Las PASO constituyen una herramienta para conocer cómo votan aquellos que no responden encuestas


¿Son las PASO una "gran encuesta"?




Se ha instalado bastante la idea de que las elecciones primarias, simultáneas y obligatorias son “una gran encuesta”. En las recientes PASO presidenciales participaron 25.861.050 electores, un 76,35% del total empadronado, lo que indica que, si se la toma como encuesta, el margen de error fue de 0,0197%, algo impensado para cualquier encuesta ad hoc. Si bien podemos decir que las PASO son una medición sumamente precisa de las intenciones de voto de cara a las generales, no podemos, sin embargo, afirmar del mismo modo que sea exacta. Recordemos ambas definiciones: la exactitud es qué tan centrada es la medición con respecto al valor “verdadero”, la precisión es qué tan disperso puede ser el resultado de una medición cuando se mide repetidas veces la misma cantidad. Dicho de otra manera, las PASO son una excelente medición pero de algo que no es exactamente lo que necesitamos medir para predecir el resultado de las Generales.


Decir que las PASO no es una encuesta exacta en este sentido es reconocer que muy probablemente no sucederá exactamente lo mismo en las Generales. El resultado del 27 de octubre no será una mera proyección de los votantes que no participaron o que votaron a algunas de las cuatro listas que no pasaron el filtro del 1.5%. El mero hecho de que no estén presentes estas cuatro listas y que, además, el resultado de la misma sea, ahora sí, “vinculante”, en el sentido de definitorio de los cargos a elegir, hacen a las Elecciones Generales de naturaleza diferente. Esto lo sabemos también a fuerza de experiencia: entre las PASO 2011 y las Generales 2011 se movieron 21 puntos (CFK creció 6 puntos, Binner 7 puntos y Duhalde decreció 6 puntos), y entre las PASO 2015 y las generales 2015 se movieron 8 puntos (Macri creció 4 puntos, Scioli decreció 1 punto y Massa creció 1 punto). Pero fueron tan pocas las ocasiones hasta el momento que las especulaciones acerca de cuánto se moverán los guarismos el 27O en relación a las PASO difícilmente puedan basarse únicamente en resultados anteriores.


Algunos investigadores, generalmente afines a las ciencias de los datos, argumentan esta inexactitud reforzando la idea de volatilidad en las intenciones de voto, como si hubiera una suerte de inconmensurabilidad en las preferencias electorales. Para ellos, el resultado de las Generales es diferente al de las PASO sobre todo porque la postura de la gente cambia semana a semana, incluso día a día. Esto conlleva una concepción fragmentaria del comportamiento electoral sesgada al plano de las decisiones, como si se tratara de una mera sumatoria de individuos, excluyendo o relativizando la noción de ideología en el análisis. De todas maneras, consideramos cierto que es importante comprender que el electorado es dinámico y que esa dinámica se explica mejor en términos de un rango de resultados posibles que de números cerrados.


Pero, además, esa dinámica también se explica mejor si se piensa más en un sujeto colectivo que en una sumatoria de individuos, o en un contexto más que en un cúmulo de preferencias. Las Generales arrojan resultados diferentes a las PASO porque el contexto se modifica de una elección a otra, y no sólo porque los candidatos que pierden protagonismo empiezan a generar posiciones favorables en uno u otro sentido, lo que facilita la migración de electores en busca del “voto útil”, sino también porque se suman nuevas variables a considerar en el momento del voto. La búsqueda de consensos tiene para las Generales una mayor incidencia. Aquí es importante destacar que si no logramos discernir con precisión cuáles son las variables que inducen estos procesos y transformaciones es porque las herramientas disponibles para estudiarlos son, justamente, inexactas.


En este sentido, la sistematización de mediciones hechas con la misma metodología que arrojen, mas allá del margen de error, un rango de resultados con su evolución en el tiempo a medida que se acercan las Generales, es de alguna manera la mejor de las estrategias para entender esta dinámica. A eso, es importante sumar la interpretación del contexto que hacen los diferentes sectores del electorado, para lo cual el complemento con mediciones cualitativas es imprescindible, no sólo porque nos permite atribuirle un sentido más eficiente en términos analíticos que simplemente decir que son los “caprichos” (estado de ánimo, preferencias, etc.) de los electores, sino también porque nos permiten acercarnos a la opinión de sectores usualmente deficientemente alcanzados por las encuestas.


Respecto a este último punto es importante destacar que el alcance deficitario que tienen las encuestas, sobre todo en lo que refiere a alcanzar a perfiles sociales y económicos ubicados en los extremos de la pirámide social, en parte responden a la naturaleza obligatoria del voto. Siendo entonces este un problema que mengua en los lugares donde el voto no es obligatorio. En esos casos (ejemplos clásicos son Chile y EEUU) la capacidad predictiva de las herramientas de medición, incluyendo las mediciones en redes sociales, suele ser bastante más aceptable porque votan “los politizados”. No como sucede aquí, donde también participan los supuestos desinteresados en la política.


Es por todo eso que las PASO tienen una enorme utilidad para la trazabilidad electoral, constituyen una herramienta para conocer cómo votan aquellos que no responden encuestas. Pero, como discutimos en los párrafos anteriores, esto no quiere decir que podamos anticiparnos al resultado de las Generales sólo con un análisis de las mismas. Es necesario un complemento cualitativo y seguimientos cuantitativos acotados pero constantes para desentrañar información sobre segmentos clave del electorado, y así construir un panorama sólido sobre qué resultados esperar en las Generales y, sobre todo, encontrar los puntos estratégicos en los cuales concentrar esfuerzos de campaña.

PASO Salta:en cifras

Más de un millón eligen 445 cargos
En la votación que se desarrolla desde las 8 y hasta las 18 en la provincia de Salta hay más de 16 mil candidatos.


Se usa el sistema de voto electrónico Imagen: Gobierno de Salta


En estas Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias se definen los postulantes que competirán en los comicios generales del 10 de noviembre próximo para elegir gobernador y vicegobernador, once senadores, 30 diputados, 60 intendentes y 343 concejales, según datos aportados por el Tribunal Electoral de Salta.
Este domingo compiten cuatro alianzas, 84 fuerzas políticas y 332 listas que postulan a 15.887 precandidatos. Se vota con Boleta Única Electrónica.
En total, están habilitadas para votar 1.032.851 personas. En la provincia esta la primera elección con un padrón que supera el millón de electores registrados. En 2013, la primera la primaria se hizo con un padrón de 892.049 electores. En 2015 el padrón incluyó a 937.124 ciudadanos y en 2017, a 997.364 electores.

En el padrón, el departamento Capital es el más numeroso, con 436.907 ciudadanos habilitados para votar, de los cuales 416.161 corresponden al municipio Salta.

Esto se traduce en una mayor cantidad de establecimientos escolares habilitados para votar. Este año abrieron sus 453 escuelas, tres más que en 2017. En 2017 se habilitaron 3047 mesas para recibir los votos, mientras que hoy son 3151 mesas, de las cuales 1279 corresponden al departamento Capital.

Este total incluye las mesas de extranjeros, 34 donde pueden votar las personas de nacionalidad distinta a la argentina, que sólo podrán elegir cargos municipales. En total, hay 7090 empadronados que pueden ir a sufragar.
Otro grupo que se destaca en el padrón de electores es el de los menores de 18 años, un total de 36.466.
Los resultados de la elección podrán seguirse en el portal www.electoralsalta.gob.ar desde las 18. Para el periodismo el Tribunal Electoral de la Provincia habilitó un Centro de Prensa en la Ciudad Judicial.
A lomo de mula

La geografía salteña, con localidades de difícil acceso, obligó a que el traslado de los elementos para votar este domingo comenzara el 1 de octubre, cuando el Tribunal Electoral envió el primer bolsín con las máquinas de votación electrónica, las urnas, planillas y otros útiles electorales.

La primera partida fue al circuito electoral Norte, que comprende a Orán, Tartagal, Iruya y Santa Victoria Oeste.

Los materiales fueron enviados en vehículos equipados con seguimiento satelital, para asegurarse de que llegarían a destino. En circuito hay lugares inaccesibles con automotores, por lo que el último tramo del traslado debió hacerse a lomo de mula o caballos.
Seguridad a cargo de 5.000 policías

La Policía de Salta desplegó un operativo de seguridad en todo el territorio provincial con la afectación de alrededor de 5000 efectivos que encargados de cuidar fuera de los establecimientos y harán patrullajes.

La diagramación del operativo de seguridad comprende distintas fases, con “tareas de prevención, durante y después de los comicios”. El antes comenzó ayer a las 20, cuando comenzó a regir la veda electoral.



Hoy desde las 7 las dependencias policiales de todo el territorio provincial comenzaron a emitir las constancias de permanencia a los electores que están a más de 100 kilómetros de su domicilio y no pueden ir a votar.

En septiembre, las ventas minoristas cayeron en picada y acumulan 12 meses de baja consecutiva

Se acumulan 12 meses en baja, en términos interanuales, según un informe de CAME


El 38,7% de los comercios esperan que sus ventas aumenten

Durante septiembre, las ventas minoristas cayeron 14,5% a comparación del mismo período del año pasado, y se acumulan 12 meses de caídas interanuales consecutivas. Los datos surgen del último relevamiento de la Confederación Argentina de la Mediana Empresa ( CAME), difundido este domingo.

Si bien en septiembre las ventas minoristas crecieron 2,1% en relación a agosto, CAME remarcó en su informe que algunos sectores registraron fuerte contracción de actividad. Tal es el caso de Alimentos y bebidas, que sufrió una baja de -12,5%. Se trata del rubro más importante de los observados, ya que representa 23,5% del total analizado.

Otros rubros afectados fueron Electrodomésticos, electrónicos y celulares, cuyas ventas cayeron 18,4%; Farmacia, perfumería y cosmética con una retracción de 13,7%; Indumentaria (-10%), Muebles, decoración y textiles para el hogar (-14%) y Calzado y marroquinería (-15,9%).

