adults who live in someone else’s household typically live with a relative. Today, 14% of adults living in someone else’s household are a parent of the household head, up from 7% in 1995. Some 47% of extra adults today are adult children living in their mom and/or dad’s home, down from 52% in 1995. Other examples of extra adults are a sibling living in the home of a brother or sister, or a roommate.

In 2017, only 18% of extra adults lived in a household in which the head was unrelated (typically a housemate or roommate). Living with nonrelatives has become less prevalent since 1995, when 22% of extra adults lived with a nonrelative.

Regardless of their relationship to the household head, young adults are more likely than middle-aged or older adults to live in someone else’s household. Among those younger than 35, 30% were the extra adult in someone else’s household in 2017, up from 26% in 1995. Among 35- to 54-year-olds, 12% were living in someone else’s household, an increase from 9% in 1995. Today 10% of 55- to 64-year-olds are an extra adult, up from 6% in 1995. The only adult group that isn’t more likely than before to live in another adult’s household is those ages 75 and older (10% in both years).

The rise in shared living may have implications for the nature of household finances – that is, how income and expenses are shared among members.

In addition, the increase in “doubling up” is offsetting other social trends bearing on the nature of the nation’s households and demand for housing. While Americans are less likely to be living with a spouse or unmarried partner in their household, the rise in doubling up means more adults are living with nonrelatives and with relatives other than romantic partners. As a result, the average number of adults per household has not declined since 1995, and consequently, the number of households per adult has not increased.

In fact, household formation, or the number of households for every 100 adults, has recently fallen to very modest levels for several age groups. For example, in 2017 there were 31 households headed by an adult younger than 35 for every 100 adults in that age bracket (adjusted for the age bias in head-of-household status), among the lowest rate of household formation for this age group since the early 1970s. Decreased household formation is not confined to young adults. Last year there were 61 households headed by a 65- to 74-year-old for every 100 65- to 74-year-olds. While this marked a slight statistical increase from 2014, the last time household formation rates were that low among this demographic was 1972.

The rise in shared living is likely not simply a response to rising housing costs and weak incomes. Nonwhite adults are much more likely than white adults to be doubled up, mirroring their greater propensity to live in multigenerational households. Nonwhite adults are a growing share of the adult population, and thus some of the rise in shared living arrangements is due to longer-running demographic change.


Rubén Weinsteiner