#BigData en tiempo real en el #votojoven

Rubén Weinsteiner

Rubén Weinsteiner



En 2009 estalló una nueva gripe que combinaba las cepas de la gripe aviar y la gripe porcina. La Ciencia la llamó H1N1 y se expandió rápidamente.

Los ministerios de salud de todos los países del mundo, preveían una epidemia complicada, que se iba a propagar velozmente.

Algunos la comparaban la gripe de 1918, la gripe españolaque afectó a 500 millones de personas y que causó decenas de millones de muertes.



La paranoia cundía en todos lados, la gente no iba al cine, muchos comenzaron a usar barbijos, los padres estaban aterrorizados por sus hijos. No había ninguna vacuna disponible.



La estrategia de los ministerios de salud de los diferentes países era lentificar la propagación. A eso aspiraban de máxima. Pero para ralentizarla necesitaban saber donde estaban los focos.



En EE.UU. los Centros de Control y Prevención de enfermedades, pedían que los médicos alertaran ante cada caso nuevo de la nueva gripe.

Entre que la persona se sentía mal, pasaban unos días, recién ahí iba a una guardia médica, y el mecanismo burocrático de detectar los síntomas, confirmar la gripe, preparar los informes y procesar la información, (la CDC clasificaba una vez por semana) hacía que entre la aparición de cada caso y la confirmación pasaran 2 semanas.

Con una epidemia así dos semanas es muchísimo.

Los gobiernos estaban desbordados, se desató una histeria mundial.



La solución apareció desde Google. Desde la compañía le explicaron al gobierno de EE.UU. que Google podía identificar rápido y en tiempo real, los focos de la gripe, no sólo en EE.UU. sino en todo el mundo.

Google recibe casi 4000 millones de búsquedas diarias, las archiva todas, y puede identificar desde donde viene cada búsqueda y clasificarlas por tema.



Google puso como parámetros los síntomas de la enfermedad y podía establecer desde donde y cuantas personas buscaban en Google, cosas que estuvieran relacionadas con los síntomas de la gripe H1N1.



Google tomó como parámetro las búsquedas durante otras epidemias gripales parecidas. Había muchas búsquedas que eran hipocondría pura. Pero al cruzar búsquedas dentro de los grandes números de la Big Data, empezaron a identificar los focos de propagación. Para eso utilizaron 450 millones de modelos matemáticos para identificar los focos más consistentes, y de esa manera identificaron 45 palabras de búsqueda que tenía una correlación directa con los focos que iba confirmando la CDC.

Google no sólo que detectaba los focos, sino que lo hacía en tiempo real.



Big data es dedo en el pulso en tiempo real, es tener todos los datos, no una muestra, es poder operar con todos esos datos, y es poder plantar, pescar y buscar respuestas.



La Big Data representa un cambio disruptivo en lo que hace a cuantificar y comprender comportamientos. Una inmensa cantidad de cosas que hasta acá no podían medirse, almacenarse, analizarse, compartirse y utilizarse.


Hasta acá nos manejábamos con el muestreo, ahora tenemos todos los datos y los podemos manejar.

Con la Big Data podemos predecir con precisión a través de la correlación de una enorme cantidad de datos.

Las redes sociales nos dicen que hacen, que les gusta, adonde van, a quien quieren y a quien no, millones de jóvenes. No hace falta encuestarlos, la Big Data está ahí. Es oro para los que estudiamos los sistemas de preferencias de los jóvenes.


Todo esto en tiempo real, midiendo humores, tendencias, demandas, insatisfacciones, rechazos, con el dedo el pulso segundo a segundo.

Que decir, donde, como, cuando, a través de que medios.

Con la Big Data obtenida en la Web social se puede microsegmentar y afinar el discurso, microsegmentar las piezas publicitarias, explorar deseos, miedos, demandas, ya no desde la extrapolación de una muestra, sino de la totalidad de los datos.


Rubén Weinsteiner

La solidez del diferencial frente a la debilidad de los gimmicks en el #votojoven

Rubén Weinsteiner

Rubén Weinsteiner


Usted puede actuar bien o mal; lo importante es que actúe de verdad. 
 Konstantín Stanislavski

Sin diferencial no hay marca política exitosa, nada es más importante en comunicación política que tener un diferencial poderoso. Un significado, una idea, un concepto que pueda decodificarse en imágenes, palabras, sentimientos, que sea llamativo, recordado, si estuviéramos hablando de una melodía, diríamos pegadiza, y que pueda rápidamente construir percepciones para colonizar subjetividades y sujetar a los sujetos de elección.