En el resto de los rubros, el informe indicó que Bazar y regalos se retrajo 20,4%; Ropa y artículos deportivos, 16,9%; Ferretería, materiales eléctricos y para la construcción, 17,7%; Joyería, relojería y bijouterie, 18,5%; Juguetería y artículos escolares, 16,1% y Neumáticos y repuestos de autos y motos, 12,8%.

Las ventas "acumulan en el año una baja de 12,8%, cuando se compara enero-septiembre de 2019 con iguales meses de 2018", informó la entidad. La medición anual también destacó que las ventas en locales al público cayeron 15,3% y en la modalidad online, bajaron 9%.

"Un dato positivo del mes, fue la mejora en las expectativas para los próximos tres meses: el 38,7% de los comercios esperan que sus ventas aumenten (en agosto sólo el 27,5% esperaba aumento), el 44,2% espera que se mantengan sin cambios y 17% que continúen cayendo (25% en agosto)", agregaron.

Durante el relevamiento se cubrió un universo de 1.100 comercios Pymes de Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Gran Buenos Aires, y el interior del país, en los principales rubros que concentran la venta minorista familiar y tanto con modalidad de venta física como online.

¿Quién inventó la tele?

Martín Caparrós Dos mujeres estadounidenses, ante un receptor de señal televisiva de 1939. CHRIS HUNTER Getty Images

 
Todo gran adelanto tiene su creador. Menos el televisor, sobre cuya autoría planean grandes dudas.

NOS HAN LLAMADO Homo videns. El Homo sapiens, el hombre que sabe, ya no sabe; somos, ahora, hombres y mujeres que miramos —entre otras cosas, para tratar de no saber. Es, se diría, lo que más hacemos.

La media de los 7.500 millones de habitantes del mundo mira casi 4 horas de televisión cada día. Eso quiere decir que hay bastantes que miran 7 u 8 horas, 10 —porque hay otros que no miran nada o casi nada, por pobres, orgullosos, distraídos. Eso quiere decir que cualquier persona, a sus 70, se habrá pasado unos 10 años —120 meses, 3.650 días— enteros mirando la tele. Las dos únicas cosas que habremos hecho más en nuestras vidas son dormir y trabajar; que ya no haya tanta televisión abierta, que ahora sean sobre todo canales de series o fútbol o youtubers, da lo mismo: la tele es una de las tres actividades —la única ¿voluntaria?— a las que dedicamos la mayoría de nuestro tiempo. Y, sin embargo, no sabemos de dónde viene, quién la inventó, cómo, cuándo, por qué. El Homo sapiens se ríe en un rincón.

Cuando era chico aprendí que Franklin había creado el pararrayos, Edison la bombilla, Bell el teléfono, los Lumière el cine, los Wright el avión, Marconi la radio, Fleming la penicilina y así; podía ser cierto o no, pero les daba historias a las cosas. Ahora vivimos rodeados de inventos que no parecen tener inventores, que no parecen tener un origen —y el primero, se diría, fue la televisión: como si la falta de historicidad contemporánea hubiera empezado con el objeto que nos sirve para crear un presente perpetuo. O quizá sea porque, con más y más información, cada vez se hace más difícil disimular que aquellas historias eran cuentos de hadas.

En general, esos grandes inventores no habían inventado nada solos: recordamos a los que consiguieron, de algún modo, aprovechar y sintetizar el trabajo de tantos, los que dieron el último paso del camino que muchos habían empezado a recorrer —pero nos gustan los héroes y nos quedábamos con uno. En este caso no fue posible: la televisión no tiene una historia registrada.

Para empezar, el candidato principal —en esta saga supuestamente americana— era un maldito ruso. Se llamaba Vladímir Kosmich Zworykin, había nacido en 1888 cerca de San Petersburgo y allí se fue a estudiar a sus 17, mientras el bebé de Potemkin rodaba por las escaleras. Y allí se encontró con Borís Lvóvich Rosing, un profesor que intentaba hacer funcionar su “telescopio eléctrico”, una forma de transmitir imágenes de una máquina a otra, y ya empezaba a conseguirlo. Pero después vino la revolución soviética: Zworykin se alistó con los anticomunistas, huyó a Estados Unidos a través de Siberia, consiguió trabajo en una eléctrica llamada Westinghouse, siguió investigando, mejoró el invento y llegó, en 1923, a presentar la patente de un aparato que no terminaba de funcionar.

Mientras, en muchos lugares, otros muchos lo intentaban. Variaban los sistemas y los nombres: la llamaron también iconoscopio, televista, telefoto, emitrón; había intentos, pequeñas emisiones punto a punto, fracasos repetidos; los datos son confusos, las historias se mezclan. Algunos libros insisten en que el primer programa de televisión fue en 1939, hace justo 80 años, en la Feria Mundial de Nueva York, con la presencia estelar de Franklin Delano Roosevelt, poliomielítico de armario —­pero Alemania ya llevaba cuatro años usando el sistema de Zworykin para hacer emisiones regulares a cargo del Estado. El problema es que el Estado alemán, en esos días, estaba a cargo de un señor de bigotitos que nadie quiere asumir de precursor. Así que preferimos olvidarlo: entonces, el invento más poderoso de estas décadas, el que nos reinventó las vidas, no tiene un inventor. Es, quizás, un signo de los tiempos.

Most Americans are wary of industry-funded research


A majority of Americans are skeptical of the impact that industry funding has on scientific research and on the recommendations made by practitioners, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey. The public is somewhat more positive – though still ambivalent – about the effects of government funding on research and practitioner recommendations.

Most U.S. adults (58%) say they trust scientific research findings less if they hear that the research was funded by an industry group. About a third (32%) say industry funding makes no difference in whether they trust research, while only 10% say they trust industry-funded research findings more.

The pattern is similar when it comes to trusting science practitioners’ recommendations. Around six-in-ten Americans (62%) say they trust practitioner recommendations less when they hear the practitioner received financial incentives from an industry group. Around a quarter (27%) say such incentives make no difference; 10% say they trust practitioner recommendations more under these circumstances.



When it comes to the effects of government funding on science research and practitioner recommendations, the public is divided. About half of Americans (48%) say knowing that research received federal government funding makes no difference in whether they trust its findings. About a quarter (28%) say it makes them trust the findings less, and 23% say it makes them trust the findings more.

Similarly, 48% of U.S. adults say knowing that a science practitioner’s recommendation received financial incentives from the government makes no difference in their trust. Around four-in-ten (37%) say such incentives make them trust the recommendation less, while 14% say it makes them trust the recommendation more.

Americans are much more positive about the effects of two other factors included in the survey – open data and independent review – on the trustworthiness of research. A majority of adults (57%) say they trust research findings more when they hear the data is openly available to public, and about half (52%) say the same about research that has been reviewed by an independent committee. The pattern is similar when it comes to the trustworthiness of practitioner recommendations: A majority (68%) trusts recommendations more when the practitioner gets a second opinion, and 43% trust recommendations more if they’re based on an independent committee review.

Public skepticism about industry funding is consistent with past Pew Research Center findings. For example, a 2016 survey found Americans trusted scientists more than food industry leaders to provide full and accurate information about the health effects of eating genetically modified foods. The same survey also found that about a quarter or more of adults thought medical scientists’ research on the effects of GM foods (30%), childhood vaccines (27%) and climate change (26%) was influenced most of the time by the researchers’ desires to help the industries they work for.

Industry-funded research has been controversial in recent decades. For instance, research funded by the tobacco industry in the 1950s sought to discredit emerging science that suggested cigarette smoking caused lung disease. More recently, some scientists have been critical of industry-funded research in food science, arguing it has understated the potentially harmful effects of some food additives.

Science knowledge is strongly related to people’s views of how industry funding affects the reliability of research findings. Those with higher levels of science knowledge are less trusting of research that has received funding from industry groups than are people with medium or low knowledge levels (80% with high science knowledge trust this research less vs. 55% and 30%, respectively).

Men are slightly more likely than women to distrust industry-funded research (61% vs. 54%, respectively), as are white Americans (65%) compared with black (41%) or Hispanic (49%) Americans. People ages 50 and older are more likely than younger adults to distrust industry-funded research findings.

Modest differences emerge between partisans. Democrats and independents who lean Democratic are more likely to distrust industry-funded research than Republicans and Republican leaners (62% vs. 53%, respectively). This difference is largely driven by the opinions of liberal Democrats, who are the most wary of industry-funded research: Nearly three-quarters (73%) say they trust research less if they know it was funded by an industry group. This compares with 52% of moderate and conservative Democrats, 55% of conservative Republicans and half of moderate and liberal Republicans.

Grindetti: "No estamos pidiendo que corten a Mauricio"

"No estamos pidiendo que corten a Mauricio", dijo Grindetti en un acto masivo en el estadio de El Porvenir en Gerli.


Néstor Grindetti relanzó su campaña de cara a los comicios del próximo 27 de octubre: "Estamos mas fuertes que nunca, todos los días recorremos los barrios y recibimos el apoyo de cada uno de los vecinos que nos alientan a no aflojar", dijo ante más de 4 mil vecinos que colmaron el micro estadio del club El Porvenir, en Gerli.


"El triunfo depende de nosotros, tenemos que tocar todos los timbres y hablar con todos los vecinos, somos creíbles porque cumplimos lo que prometimos"., agregó en un acto multitudinario con la presencia de concejales, consejeros escolares, militantes y referentes del espacio que lidera Grindetti en Lanús.

"Les pedimos a los vecinos que al momento de emitir su voto se tomen un momento para pensar en Lanús, no estamos pidiendo que corten a Mauricio (Macri), estamos pidiendo que corten a Depetri que no conoce el municipio y no tiene ninguna propuesta, solo habla de Venezuela o del precio del dolar, pero de proyectos e ideas no escuchamos nada", aseguró el intendente.