El posicionamiento, el lugar en lugar en la cabeza de los sujetos de elección, es esa diferencia generan do percepciones, emociones, y traducida en competencia política en el sistema de preferencias de las personas.

Esa diferencia debe poner a la marca política en una categoría diferente a todas las demás ofertas. Ese concepto que diferencia, que separa, que hace especial debe estar preparado para ser plataforma de instalación de diferentes mensajes, para los diferentes segmentos que se quiera abordar.

Ese diferencial debe tener


1)Ubicuidad: ser visible y comunicado allí donde los diferentes públicos se encuentren

2)Consonancia: debe tener que ver con lo que los deseos, temores, anhelos, angustias, demandas de los diferentes segmentos

3)Repetición: debe insistirse con la visibilización y comunicación de ese diferencial para instalarlo.


Frente a “todos son iguales”, el que establece una diferencia, construye una ventaja.
El diferencial en el voto joven es tributario de la demanda de autenticidad frente a la impostura. El diferencial no sólo debe ser poderoso, sino real, verdadero. En el voto joven el diferencial, debe como decía Stanislavsky, ser verdad, actuar de verdad



Gimmick es un anglicismo que hace referencia a un truco, y a todo elemento añadido a una pieza creativa con el fin de hacer que sobresalga por encima del resto, y que de forma aislada no tiene valor. Es un adorno, algo que no establece una diferencia real, verdadera.
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Gimmick es un truco publicitario es una característica única o peculiar que le atribuyen a los productos para hacerlos resaltar, sin embargo esta característica no necesariamente es relevante, muchas veces ni siquiera es verdadera, o muchas veces ni si quiera trae beneficios, es sólo para llamar la atención.


Por ejemplo acaba de salir una compañía que anuncia una cerveza que está dirigida especialmente para  jugar beer pong (el beer pong es un juego popular entre jóvenes, que se juega con vasos llenos de cerveza en una tabla de ping pong).


Y muchos se preguntarán ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre esta cerveza y todas las demás? En realidad ninguna, el truco está en que es una caja con 30 cervezas que incluye los vasos y las pelotas para armar tu juego de beer pong.




Los trucos publicitarios atraerán atención, pero de manera muy efímera, luego se generará una sensación de defraudación difícil de dar vuelta. En conclusión los gimmicks generan ruido y cierta atención a tu marca pero no acumulan.

Sirven para decirle a las personas “ey mírame” pero si cuando te miran no decís algo que conmueva, no acumulará.
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Diferencia y verdad

Las marcas políticas y corporativas se vuelven mucho más eficaces a la hora de ocupar el imaginario de los microsegmentos jóvenes, colonizar subjetividades, y sujetar a los sujetos de elección, si exhiben su versión unplugged. En los diferentes públicos jóvenes, las marcas políticas, que “hacen playback”, que solo mueven los labios, suenan cada vez lejanas, artificiales, “gatos” Y “caretas”.

La identificación, en los públicos jóvenes está apoyada en el clivaje autenticidad-impostura. Lo autentico y lo artificial. La otredad es la impostura, los que dicen una cosa pero son otra. Contra eso, se plantea un modelo normativo de autenticidad, sencillez y transparencia. No ser “careta”, no ser “gato”, no ser “trucho”, ser o en realidad parecer verdadero y transparente.

Es difícil identificarse con algo “perfecto, las imperfecciones, lo real, la emergencia de las imperfecciones, limitaciones y zonas oscuras, acercan al votante joven a la marca política y facilitan su identificación.


Esta artificialidad e impostura, establece una barrera entre las marcas políticas y los votantes que impide la construcción de un vínculo emocional eficaz, de una positiva empatía e identificación y de establecer compromisos emocionales y de acción.







En los microsegmentos jóvenes, lo unplugged es esencial. Los tweets se mandan sin pulirlos, los sms se escriben acortando palabras, con errores de tipeo, sin revisarse ni refinamiento literario, los videos mas virales de You tube no llevan mucha edición.







Para los jóvenes un tweet coloquial o un video hecho con el celular “así, nomás” es muchísimo más “real” y legítimo que un tweet formal como los de Macri del tipo “muy feliz de inaugurar la muestra bienal del cine búlgaro”. O un video lleno de nerds, que repiten prolijamente un libreto. Se comunica desde el celular, mientras se hacen otras cosas, en camino a otros lugares, mientras se habla, se proyecta y se vive. Los jóvenes no paran para comunicar, comunican y hacen otras cosas a la vez. Un tweet desprolijo, un video en crudo, un discurso “improvisado, comunican autenticidad, sencillez, audacia, y un liderazgo activo, en territorio que no tiene tiempo para “marketing” sino para “hacer” y resolver problemas importantes.









Hablar con los jóvenes es fácil, que te escuchen no tanto. La comunicación entre una marca política y los sujetos de elección jóvenes, en medio de la disputa de sentidos, emociones y ofertas simbólicas, requiere por parte del receptor joven de una validación, donde el emisor, en este caso la marca política debe primero ser diferente de verdad y debe convocarlo a “ser parte”. Para lograr la atención de los jóvenes, el discurso debe dejar establecida esa diferencia, lo que le va a permitir al joven validar tribalmente el pertenecer, el ser parte, y poder vivenciar algo con la tribu de cara a la promesa de la marca política, para atravesar una instancia colectiva, donde se comprometa lo emocional.

Los esfuerzos por perfeccionar la comunicación política volviéndola impostada, artificial y alejada de un liderazgo con las botas embarradas, producen ruidos en el realismo político del voto joven, ya que en los públicos jóvenes, producir un contenido es solo el arranque. El despliegue del mensaje en el spin mediático-social de los microsegmentos jóvenes, cobra vida y construye sentido con la contestación social, la ponderación socialmente mediada y co-creada, la viralización, la legitimidad tribal, y las conversaciones 3.0 entre audiencias de audiencias. En este proceso, el grado de compromiso que el mensaje pueda generar y que los receptores puedan asumir, determinara el salto cualitativo del mensaje de “ruido” a “valor”, esencial para toda construcción discursiva política significativa.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Pautas de rebelión en el #votojoven

Rubén Weinsteiner

#Votojoven; pautas de rebelión funcionalmente constantes e históricamente cambiantes


Por Rubén Weinsteiner


Ningún movimiento estudiantil o juvenil estructurado se alzó en la década de 1930 contra el nazismo en Alemania o contra el fascismo en Italia. Los jóvenes como colectivo, se podría decir que apoyaron o por lo menos acompañaron estos procesos. Los trabajadores alemanes e italianos apoyaban a los socialdemócratas, a los liberales o a los comunistas, y se mostraban fuertemente hostiles hacia los nazis y fascistas. Los jóvenes sin embargo nutrían las marchas y muestras de fuerza de estos movimientos. Incluso los jóvenes intelectuales no se opusieron enérgicamente como lo hicieron los trabajadores, a Hitler y a Mussolini.

Esta capitulación de los intelectuales jóvenes fue voluntaria y no existieron focos de resistencia significativos como los que se desplegaron entre los trabajadores.



Joseph Lash escribió en Oxford Student Advocate : “ Los jóvenes socialistas y comunistas de Alemania e Italia actuaron convencidos que era inútil tratar de organizar a los jóvenes- de origen burgués- para aliarse con los trabajadores. A lo sumo un puñado de espíritus esclarecidos e independientes podrían haberse interesado por el movimiento obrero. El movimiento estudiantil italiano de izquierda, no pasó de ser un exaltado círculo de estudios marxistas. Los fascistas en cambio, fueron más astutos y perceptivos de las privaciones, inseguridad y malestar de la población joven. Las soluciones propuestas apuntaban a la democracia y los mayores como los causantes de retardar las soluciones a los problemas de los jóvenes”



Los jóvenes bajo el primer franquismo



En España con el triunfo de Franco, el escenario fue muy diferente. Cuando la elite militar se enfrentó a los intelectuales, los jóvenes opusieron una feroz resistencia.

En 1926 surgió un movimiento estudiantil para combatir a la dictadura de Primo de Rivera. El líder estudiantil Sbert, fue deportado a Mallorca, y en 1930 los estudiantes apedrearon la casa del dictador. La Universidad de Madrid fue clausurada, y el 22 de diciembre, una huelga estudiantil, fue uno de los factores que determinaron la caída del dictador Primo de Rivera. Sbert volvió victorioso y lideró la lucha para modernizar los planes de estudio, lograr la libertad en el aula, y liberar de restricciones medievales los ámbitos frecuentados por los jóvenes. Estas luchas foguearon a los jóvenes en la calle, enfrentando a la guardia Civil, de hecho, cuando esta generación fue a la guerra civil en 1936, ya tenía varias batallas en su haber.

Los jóvenes españoles se enfrentaban a un orden parecido aunque no tan brutal como el que se constituía en Italia y en Alemania, sin embargo el comportamiento de los jóvenes en ambos casos, fue diametralmente opuesto.