Desde hace semanas, Grindetti despliega una campaña muy territorial centrada en reuniones con vecinos, caminatas por los centros comerciales y visitas a barrios humildes mostrando el antes y después de la gestión donde se resalta lo hecho en materia de obra pública y mejoras en los servicios que el Estado municipal brinda a los vecinos.

Desde su equipo, destacan que durante su gestión hubo 1600 cuadras re pavimentadas, 25 mil nuevas luces led , y se incorporó el SAME. Adempas subrayan las obras de mejoras en 13 unidades sanitarias del partido, la nueva clínica veterinaria municipal, la construcción del Puente Olímpico y el Polo Educativo en Villa Jardín, la extensión de la red cloacal para más de 100 mil vecinos nuevos, 700 cámaras de videovigilancia, 500 policías locales nuevos, la lucha contra el narcomenudeo, la nueva sede de licencias de conducir, obras de remodelación en 207 escuelas del distrito, entre otras mejoras.

Estuvieron presentes el diputado provincial, Adrian Urreli, el jefe de Gabinete y 1er candidato a concejal, Diego Kravetz, la presidente de la Corporación del Sur, Karina Spalla y la senadora provincial, Lorena Petrovich, entre otros dirigentes.

Un intendente de Cambiemos va a la Justicia para que le saquen a Macri de la boleta

El jefe comunal de Las Heras dice que "Macri ya se va" y que lo quieren pegar a la lista de un diputado "pedorro".
Un intendente de Cambiemos aseguró que irá a la Justicia el lunes para que despeguen su lista de la boleta de Mauricio Macri.


Se trata de José María Carambia, jefe comunal de Las Heras, la sede del mayor polo petrolero de Santa Cruz. Carambia proviene de un partido vecinal que se plegó em 2015 al frente Unión Para Vivir Mejor (UPVM), la expresión de Cambiemos en la provincia.

Carambia adelantó que el lunes pedirá a la Justicia Electoral que baje su candidatura intendente o "en su defecto que dejen cambiar por otro en mi espacio porque su apoderado Evaristo Ruiz, a quién calificó de "vendido", firmó un acuerdo para que su sublema llevara pegado en la boleta a Macri y a Omar Zeidán, el candidato a diputado nacional de Cambiemos en Santa Cruz.


"Yo en mi boleta no pienso llevar a Zeidan ni a Macri!!!!! A ningún presidente y diputado nacional porque somos un partido Vecinal! Y no pueden obligar a llevar candidaturas que no participamos. Es una elección", disparó Carambia en Facebook.

El intendente de Las Heras denunció la "ilegalidad manifiesta de la justicia electoral al no respetar la voluntad del lema" y dijo que la decisión "es funcional al poder de turno y sabiendo que ya Macri se va, la justicia electoral sigue funcional a los K".

En otro posteo se había referido a Zeidán como "el candidato pedorro".

Can Canada Ward Off a far-right waves Surge?





So far, it’s been immune to the far-right waves that swept Europe and America. Maxime Bernier is trying to change that.

 On a hot day in early September, Maxime Bernier stood in line at a Booster Juice waiting for a smoothie. Bernier, who is 56 years old, looks tall in person. He has graying brown hair that flops to the right across his forehead, in an aging prep-school kind of way. In the student union building, at Ontario’s Western University, he didn’t look out of place. He might have been a business professor. He might have been someone’s dad. He didn’t, in other words, look much like what he is: Canada’s patient zero for the kind of right-wing populism—shouty, nativist and outside the mainstream—that has remade politics all over the Western world.

Bernier was on campus that day drumming up support for his upstart populist movement, the People’s Party of Canada, ahead of Canada’s federal election, scheduled for October 21. Bernier, the party’s founder, leader and only member of Parliament, was a senior Cabinet minister in Stephen Harper’s Conservative government in the 2000s. He came within a hair of leading that party in 2017, before breaking away last year following months of public friction with the party brass over a very Canadian mix of issues, including dairy quotas and multiculturalism.

Since founding the People’s Party, Bernier has been denounced as xenophobic, racist, egomaniacal and doomed. His chief strategist has deliberately positioned him in line with the anti-immigrant and climate-skeptic European new right. At an event over the summer, Bernier vowed to “build a fence” on Canada’s southern border to keep out migrants. Unlike every other federal leader, he downplayed recently revealed photos and videos of Justin Trudeau in black- and brownface, calling the Canadian prime minister a hypocrite but not a racist. Online, Bernier has crafted a Twitter voice that apes, in two languages, the scream-’till-someone-pays-attention style of early Donald Trump. A week before the Western University event, he had launched a Twitter attack on the teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg, calling her, among other things, “mentally unstable.”

But in person, Bernier is much less incendiary. In the sunny quad, he fidgeted as students streamed past, mostly ignoring him and his tiny crew. A young woman wearing a hijab approached with a pamphlet. Bernier’s team visibly tensed. Within seconds, it was clear the woman had little idea Bernier was anyone other than a generic politician. She asked him about higher education grants. He answered with something about federal jurisdiction. They spoke for a few seconds, and then she walked away. Bernier’s team relaxed. “Where are our juices?” one of them asked.

For years, as anti-establishment and anti-outsider politicians have grown in prominence across Europe and in the United States, Canada has been held up as the Great Exception—the one country that’s immune, somehow, to that populist wave. Trudeau, young and progressive, was elected prime minister three months before Trump won the New Hampshire primary. Unblemished at the time by scandal or compromise, Trudeau seemed to stand for everything Trump did not. He played into a sense, around the world, that Canada is somehow different—that, owing to a mix of cultural attitudes, immigration patterns and electoral realities, anti-outsider politics just can’t thrive here.

It would be easy enough, watching Bernier campaign and looking at his numbers, to assume that still holds true. Most polls have his People’s Party tracking below 3 percent of the national vote. His “star” candidates include the reclusive widow of a former mayor most famous for smoking crack on tape (twice) and a Conservative castoff who made headlines last year for tweeting about (and at) his “hottest” middle school teacher. The party’s best-case scenario this campaign might be winning a single seat.

But interviews with pollsters, party insiders and experts on populism suggest that’s only half the story. Bernier remains a marginal figure on the national stage, yet his top-line numbers obscure a change afoot in Canadian political attitudes. Over the past decade, Canadians have become increasingly polarized on immigration. And while immigration itself has not yet been a ballot issue in a federal election, polls and studies show that attitudes toward immigrants have become a key indicator in this country of where any individual voter leans.
PUBLICIDAD

That dramatic development might not make a huge difference in this election. But if the European pattern holds true, it could presage a major shift to come in the way politics are done in this country.

“This populist right phenomenon is in Canada, too,” says Eric Kaufmann, a Canadian political scientist and author of White Shift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majority. “It’s just that it hasn’t got control of a major party yet.”


***

To understand why that shift would matter, you first have to understand why it hasn’t already happened. And to understand that, you need to dig a bit into the nitty-gritty of Canadian politics.

If you ask Canadian political scientists or strategists why this country has never had a Trump, they’ll usually laugh and say, “We have. His name was Rob Ford.”

Ford—the populist, right-wing mayor of Toronto for a single, chaotic term—was Trump before Trump: loud, crude, unqualified and uninterested in any existing political norms. Also like Trump, Ford was dismissed by political elites and much of the media as a joke for most of his career. And he was, in many ways, a joke—a serial liar who couldn’t keep his foot out of his mouth, who had little to no grasp of policy nuance, who was able, nonetheless, to forge an unshakable bond with his mass of politically alienated supporters.

Ford, who died in 2016, was no one-off. Not even in his own family. His widow, Renata, is now running for the People’s Party. His brother, Doug, is the premier of Ontario, Canada’s largest province.

The Fords have never been anti-immigrant to the same degree as Trump is; it isn’t the core of their political brand. But nativist sentiment did play a significant, underreported role in Doug Ford’s election in 2018. One studyof that campaign found that having a negative opinion of immigrants and refugees was more likely than any other factor studied, including the economy and the environment, to predict a Ford vote. During that campaign, Ontario Proud, a third-party advertising group, flooded Facebook with messages that attacked a sanctuary city pledge made by the rival New Democratic Party, a tactic NDP strategists said hurt them badly in several key electoral districts.

European-style nativist politics also have been thriving for years in Quebec, where political norms on immigration, multiculturalism and diversity are much closer to those in Europe than they are to English Canada. The governing party in the province, Coalition Avenir Quebec, “is essentially a populist right party where it matters on this issue of immigration and Islam,” says Kaufmann. In June, the CAQ government passed a law banning civil servants, including teachers and university employees, from wearing “religious” garments, like headscarves and turbans, while at work.

If nativist populism is thriving in Quebec and is viable in Ontario, why has it never been a significant factor in a national campaign? One reason is that it’s difficult for fringe parties to break through under Canada’s “first-past-the-post” electoral system. Unlike in many European parliaments, which assign multiple seats proportionally based on each party’s share of the vote, Canada elects MPs individually in each district. That makes it hard for parties with broad national support but no regional base to get a toehold in Parliament.

Another big factor is that it’s just very hard to win federal elections in Canada without support from first- and second-generation immigrants, who, combined, made up almost 40 percent of the Canadian population as of 2011. Jason Kenney, a Conservative former Cabinet minister who is now premier of Alberta, built his career on outreach to immigrant communities, earning the nickname “minister of curry in a hurry” for his relentless organizing in immigrant communities, particularly in the vote-rich suburbs of Toronto. This strategy helped to deliver Harper three consecutive elections between 2006 and 2011. “If you look at Stephen Harper’s approach to building a winning coalition, it would have gone nowhere without immigrant communities and new Canadian communities,” says Andrew MacDougall, Harper’s former director of communications.

Kaufmann also believes there “is a more intact, stronger kind of political correctness” in Canada than in the United States or Europe. He points to a recent controversy in British Columbia. In September, the Vancouver Sun, a traditionally conservative paper, published an opinion article by a university lecturer that called for Canada to reconsider its commitment to diversity. The reaction online was swift and severe. The Sun pulled the column from its website. The paper’s editor issued a public apology. Sunreporters openly rebelled on Twitter and in the newsroom. The column was sloppy and unabashedly nativist. But Kaufmann believes a similar article would not have made a ripple in Denmark or Sweden, or even the United Kingdom.

There are other factors, too. Thanks to geography, history and a complicated points system for selecting immigrants, Canada has long been able to be more selective about which newcomers it takes in than has the United States or Europe. “Because we don’t have a large, open border and because we’re protected by seas on all three sides of our country … we’ve been able to cherry-pick,” says pollster Frank Graves, president of Ekos Research Associates in Ottawa. If reelected, the Trudeau government plans to admit 350,000 new immigrants to Canada annually by 2021, up from about 260,000 in 2014, the last full year of the Harper administration. That represents a significant per capita increase, but it hasn’t been a particularly controversial one: For decades and across governments in Canada, there has been a cross-party consensus that immigration, on the whole, is a good thing.

Perhaps the biggest difference, right now, between Canada and Europe on populism is that the former has not experienced anything like the influx of refugees that entered Europe beginning in 2015. A significant body of scholarship now points to that influx as the main reason for the spike in populist, nativist attitudes on the continent in recent years. Canada did see a significant—for this country—increase in the number of asylum-seekers coming over the border from the United States beginning in 2016; thousands of migrants, many of them Haitians facing the end of temporary protected status in America, crossed over a single ditch in upstate New York into rural Quebec in the summer of 2017 alone. (It is there that Bernier has vowed to “build a fence” to block the crossing, at Roxham Road.) But the numbers of people coming over never went beyond a bare fraction of the millions who sought refuge in Germany, Sweden and the rest of the Europe.

Even so, there are signs the Canadian consensus on immigration is beginning to shift. Graves has been tracking attitudes toward immigrants and minorities for decades. To him, the great undertold story in Canadian politics right now is how much the base of the Conservative Party has moved on these issues over the past several years. In 2013, according to his data, 47 percent of self-identified Conservative voters thought too many immigrants were “visible minorities,” a term used in Canada to refer to non-aboriginal, non-white people. In 2019, that number had spiked to 69 percent. Liberal voters have gone the opposite direction, from 34 to 15 percent.

Graves says that the number of people expressing anti-visible minority sentiments hasn’t actually increased. Instead, he believes those voters, who were once spread out among the parties, have begun to coalesce on a single end of the spectrum—the right. “Immigration,” he says, “has become the new fault line.”


***

If that’s true, why can’t Bernier, Canada’s unabashed champion of cutting immigration and fighting multiculturalism, crack 3 percent in the polls?

Many who have followed Bernier’s political career find his recent populist turn something of a mystery—and few are baffled by his failure so far to connect with voters. Bernier made his name in political circles in Canada as a free-market, consumer-issues capitalist. He was first elected in his home region of Beauce, outside Quebec City, in 2006 and served as industry minister under Harper for 18 months. Conservatives who worked with Bernier at that time mostly describe him as distant but affable. “He didn’t have a strong ideology or philosophy,” one senior Harper-era staffer told me. “He certainly didn’t raise any issues around immigration or climate change or environmental policy.”

After leaving Harper’s Cabinet following a scandal (he had left confidential documents at his girlfriend’s house), Bernier became a minor iconoclast in Conservative circles, speaking out on issues that were popular with the party’s libertarian wing, like telecom monopolies and deregulation. The real firebrand persona, however, didn’t emerge until the 2017 Conservative Party leadership race, after Bernier lost to Andrew Scheer.

Bernier wasn’t the nativist candidate in that race. That was former Cabinet Minister Kellie Leitch. In fact, when she proposed a “values test” for Canadian immigrants, Bernier accused her of being a “karaoke” Donald Trump. Bernier, meanwhile, staked out a position on the libertarian right of the party and established himself as one of few candidates willing to go outside what one senior Conservative called “the Harper box.” He went into the leadership convention, in May, with a sizable lead in almost every poll. One close associate from the campaign said his team was already in transition mode, so sure were they of victory. For hours that day it seemed like that confidence was well placed. Only on the 13th and final ballot did Scheer pull ahead and win, by less than a percent.

To this day, there are those around Bernier who believe he was unfairly denied the leadership, that there were irregularities surrounding the vote and that the party brain trust, dominated by Harper loyalists, never wanted him to win. His relationship with the party soon deteriorated, before exploding for good in the summer of 2018, when Bernier unleashed a series of tweets attacking “extreme multiculturalism” and “cultural Balkanism” in Canada. Scheer publicly distanced himself from that message. He told his former rival by phone that Bernier didn’t speak for the party. Less than a month later, Bernier resigned from the Conservatives and launched his own party.

The People’s Party today remains a work in progress. In many ways, it’s not much more than Bernier, a Twitter account and the biggest slice of the radical fringe this country has ever seen. Still, Bernier’s chief strategist, Martin Masse, believes his candidate is speaking to a suite of issues that many Canadians care about but no other party will address, just like populist parties are in Europe. “There is, in all of these countries, a profound disconnect between a part of the population that doesn’t see its concerns reflected in what the elites are talking about or what is acceptable speech or what can be raised in debates,” he says.

At least so far, that message isn’t resonating widely. One Conservative pollster put Bernier’s ceiling in this election at about 11 percent of the popular vote. He’s nowhere near that now. His best chance to win any seat is his own, in Beauce, but even that is far from guaranteed. (His second-best hope is probably Renata Ford.) Bernier could play spoiler for the Conservatives in several ridings, where even 3 percent of the vote could be enough to swing a seat. But that wouldn’t make the People’s Party a factor in Parliament.

Nick Kouvalis, who ran Rob Ford’s first mayoral campaign and helped manage Leitch’s, believes Bernier’s struggles are a matter of his sincerity. “Maxime Bernier is not Canada’s Trump, because Maxime Bernier doesn’t believe a thing that he says,” Kouvalis says. “It’s inauthentic.” (Michael Diamond, a rival conservative strategist, told me he thinks the online personality Bernier developed during the 2017 leadership race was largely the creation of his chief digital strategist, Emrys Graefe, who is now in the private sector and did not respond to an interview request. Masse told me he co-writes Bernier’s tweets today but wouldn’t comment on the specifics of the process.)

Kaufmann thinks the bigger problem for Bernier is that, for a populist, he has his policy mix wrong. Outside immigration and culture, Bernier is a classic small-government, low-tax conservative—not someone trying to appeal to the working class by promising restrictive trade. (One close associate described him as being closer to Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan than to Trump.)

But the main reason cited for Bernier’s trapped-in-amber polling numbers, one that came up again and again in interviews for this story, is Trudeau. Beating Trudeau—“kind of the poster child for globalist elitism,” in Graves’ words—is a priority for many voters who might otherwise lean toward Bernier. And the only way to do that in this election is to vote for Scheer, the Conservative candidate, who is polling close to the prime minister.

That’s why Kaufmann thinks the next election, not this one, will be the true test of populist support in this country. “That’s when I would expect the People’s Party to make a bigger impact,” he says. “Not this cycle, because Trudeau helps the Conservatives keep that vote.”


***

Two weeks after the London event, Bernier walked, from one interview to another, across a hotel lobby in Hamilton, Ontario, an old steel town just outside Toronto. He wore a light gray suit over a blue checkered shirt. He was in town for an event with Dave Rubin, a conservative American YouTube host. Hours later, outside the event, Bernier’s supporters would clash with protesters, leading to four arrests. But in the hotel lobby, with TV cameras all around, Bernier gave off an air that was less raving insurgent than corporate casual.

It had been, as it tends to be for Bernier, a mixed couple of weeks. On September 16, the commission organizing the English-language leadership debate reversed a previous decision barring Bernier from the stage. The debate promised Bernier and his party the biggest national platform they’d ever had. Then, on September 23, the network Global News reported that three of the founding members of Bernier’s movement, part of a group of about 400 that signed the paperwork creating the party, had close ties to extreme far-right organizations, including Canadian offshoots of the German group Pegida and the Finnish Soldiers of Odin. “We’ve lost track of the number of [the People’s Party’s] most vocal supporters who have the most odious views in Canada,” Evan Balgord, executive director of the Canadian Anti-Hate Network, told Global News.

Leaning forward in the kind of circular half-chair that seems to exist only in hotel lobbies, Bernier said it wasn’t fair to judge his party based on a handful of fringe members. Asked why people who were attracted to those kinds of extreme ideas were also drawn to him, Bernier replied, “You must ask them. I said regularly that these people are not welcome in our party. They do not share our values.”

Bernier’s platform calls for a massive reduction in immigration to Canada, down to between 150,000 and 200,000 new immigrants per year. He also wants the government to cut off all funding for official multiculturalism, to leave the United Nations Global Compact for Migration and to prioritize refugees who, among other things, “reject political Islam.” Bernier’s party also wants to impose a cultural values test on prospective immigrants, the same idea Bernier himself once laughed off the stage.

“We don’t want to have ghettos,” Bernier said in Hamilton. “There are some cities that you cannot speak English and French in this country, and you can be able to do your day-to-day life.” He cited Richmond, British Columbia, an oceanside suburb of Vancouver, where more than half the population is ethnically Chinese. But the city is also wealthy, safe and well educated. If it’s a ghetto, it’s probably the nicest ghetto in the world.

Bernier says his goal this election is to win enough seats to hold the balance of power in Parliament if no one party gains enough support to govern on its own. It’s an unlikely, but not impossible idea. More plausible, for now, is that he will win enough support to start tugging the Conservatives to the right on immigration and refugees. Of course, there’s another possibility: Bernier could lose his own seat, and every other seat, too. He could carry on shouting, after the election, outside Parliament, to an ever-shrinking fringe.