El caso francés


Hasta la segunda guerra mundial el movimiento estudiantil francés era básicamente de derecha, nucleado alrededor de la Action Francaise. De tendencia monárquica, controlaban la Sorbona con los socialistas como oponentes minoritarios. En 1920, comenzaron a publicar la revista mensual L’ Etudiant Francais, fuente de inspiración de varias generaciones de intelectuales de la derecha francesa.

Las pautas de la rebelión juvenil francesa antes de la segunda guerra mundial, eran bastante heterodoxas. Se rebelaban contra padres republicanos desde una posición conservadora. La Gazettte de Lausanne lo definía: “Los jóvenes son realistas en 1933, así como sus padres republicanos bajo el segundo imperio”. Estos jóvenes eran hijos y nietos de jacobinos y comuneros. Si bien la ideología imperante en los jóvenes variaba de acuerdo con la norma de la revuelta generacional, la pauta de sus tácticas, la pauta de la política de la rebelión generacional, permanecía invariable.

Bernard de Vésins, líder de la Action decía: “Los jóvenes constituyen el elemento más eficaz para frenar a los profesores republicanos”.

Edouard Herriot, Primer Ministro francés, icono de la tradición jacobina y el más representativo de los estadistas liberales entre las dos guerras, era el blanco preferido y enemigo perfecto de los estudiantes franceses, mayoritariamente de derecha. Era la figura paterna de la Francia republicana que detestaban. En 1925 , lo abuchearon e insultaron masivamente en una entrega de premios en el Lycée Louis le Grand. En diciembre de 1932 los estudiantes de la mayoritaria Action Francaise juntaron 30.000 jóvenes y rodearon la Cámara pidiendo la renuncia de Herriot, 6000 policías contuvieron a los jóvenes, pero esa noche, el primer ministro Herriot tuvo que renunciar.


Pautas de rebelión

Una pauta es una regularidad efectiva de la acción social, es una creencia, una forma, una conducta, una manera de actuar que se da y repite en un contexto social.

La pauta de la rebelión en los jóvenes es funcionalmente constante pero históricamente cambiante.



Para analizar el posicionamiento de los jóvenes en determinada etapa histórica, hay que tener en cuenta la pauta de rebelión en función de las condiciones objetivas de poder y contra poder.



Los Nazis y los fascistas, más allá de las valoraciones acerca de las aberraciones propuestas y cometidas, supieron aumentar las tensiones del conflicto generacional, desautorizando a los mayores ante los jóvenes, cosa que el franquismo no hizo, sino todo lo contrario. El Franquismo puso en valor la autoridad paterna, instituciones como la familia, y tradiciones antiguas.



El nazismo y el fascismo plantearon un esquema tribal hacia los jóvenes La tribalidad alude a la identidad social del joven. Los adultos mayores pueden, si quieren estar solos, para los jóvenes es más difícil, un joven va a la escuela, a la universidad, a un club, hace deportes, se junta en la esquina, integra grupos, y en esos marcos organizacionales se define identitariamente el sistema de valores y preferencias del joven.

El franquismo estructuraba su esquema de valores de manera celular, con la familia como núcleo, la parroquia, el barrio y las ciudades como continentes. La tribu no era contemplada por la narrativa franquista.


La narrativa nazi-fascista apuntaba a que los mayores habían errado el camino, se habían equivocado, se habían rendido en el caso alemán, y habían aceptado en Versalles condiciones humillantes que condicionaban las posibilidades de desarrollo de los jóvenes, y había que cambiar el orden y los jóvenes debían encarar esa rebelión. La narrativa franquista sostenía que los problemas habían surgido porque los jóvenes habían abandonado el camino de sus mayores, la tradición y los valores, y había que retomar el camino de los padres y abuelos.



Los nazis y los fascistas le planteaban a los jóvenes una lucha contra un enemigo poderoso, con final abierto, algo que moviliza fuertemente a los jóvenes. El franquismo le proponía a los jóvenes ser como sus padres, no agitar el avispero, ya que lo que ellos hacían estaba mal.


Los jóvenes y el franquismo de posguerra

Treinta años después y todavía bajo Franco la insurgencia estudiantil viró de lo estrictamente ideológico a un sentido más corporativo.

La pauta de rebelión de los jóvenes españoles, no se constituía en una disputa por el sentido acerca de grandes problemas sociales, sino como reacción al autoritarismo vertical del establishment y los mayores.