It would be easy enough to assume that’s what’s going to happen, to dismiss Bernier and his supporters as a joke, or to ignore them entirely. But that’s the thing about populists: They always seem like a joke right up until the moment they’re not. “There’s a tendency in countries, before it actually expresses itself politically in a Brexit or a Donald Trump, for a lot of the institutional elite to not see it,” Graves says. “It’s a blind spot.”

Carrió sigue con su gira de stand up:"Frigerio nos entregó"




 Elisa Carrió sigue con sus shows de stand up. Esta vez fue junto a Horacio Rodríguez Larreta en un acto en la ciudad. Allí, la diputada volvió a atacar al ministro del Interior Rogelio Frigerio, al que desde las primarias acusa de haber jugado en contra del oficialismo en las elecciones.

"Nosotros vamos a decir ganamos, aunque no sabemos si ganamos"
Carrió les pidió a los candidatos de Juntos por el Cambio que salgan a anunciar una victoria oficialista a las 6 de la tarde del 27 de octubre. Apuntó contra integrantes de Cambiemos: sostuvo que Frigerio “esconde muchas cosas” y a Peña le dijo que tire "a la miércoles los formatos”. A Rodríguez Larreta le advirtió: "Es la única vez que te lo digo Horacito, porque sino te cago a patadas".
“Frigerio esconde muchas cosas, total a mí no me importa Frigerio. Además nos entregó en toda la Nación, así que no me importa“, dijo Carrió ante las risas y el aplauso de sus seguidores
“Porque hizo de los candidatos del PJ candidatos del Gobierno. Porque las obras acá en Buenos Aires pertenecen al gobierno de Rodríguez Larreta y al Gobierno nacional, pero en todo el país pertenecen al Gobierno nacional de Macri a través del Fondo de Infraestructura. Y todos los gobernadores convencieron a sus pueblos con ayuda de algunos de Cambiemos que esas obras no eran de Cambiemos, eran del PJ. ¡Qué se hagan cargo de la entrega que hicieron de esta coalición!“, disparó.
“Algunos me miran espantados, no me preocupa. Yo no estoy en la elección. ¿Pueden decir que soy incorrecta? Sí, ¡digo la verdad!. ¡Que se vayan todos a la mierda!“, completó Carrió.
También le habló a Rodríguez Larreta enfrente de todos los presentes en el boliche Club Araoz: “Escúchenme, es la única vez que te lo digo Horacito porque sino te cago a patadas, porque ya no hay mas tiempo para nada, a Marquitos los formatos, a la miércoles los formatos”.
Los dichos de Lilita sobre Frigerio causaron impacto en el gobierno, al punto que el propio Macri tuvo que salir en defensa de Frigerio.
En una entrevista con una radio de Bahía Blanca, el presidente dijo que no tiene “las mismas opiniones sobre todos los temas” con Carrió. “Ella tiene una visión pero yo confío en Rogelio, todo lo que ha hecho ha sido bajo mi conducción y liderazgo, por lo tanto estoy tranquilo“, afirmó Macri, dejando claro que en la Casa Rosada no hay sospechas sobre el ministro
“Debería preguntárselo a ella, no tengo esa interpretación“, respondió Macri cuando el periodista insistió sobre por qué Carrió dice que Frigerio “entregó” a Juntos por el Cambio.

Broadening the Concept of Consumer Behavior: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL MARKETING - 1975

Avraham Shama, Department of Marketing, Baruch College/CUNY


The broadened concept of marketing introduced by Levy and Kotler (1969) has suggested that in addition to economic products and services, the concept of markeing is applicable to the marketing of persons, organizations, and ideas. These broadened boundaries of the concept of marketing call for widening other marketing concepts whose boundaries were conventionally set to relate only to marketing of economic goods and services. Examples of such concepts heeding broader definition are: sellers and buyers, product development, product definition, consumer behavior, brand loyalty, market segmentation, promotion, and distribution. Although Levy and Kotler addressed themselves to these concepts, their discussion is brief, general, and auxiliary to their main theme. In doing so, they left the practical issue of broadening the above concepts quite open.

The purposes of this paper are to show the applicability of marketing concepts to the area of political marketing in general, and to discuss the relationships among consumer and voter behavior concepts in particular. To achieve these goals, a definition of political marketing is presented. Then the applicability of major marketing concepts such as sellers and buyers, market segmentation, product mix, brand loyalty, and the like is discussed. Finally, the similarities and differences in the structure of the study of consumer and voter behavior are assessed.

MARKETING AND POLITICAL MARKETING

Political marketing is the process by which political candidates and ideas are directed at the voters in order to satisfy their political needs and thus gain their support for the candidate and ideas in question. A cursory comparison between marketing of goods and services, and marketing of political candidates would readily point up at least one common concept promotion. Clearly there is quite extensive use of media by the seller and the candidate for the purposes of informing, reminding, as well as changing attitudes and behavior. Possibly, such a comparison would also indicate that both marketing of goods and services, and marketing of political candidates utilize similar tools such as market research, and various statistical and computer techniques in studying the market. Although these points are essentially correct, they denote only a few of the similarities between marketing and political marketing.

A more serious comparison, however, will indicate that many more concepts and tools are shared by marketing of goods and services, and marketing of political candidates. Consider, for example, some well-known concepts of marketing: sellers and buyers, consumer behavior, market segmentation, image, brand loyalty, product concept, and product positioning. They are all concepts of political marketing. Consider also some of the familiar tools which are used in marketing: market research, media, advertising, multiple regression, factor analysis, discriminant analysis, conjoint measurement, and multidimensional scaling, etc. The are all tools utilized in the marketing of political candidates (Kotler, forthcoming), In addition, even the terminology that specialists of political campaigns use is basically a marketing terminology. For example, the development of political campaign terminology in recent years: "The Making of The President" (White, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1973), "The Selling of The President" (McGinniss, 1968), and the "Selling of the Candidates" (1971).

But perhaps the most powerful test for applying the concept of marketing in the area of political marketing, is by examination of the applicability of consumer behavior concepts to the area of voter behavior. The reason for this is that the consumer orientation of marketing has made consumer behavior concepts the focal points of marketing.

Similarities of Concepts

Common Concept One: Sellers, Products, and Buyers. Both marketing and political marketing include three main elements: sellers, products, and buyers. Marketing is a process by which sellers offer the buyers products and services in return for something of value (usually money). The same process takes place in political marketing, whereby the candidates offer the voters products or ideas such as "economic prosperity," or "safe society," in return for their votes and support in the campaign period and there after. The fact that many economic products can be sold and bought often while buying the product that political candidates offer can be done only infrequently and at a fixed point in time and space does not invalidate this argument, but rather indicates differences in nature and use of political and economic products, very similar to the differences in nature and usage of products and services which are-traditionally subsumed by marketing (e.g.: food items Vs. durable goods, insurance, auctioned merchandise).

Common Concept Two: Consumers. The core of both marketing and political marketing are the consumers. Without consumers, the marketer of economic goods and services does not have a market, and without voters the political marketer does not have a campaign. Because both marketers need consumers to survive, the concept of consumer behavior or voter behavior becomes a focal point of marketing and political marketing, respectively. The fact that in one case an individual is called "consumer" and in the other "voter," is merely a semantic difference. In both cases the individual can be viewed as an organism receiving stimuli about the product and reaching predispositions to respond, and a final response state after going through an essentially similar decision making process. Accordingly, the principles of well known models of consumer behavior can certainly be applied to voter behavior, and vice versa. In fact, the similarities here are so strong, that consumer behavior literature and models include concepts which were first developed in the literature of voter behavior, for example, selective exposure, selective perception, two-step flow of communication. (See Lazersfeld et.al., 1948; also Berelson et.al., 1954; Campbell et.al., 1966; Engel et.al., 1973; and Howard and Sheth, 1969).

Common Concept Three: Market Segmentation and Product Mix. Both marketing and political marketing utilize the concepts of market segmentation and target groups to increase sales and votes, respectively. Market segmentation is the process by which consumers and potential consumers of the product are distinguished along one or more variables so as to create homogeneous groups, and select some of them as target gm ups in order to offer a satisfactory product mix, and achieve the company's goals (e.g.: profit, growth, market share). Variables along which product and candidate markets are segmented are almost identical: age, sex, income, occupation, family size, race, personality characteristics, life style, and the like. Furthermore, product-specific variables such as previous product use and preferred product characteristics are often similarly used (e.g.: "how many times did-the voter support the same program or candidate before?" "What does the voter like most about the candidate?" etc.). As target groups the product marketer and the political candidates select consumers and voters, respectively, and offer them satisfactory product mixes. The product mix, viz., the different mixes of product, promotion, price and place that are offered to different voter segments, is also similar to the idea of product mix of marketing. Specifically, the product mix of political marketing includes: (1) product--the basic themes, ideas or issues that the candidate may represent "law and order", and "full employment," and another--"active foreign policy," (2) promotion-the specific mix of mass media advertising, specialized media advertising, and personal selling (i.e.: canvassing),that the candidate uses to reach his target voters. In addition, the idea that different voter segments may be effectively reached by different promotion mix is well practiced by political marketers, (3) price--the vote given to the candidate, which alternatively could have been given to the competing candidate. This price is not a fixed one (i.e., it is not merely a vote), but can be conceived as having different values which are a function of the attractiveness of those candidates competing with the chosen one; and (4) place--the importance of when and where the product (i.e. the candidate or the ideas representing him) is available to the voter. Obviously, availability and timing of the product are as critical elements in political marketing as they are in marketing of goods and services. The fact that the polls are open to the voters only in specified times and places, and the fact that each consumer is restricted to one purchase only (one vote), do not imply a sharp difference from the concept of place as it has thus far been conceived by marketing. For example, auctions are held only at specified places and times and contrary to elections not even on a regular basis. In addition, consumer purchases are often restricted in quantity, the way voters are restricted to one vote.

Common Concept Four: Product Image. Both product marketing and candidate marketing have emphasized that consumer and voter behavior toward products and candidates in question. In addition, it seems that they both have over-popularized the image concept to a degree where it became merely an impression or a stereotype that consumers and voters have about the products and candidates, respectively. However, a recent synthesizing effort to investigate this concept suggest that image is a result of an interactive perceptual process through which the perceiver selects some of the object's attributes (e.g. brand and quality of a product, party affiliation and issues of a candidate), processes them in his mind, and forms predispositions to respond toward the object. Therefore, it seems that the image concept is not only shared by marketing of goods and services, and marketing of political candidates, but rather is a concept common to many social political candidates, but rather is a concept common to many social sciences (Shama, 1975).

Common Concept Five: Brand Loyalty. When measured by the degree of attachment to the brand (as indicated by repeated purchase or brand attitude), and related to such consumer's characteristics as age, income, race, personality, etc., brand loyalty becomes equivalent to the concept of party loyalty of political marketing. Furthermore, the concepts of brand loyalty and party loyalty have been utilized as a baseline for promotion strategy for the product and the candidate. Accordingly, the first step of such promotion strategy is to distinguish between voters who are loyal to the party and swing voters and hence design a different promotion mix for each of the two main groups (Campbell, et al., 1966).

Common Concept Six: Product Development. Both product marketing and political marketing place great importance on the series of integrated activities and research that take part in the process of developing a product that will satisfy the target consumers and voters, respectively. In the case of consumer products, product development is a process through which a consumer-satisfying parcel of ingredients, quality, brand, package, etc., is created. Similarly, the process of developing a product in the political market is one of creating a parcel encompassing a candidate, issues, party, and the like, which will satisfy the target voters.

Common Concept Seven: Product Concept. Essentially a part of the product development process, the product concept includes the central idea(s) which serves as the core of the product in the target group's mind. This concept is shared by marketing and political marketing. Thus, an economic product such as a car might be planned and developed to convey "economy" and "dependability," while a candidate might wish to convey "healthy econ%my" and "active foreign policy" .

Common Concept Eight: Product Positioning. Related to the above concepts of product development and product concept, the idea of product positioning: the process by which the product is positioned vis-a-via its competitors in the market. Clearly, it is utilized by both marketing and political marketing. In both cases, the product's and the candidate's "location" in the perceptual map of consumers and the voters relative to the location of the competitors is to be determined, planned, and promoted so as to increase consumer and voter preference of the product and the candidate in question. In addition, products and candidates utilize the same research technique in determining and planning their positions in the market in relation to their competitors, namely multidimensional scaling.

Common Tools

Common Tool One: Market Research. Both marketing of economic products and services, and the marketing of politicil candidates make frequent use of market research or public opinion polling for the purposes of measuring product performance, identifying potential consumers, and detecting and solving problems. In doing so, market research and opinion research use similar methods of data collection (panels, interviews, questionnaires) and data analyzing techniques (regressions, factor analysis, discriminant analysis, multidimensional scaling). In fact, because rulers and politicians have been very sensitive to public opinion throughout history, it seems that early public opinion gathering techniques were developed before market research, and therefore the latter seems to have followed the-former not the contrary. Presently as was the case historically, both the social sciences and marketing utilize similar data gathering and analysis techniques indicating the basic similarity of their purposes.

Common Tool Two: Concept Testing. A technique used in the process of product development and product positioning, concept testing refers to the procedure which is designed to discover consumer reactions to different product concept, develop and introduce it to the market to satisfy the target consumers. Although not to the same degree of sophistication, this procedure is used by both marketing and political marketing. Thus, similar to product concept-testing, the candidate concept-testing involves the following major steps: (1) identification of possible candidate concepts, (2) introduction of candidate concepts to the voters; (3)recording voter reactions to each concept (by rank order, attitude measurement, intentions to vote); (4) identification of causal or associative connections among voters characteristics (socio-economic status, behavioral, and political) and their reactions to different candidate concepts, and to various attributes of single candidate concepts (factor analysis to reduce candidate attributes space, and voter characteristics space, and multiple regressions) so as to evaluate the contribution of separate candidate attributes and voter characteristics in the overall preference or separate candidate attributes and voter characteristics in the overall preference or ranking of the concept; (5) choice of the most positively evaluated candidate concept or concepts, and finally (6) introduction and promotion of the chosen concept or concepts among voter groups in reference to the results in step four. Clearly, this also implies the possibility for market segmentation: different voter groups who evaluated a given candidate concept differently can be regarded as different market segments.

Common Tool Three: Communication. The instrumental use of communication media for the purpose of promoting economic products and political candidates is another characteristic of both marketing and political marketing. Each of these utilizes media schedules, and media mix to effectively reach its target groups. Consistent with this last point, the fact that product marketing and candidate marketing use different media mixes or schedules should be regarded as an indication of the different nature of the products, and their target groups.

One clear conclusion that can be drawn at this point is the marketing as it has been traditionally conceived to refer to economic products and services, and political marketing, which relates mainly to marketing of political candidates, have much in common: (1) basic concepts such as sellers., buyers, products, consumers, market segmentation, are at the core of each of them, and (2) tools or techniques and media selection. on these grounds, the concept of marketing seems to be quite applicable to the area of political marketing.

However, a more critical examination of broadening the concept of marketing to include also political marketing is provided by examining the applicability of the most important concept of modern marketing. namely that of consumer behavior, to the area of voter behavior.

CONSUMER AND VOTER BEHAVIOR

Voter behavior has been studied much in the same manner as consumer behavior, namely as a decision making process to engage in a certain action (voting, purchasing), including processes which precede and follow that act. Both the voter and the consumer are viewed as individuals receiving information, and possibly seeking out information, processing this information to reach predispositions to respond, and finally responding toward the product and the candidate in question. Consequently, the principles of well known models and frameworks of consumer behavior can be effectively applied to voter behavior and vice versa. Accordingly, in applying the general approach of consumer behavior models to voter behavior, one can point out the following components that are part of the decision process (Howard and Sheth, 1969).



1. Stimulus input variables which originate from the candidate and his party and are targeted at the voters. Such input variables may be related to the candidate's experience in politics, his style of action as a political figure, his stand on issues, and his party identification.

2. Environmental influences on the voter. These relate to such factors as social class, peer group, and family influence on the voter, as well as the influence of the voter's own personality traits, and past experience with the candidate in question.

3. Processing stimulus and environmental information to reach voting predispositions. Such processing is subject to learning and selective screening.

4. Output variables which relate to the decision how to vote, as well as to changes in perception of, and attitude toward, the candidate. One of the most powerful output variables is the voter party identification which, in a manner similar to brand loyalty, denotes an attachment to the party, and therefore also to its candidates.

5. Feedback processes.

Similarly, in applying voter behavior approaches to consumer behavior, one might follow the approaches of Lazarsfeld.-et al.(1948) and Campbell, et al. (1966) and postulate that consumer behavior is determined by socioeconomic status and psychological makeup. More specifically, one can follow Lane's (1965) model, and describe the consumer decision making process as including the following three components: stimulus, organism, and response.



1. The stimuli are symbols which are transmitted to the consumer from his social environment (e.g., the community, media, family, ethnic group,,social class, marketing channels) about the product or service in question.

2. The organism is the consumer receiving such stimuli, screening them through his perceptual and attitudinal screens in order to reach predispositions to respond toward the product or the service.

3. Responses include such actions as purchasing, expressing an opinion about the attitudinal object, reading and listening to messages about the attitudinal object.

On the basis of the above it is quite clear that voter and consumer behavior models utilize similar approaches. Furthermore, it can also be argued that consumer and voter behavior models are theoretically identical in that they utilize the basic SOR paradigm. Such a generic approach to the study of the voter and the consumer results in the mutual utilization of other concepts in the study of consumer and voter behavior.

Thus, both consumer and voter behavior scientists seem to prefer tie use of a middle-range theory approach in analyzing consumers and voters, respectively, rather than relying on comprehensive theories that are not yet well articulated. This takes the form of conducting studies which focus on the relationship between a fairly defined concept such as social class, the family, or peer group, or a limited number of variables such as self-confidence, education, and dogmatism, and consumer behavior or voter behavior. The hope is that the knowledge accumulated through such studies will permit more effective theory construction in the future (Merton, 1957; Ward and Robertson, 1973).

A summary of such a middle-range theory approach and findings in the areas of consumer and voter behavior is presented in Table 1. An examination of this table shows that different concepts such as learning, perception, and social class help to explain consumer and voter behavior in similar ways. For example, learning concepts help to explain the processes by which consumers and voters develop brand and party loyalty, respectively; perception contributes to the explanation of consumer and voter imagery and its resulting influence on their behavior; and social class helps to explain the purchase of certain products and voter party orientation.

Table 1 also suggests that the concepts depicted are of different nature and scope. Learning, perception, attitudes, personality, and motivation are theoretical concepts "that derive meaning from their role in the theory in which they are imbedded and the purposes of the theory " (Zaltman, Pinson, and Angelmar, 1973). As these theoretical concepts are commonly employed in the areas of consumer behavior and voter behavior for the same purposes of description, explanation, and prediction--they offer the researcher a wider universe for observation, hence increasing observational validity, a greater opportunity for concept operationalization, thus increasing content validity, and a basis for operationalizing concepts, thus improving construct validity. By offering such opportunities, these theoretical concepts play an essential role in theory-building focusing on human behavior in general, or subsets of this behavior. As a result, the proposition can be advanced that when a theoretical concept can be applied to mcre than one role of human behavior (e.g., consumption, voting), its observational validity, content validity, and construct validity become stronger, thus strengthening its role in theory building.

On the other hand, concepts and variables such as social class, family, age, education, and brand loyalty are of a narrower scope in that they usually represent simple, singular propositions as to the connection between a few consumer or voter variables and behavior. Although findings of such propositions are valuable, their share in theory building and pointing out commonalities of voter and consumer behavior is not very profound.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the applicability of the concept of marketing in general, and the concept of consumer behavior in particular, to the areas of political marketing and voter behavior. In both cases, it was suggested that marketing concepts are quite applicable to political marketing. Admittedly, by focusing on the decision making approach to voter behavior, other popular approaches were not given any exposure. Such approaches are (1) the normative approach which discusses how the individual should function as a political creature, (2) the legal approach which focuses on the individual's political rights and duties, and (3) the systems approach which studies the voter's role in the total political system. These approaches can represent some conceptual differences in the structure of consumer and voter behavior. Nevertheless, the similarities between consumer and voter behavior are still sharp.

TABLE 1

CONCEPTS AND FINDINGS IN THE AREAS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND VOTER BEHAVIOR

Consumer behavior is a scientifically oriented approach aimed at the study of the consumption role of human behavior. However, the consumption role of human behavior is vaguely defined, as are its boundaries (Ward and Robertson, 1973). Therefore, broadening the concept of consumer behavior to include voter behavior does not have so much to do with actual broadening, but rather with an eclectic process of determining boundaries which have never been previously determined. Furthermore, because consumer behavior theory and approaches have so far only borrowed from the social sciences (including political science), the eclectic process of determining its boundaries may mean reciprocity with the social sciences in that some of the concepts which were borrowed by consumer behavior can now be returned to the social sciences with the contributions of consumer behavior. The testing of variables and the validation of concepts within consumer behavior contexts can now be shared with the social sciences and perhaps help explain some of the ambiguities still existing in the social sciences. Examples of such concepts are opinion leadership, selective processes, cognitive processes, role theory, imagery, and group behavior.

REFERENCES

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Engel, J., Kollat, D., and Blackwell, R. Consumer Behavior, New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 2nd Edition, 1973.

Howard J. and Sheth, J. The Theory of Buyer Behavior, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969.

Kotler, P. Marketing for Nonprofit Organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, forthcoming.

Lane, R. Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1965, p. 6.

Lazersfeld, P., Berelson, B., and Godet, H. The People's Choice New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd Edition, 1948.

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McGinnies, J. The Selling of the President, 1968. New York: Pocket Books, 1970.

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Milbrath, L. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get involved in Politics. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company-,79-65, p. 88.

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Ward, S. and Robertson, T. "Consumer Behavior Research: Promise and Prospects," in S. Ward and T. Robertson (Eds.), Consumer Bebavior: Theoretical Sources. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973, pp. 20-22.

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Encuestas: Alberto Fernández amplía la ventaja y lo votan por el trabajo y la economía

A 23 días de las elecciones generales del 27 de octubre, las encuestadoras siguen dando sus pronósticos electorales: sus datos reflejan que el escenario de las Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias del 11 de agosto pasado se repetiría en los próximos comicios. Más allá del resultado, los sondeos hacen foco además en las razones por las que los consultados eligen votar por los dos principales candidatos, Mauricio Macri y Alberto Fernández, y la confianza e imagen de cada uno.

En un sondeo de la encuestadora Oh Panel!, realizado entre el 15 y el 27 de septiembre, mediante entrevistas online a 1250 casos, un 52% respondió que votaría por Alberto Fernández, mientras que un 33% votaría por Mauricio Macri. Así, la diferencia de las PASO se estiraría a 19 puntos.

En el mismo estudio, Roberto Lavagna obtendría un 8%, y Nicolás del Caño un 2%. Con un 1% lo siguen Juan José Gómez Centurión y también José Luis Espert, y ese mismo porcentaje se contempla de votos en blanco, indecisos y quienes prefieren no responder, que suman un 3%.

Un aspecto interesante de relevamiento son los “key drivers” del voto, es decir, los motivos clave que llevan a los votantes a optar por un determinado candidato a la hora de acercarse a las urnas el próximo 27 de octubre.Intención de voto. Fuente: Oh Panel.

Los votos del Frente de Todos destacan los motivos económicos para elegir a ese candidato. En orden de preferencia, señalan que es por los siguientes motivos:
“Para que haya más trabajo”
“Para reducir la pobreza
“Para mejorar las jubilaciones y pensiones”
"Para que se reduzca la inflación”
"Para lograr un cambio en la economía argentina”
"Para que suban los salarios”
"Para mejorar la distribución del ingreso”

En el caso de Juntos por el cambio, los motivadores del voto se relacionan a otro tipo de cuestiones, como el rechazo al kirchnerismo, o la inseguridad. Los consultados responden por que votarían por Juntos por el Cambio:
"Para evitar que gane el kirchnerismo/CFK”
“Para que se reduzca el narcotráfico”
“Para que se reduzca la corrupción pública”
“Para que se reduzca la inseguridad”
“Para profundizar la democracia argentina”
“Para que haya más inversiones internacionales en el país”
"Para lograr un cambio en la economía argentina”"Key drivers" del voto, según Oh Panel. Fuente: Oh Panel.

En términos de imagen, el candidato del Frente de Todos supera al líder de Juntos por el cambio. Con un 49% de imagen positiva lidera el ranking Alberto Fernández, mientras que Mauricio Macri, en el noveno puesto, suma un 32%. En imagen negativa, se reparten un 39% y un 61%. Entre ambos están Roberto Lavagna con un 49% de imagen positiva y 18% de negativa, Axel Kicillof con 48% y 43%, y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, con 47% y 45%.Imagen positiva de dirigentes. Fuente: Oh panel.

Sobre las posibilidades de llegar una segunda vuelta (si el candidato más votado no supera el 45% de los votos, o si no consigue el 40% con 10 puntos de diferencia sobre el segundo), la mayoría de los encuestados cree que no ocurrirá. Un 50% de los consultados cree que en estas elecciones no habrá balotaje, mientras que un 34% considera que si, y un 16% respondió que no sabe.

En cuanto a las percepción social del eventual ganador de la presidencia, un 69% estima que triunfará Alberto Fernández, frente a un 19% que cree que Mauricio Macri será el candidato más votado. Esta percepción, que no está dividida según a quién vota el encuestado, se profundizó en comparación a un relevamiento de la misma empresa en agosto. En ese entonces, tras las PASO, el 62% de los consultados creía que ganaría el exfuncionario, y un 21% percibía que el elegido sería Mauricio Macri.

Opinaia tomó 3000 casos nacionales mediante el método online, con un error muestral de +/- 1,8, para indagar también sobre la imagen de los dirigentes y su intención de voto. En las percepciones de imagen de los principales dirigentes, lidera Alberto Fernández, con un 51% de sensación positiva. Lo siguen Roberto Lavagna con un 48%, Cristina Kirchner con 47%, María Eugenia Vidal con 44%, Axel Kicillof con 42% y Horacio Rodríguez Larreta con 41%.

El Tracking de Opinión Pública de Opinaia tiene además una serie de preguntas de asociación simbólica entre dirigentes políticos y situaciones hipotéticas, que reflejan atributos relevantes a la hora de pensar el voto: confianza, honestidad, gestión, cercanía y coraje. Por ejemplo, se les consulta a la encuestados a qué político le comprarían un auto usado, o a qué político invitarían a su cumpleaños.¿A quién elegirías para negociar tu sueldo? Fuente: Opinaia.

“De esta manera, apuntamos a entender de qué manera se relacionan los argentinos con cada uno de los referentes políticos desde el plano emocional y simbólico”, detallan en el informe los consultores. Las preguntas son: ¿A quién dejarías al cuidado de tus hijos? ¿A quién le comprarías un auto usado? ¿A quién elegirías para que administre tu edificio? ¿A quién invitarías a tu cumpleaños? ¿A quién para negociar tu sueldo?.



En las dos primeras lidera María Eugenia Vidal, para administrar un edificio se impone Axel Kicillof, para invitar al cumpleaños la más elegida fue Cristina, como así también para negociar un sueldo. En relación al escenario electoral, un 52% manifestó que votaría a Alberto Fernández, y un 33% optaría por Mauricio Macri. Si se proyecta el 5% de los indecisos, los porcentajes serían 48% y 30% respectivamente.

“No se detectan cambios significativos en el escenario electoral. Alberto Fernández lidera la intención de voto por una amplia ventaja en relación a Mauricio Macri. Al igual que en las PASO, el tercer lugar lo ocupa Roberto Lavagna”, explicaron desde la consultora en el estudio.Intención de voto. Fuente: Opinaia.


Trump hace caja con el ‘impeachment’

El presidente de EE UU explota el proceso de destitución con una ofensiva en línea que le reporta cifras récord de donaciones


La maquinaria política de Donald Trump está logrando la pirueta de convertir la mayor amenaza hasta la fecha a su presidencia en una prodigiosa fuente de ingresos para financiar la campaña electoral y alcanzar su segundo mandato. El martes de la semana pasada, la líder de la Cámara de Representantes, la demócrata Nancy Pelosi, comunicaba la apertura del proceso de impeachment al presidente, una lucha por su destitución a raíz de una conversación telefónica de Trump con su homólogo ucranio, en la que le presionaba para investigar las andanzas en aquel país del hijo de su rival político Joe Biden, Hunter. En las tres horas siguientes al anuncio de Pelosi, Trump recaudó un millón de dólares, según su equipo de campaña. En 24 horas, cinco millones. Y hasta 8,5 millones en dos días. Un auténtico récord, que se suma a los ocho millones que consiguió embolsarse en dos eventos de recaudación de fondos, celebrados el miércoles y el jueves de la semana pasada.

El impeachment llevaba meses sobrevolando la política de Estados Unidos, con la investigación sobre la posible conspiración del presidente con Rusia, y por ello la estrategia de cómo explotarlo estaba más que preparada. Existía incluso un vídeo, listo para publicarse desde el verano, en el que Trump pedía a sus seguidores que “detuvieran este sinsentido”. La semana pasada, la grabación se lanzó como parte de una contraofensiva en línea que reportó a la campaña 50.000 nuevos donantes.

No conviene subestimar el valor de esos 50.000 nuevos contribuyentes: fueron algo menos de 80.000 votos en tres Estados los que le dieron la victoria a Trump en 2016. Ahora, la campaña podrá seguir pidiéndoles dinero, y los datos personales que han proporcionado facilitarán al partido evitar que se les ocurra quedarse en casa el 3 de noviembre de 2020.

El republicano llegó a la presidencia cabalgando el tradicional malestar de la derecha estadounidense con el establishment liberal de Washington. Durante casi tres años en la Casa Blanca, ha perfeccionado la técnica. El inicio del impeachment, un intento de apartar al presidente sin pasar por las urnas, era la ocasión perfecta para azuzar esa furia latente en las bases del trumpismo. “Es un golpe de Estado”, llegó a tuitear el presidente este lunes.

Meses de convulsiones políticas han permitido comprobar que la recaudación se dispara cuando los seguidores perciben que el republicano está siendo atacado. El día siguiente a la presentación del informe Mueller sobre la injerencia rusa en las elecciones de 2016, por ejemplo, la campaña recibió un millón de dólares.

Los propios demócratas temen que la habilidad que ha demostrado el presidente para movilizar a sus bases victimizándose pueda tener un impacto en las elecciones del año que viene. Y muchos se resisten a proporcionarle carnaza. “Junto a Donald Trump, los demócratas son nuestros mejores recaudadores de fondos”, tuiteó irónico el miércoles Richard Walters, del Comité Nacional Republicano. Dicho órgano y la campaña de Trump actúan en la carrera a la reelección en una eficaz simbiosis, más allá de la mera coordinación que venía siendo la norma, una muestra del poder absoluto que ha acabado ejerciendo este presidente sobre el partido. A 14 meses de las presidenciales de 2020, juntos han recaudado más de 210 millones en lo que va de año, según registros de la Comisión Electoral Federal. Más que la suma de lo que llevan recaudados todos los aspirantes a convertirse en su contrincante demócrata.

El guion es claro. El presidente está siendo atacado por “los medios de las noticias falsas” y la “caza de brujas” de los demócratas. La narrativa parece convencer a los simpatizantes. Y no se escatiman recursos para convertir esa sintonía en dinero.

Entre el martes y el domingo de la semana pasada, la campaña de Trump gastó 2,1 millones de dólares solo en Facebook en anuncios que pedían donaciones. Cada una de las 500 publicaciones que lanzaron los primeros tres días en la red social mencionaba el impeachment.

“Nancy [Pelosi] acaba de lanzar un impeachment. ¡CAZA DE BRUJAS! Te necesito en mi Equipo de Defensa del Impeachment. Dona AHORA”. El mensaje de texto fue enviado el martes, acompañado de un enlace a una página para realizar aportaciones, con las que los donantes se incorporaban al recién inventado “Comando Oficial de Defensa del Impeachment” y engrosaban la “lista de patriotas” que sería “enviada el presidente Trump”. En la semana del anuncio de Pelosi, un potencial seguidor medio cuyo móvil figura en la agenda de la campaña recibió 10 mensajes semejantes. En total, 12 millones de mensajes de texto pidiendo microdonaciones. Y 65 millones de correos electrónicos.

Gastaron ocho millones de dólares en un anuncio de televisión que destacaba los vínculos de Biden con Ucrania. Y el Comité Nacional Republicano ha producido otra serie de spots televisivos a medida para distritos que votaron por Trump en 2016 y en los que, en las legislativas del año pasado, ganaron candidatos demócratas que ahora apoyan el impeachment.

Entre los demócratas ha habido menos consenso a la hora de tratar de hacer caja. Los primeros días, muchos optaron por pedir a sus simpatizantes, en vez de dinero, que firmaran su adhesión al proceso. Pero, según ActBlue, la empresa que procesa las donaciones en línea del partido, los candidatos recaudaron el martes, día del anuncio, 4,6 millones de dólares, 400.000 más que el lunes.

En el caso de Joe Biden, el favorito a enfrentarse a Trump en 2020, la semana pasada fue una de las que más dinero recaudó desde que presentó su candidatura, según su campaña. Nótese que Biden es, después de Trump, quien más tiene que perder con este proceso de impeachment.

Clinton’s impeachment barely dented his public support, and it turned off many Americans


President Clinton’s approval rating in August 1998 was a robust 62%, where it remained through his admission of an extramarital affair and the opening of impeachment proceedings. (David Hume Kennerly/Getty Images)

The U.S. House’s impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump’s interactions with the president of Ukraine comes more than two decades after the last presidential impeachment crisis – the one that engulfed President Bill Clinton in 1998 and early 1999. The circumstances – factual, political and societal – were very different back then, and so was U.S. public opinion about the push for impeachment.

A quick review of the facts: In early 1998, rumors began circulating that Clinton had had a sexual relationship with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. Clinton denied the allegations, both publicly and in a sworn deposition, but later admitted they were true. Independent counsel Kenneth Starr, whose investigation started as an inquiry into the Clintons’ financial dealings but broadened to other matters, argued that Clinton had committed perjury and obstructed justice by trying to influence the testimony of Lewinsky and other witnesses. The Republican-controlled House impeached Clinton on those charges, but in February 1999 the Senate – also led by Republicans – acquitted him.

One key difference between the Clinton impeachment and Richard Nixon’s experience a quarter-century earlier is that Clinton’s job approval ratings were already quite high before the scandal broke, and by and large they remained so. (Trump’s approval ratings have been fairly stable since the early days of his presidency, but at a considerably lower level – around 40% in a summer 2019 Pew Research Center survey.)

A Center survey taken shortly after Clinton’s Jan. 26, 1998, denial of the affair allegations found that 71% of Americans approved of how he was handling his job as president, 10 percentage points higher than a survey taken just before the scandal broke. Clinton benefited from widespread support for his policies and skepticism about the media’s coverage of the allegations.

While that initial boost faded over time, Clinton’s approval rating in August 1998 was still a robust 62%, where it remained for months – throughout his admission of the affair, the release of the Starr report and the opening of impeachment proceedings. Clinton’s approval hit 71% again in mid-December, after the House vote to impeach him.

Clinton’s impeachment process was generally unpopular, according to Center surveys during that time. Roughly three-in-ten or fewer Americans supported impeaching Clinton throughout autumn 1998 and even into mid-December, just before the House did so anyway. Only later in 1999, after Clinton had been acquitted, did retrospective support for impeaching him reach a high of 44%. (Note that question wording on this issue differed by survey, so direct comparisons are imperfect.)

The Center’s results were consistent with polling by other organizations, which typically found between a quarter and a third of Americans favoring Clinton’s impeachment. That contrasted with the Watergate situation, which saw public support for Nixon’s impeachment steadily rise as more and more was learned about the scandal.

Unlike the Watergate hearings, which gripped much of the country in 1973, Americans largely tuned out the proceedings against Clinton. In a Center survey conducted just after the House impeachment vote, only 34% said they had paid very close attention to it. In fact, the impeachment didn’t even crack the Center’s top 10 news interest stories of 1998.

The current impeachment inquiry against Trump will be the first to play out in the digital age. In 1998, during Clinton’s impeachment ordeal, 41% of U.S. adults used the internet, versus 90% today. Back then, newspapers and television were the dominant news sources for most people, but the trend since then has been away from print and toward online news.

In 2018, according to Pew Research Center data, 24% of Americans said they preferred to get their news from news websites or apps, and 10% chose social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter; just 7% cited print newspapers. (TV still led, with 44% saying it was their preferred news source.)

Con la presencia de Alberto Fernández, la CTA votó volver a ser parte de la CGT

El escenario fue el microestadio de Lanús, con la presencia de dirigentes políticos peronistas y referentes del sindicalismo.


Por unanimidad, el Congreso de la CTA de los Trabajadores definió avanzar en su reunificación con la CGT, tras 28 años. Con la presencia de Alberto Fernández, también se votó el apoyo a la fórmula presidencial del Frente de Todos de cara a las próximas elecciones del 27 de octubre.

Con un microestadio de Lanús completo, Hugo Yasky, secretario general de la CTA, confirmó ambas votaciones y consolidó el avance, "por unanimidad, hacia la esperanza" y la concertación social.
En el congreso se aprobó dar mandato a las autoridades de la central obrera para "ser parte de la refundación del contrato social", explicó Yasky desde el escenario, secundado por dirigentes políticos y referentes sindicales, y agregó: "Para ser parte de la convocatoria al diálogo para que en la Argentina seamos los que queremos trabajar, los que queremos producir, los que quieren que haya ciencia y tecnología, escuela pública, los que se junten a definir los pasos a dar" para sacar adelante el país.

Por eso, pidió votar el avance hacia la "concertación social" y, después de una alzada de manos multitudinaria en el microestadio, dijo: "Por unanimidad, hacia la esperanza".

Pero también remarcó que la independencia y autonomía de clase no significan neutralidad, por lo que pidió un "compromiso político de ser parte de la construcción de un tiempo nuevo, de esperanza y de trabajo" y el congreso votó su apoyo a la fórmula Alberto Fernández y Cristina Fernández.

El candidato presidencial del Frente de Todos estaba sentado justo detrás de Yasky, al lado de Hugo y Pablo Moyano. También estuvieron Máximo Kirchner, Verónica Magario, Gisela Marziotta y Axel Kicillof, quien mandó un video desde el auto con el que recorre la provincia de Buenos Aires en plena campaña. El palco se completó con Felipe Solá, Sergio Palazzo, Edgardo Depetri, entre otros. En tanto, el titular de la CTA Autónoma, Pablo Micheli, dio su presente desde abajo del esenario, entre el público.