Era obligatorio afiliarse al Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU) , que tenía 100.000 afiliados y estaba controlado por el gobierno, eligiendo este sus autoridades. Este autoritarismo y afiliación obligatoria, produjo un fuerte malestar entre los estudiantes, que consideraban que el sindicato debía ser autónomo. Como protesta contra el SEU, se formaron más de 20 grupos disidentes ilegales, concentrados principalmente en las Universidades de Madrid y Barcelona. Sus reclamos eran, ante todo “sindicatos estudiantiles libres” “supresión del SEU” y “solidaridad estudiantil”. Era un reclamo básicamente sectorial y no planteaban un debate ideológico directo acerca de la política o la economía nacional, no planteban cambio profundos en materia social, económica o constitucional.

La lucha contra el SEU, fue violenta, la consigna la reorganización democrática del sindicato estudiantil. La lucha fue cruenta en Madrid, Barcelona, Salamanca, Bilbao, Valencia, Sevilla, Oviedo, Valladolid y Zaragoza.

Estos alzamientos que se dieron en un contexto de fuerte crisis política, marcaron el sentido tribal de la lucha de los jóvenes, que ante todo pusieron los problemas de la tribu al tope de la agenda.



Nazismo y juventud


A partir de 1920, el Partido Nazi eligió a la juventud alemana como una audiencia especial para sus mensajes de propaganda. Estos mensajes resaltaban que el Partido era un movimiento de jóvenes: dinámico, fuerte, progresista y esperanzado. Millones de jóvenes alemanes fueron convencidos por el nazismo en las aulas y a través de actividades extracurriculares. En enero de 1933, la Juventud Hitleriana tenía solo 50 mil miembros, pero al finalizar el año esta cifra había aumentado a más de dos millones. Hacia 1936 la pertenencia a la Juventud Hitleriana había aumentado a 5,4 millones antes de convertirse en obligatoria en 1939. Posteriormente, las autoridades alemanas prohibieron o disolvieron las organizaciones juveniles rivales.



Jay Lovestone en “The youth movement in the Third Reich” señala que “ Con hábil demagogia, Goebbels repetía que los jóvenes graduados en las escuelas alemanas, no tenían la preparación adecuada para encarar su futuro… la juventud comenzó a creer que estaba pagando por la incapacidad de los mayores. Una y otra vez los nazis los exhortaban a liberarse de la carga que correspondía a la vieja generación. Esa era la puerta de entrada discursiva para los predicadores del nazismo…”Pocos meses antes de asumir el cargo de Canciller, Hitler proclamó, durante la celebración del Día del Deporte de la Juventud Nacionalsocialista: “Grancias a nuestro movimiento está surgiendo una nueva generación llena de coraje, e incapaz de rendirse”.



Pautas de rebelión en el proceso alemán



En Alemania la pauta de rebelión contra los liberales y socialdemócratas apoyada entre los militaristas y nacionalistas de diversas extracciones, estuvo muy presente a lo largo del siglo 19. En las décadas posteriores a 1848-escribe George Mosse en “The crisis of German Ideology : Intellectual origins of The Third Reich” ,1964- “Nuevas fuerzas, vital y políticamente triunfantes, suscitaron la adhesión de un nuevo estudiantado, desilusionado por la aptitud de los viejos liberales. La unificación de Alemania, y el control de su política interna y externa, habían sido logrados gracias a los esfuerzos de unos pocos hombres; y sólo el ejército, comandado por Bismarck, había sido capaz de cumplir la proeza” Por ello “ las generaciones de estudiantes que asistieron a las universidades en la década de 1880, dieron nueva vida al movimiento radical de derecha”.



Entre 1848 y 1914 los jóvenes y los estudiantes en particular, se sometieron de buen grado al orden bismarckiano, y conformaron una elite que primero ocupó los cargos políticos más relevantes y luego se distanció de la política, para liderar el establishment desde el ámbito corporativo. Fue ahí, donde los socialdemócratas recuperaron terreno político y ganaron la batalla cultural a favor de la democracia liberal, los derechos civiles y la economía de mercado. Loa jóvenes registraron que la pauta de rebelión era contra un orden forjado por la derecha, que ya se revelaba como incapaz para responder a sus demandas.

Finalizada la primera guerra mundial y la revolución rusa, los estudiantes y los jóvenes en general volvieron a la política, desempeñando un papel modesto en el movimiento comunista y masivo en nazismo. Los jóvenes alemanes se orientaron hacia los extremos del arco político, y con la violencia como eje central de su accionar.


En la década del 30, la mayoría de los estudiantes alemanes consideraba que el estado liberal socialdemócrata era “reaccionario” y había traicionado sus esperanzas.

La autonomía académica que los estudiantes le reclamaban al gobierno socialdemócrata, bajó del listado de reclamos ante los nazis, y los estudiantes aceptaron la regimentación y coordinación política de las universidades.

Los estudiantes nazis, tomaron las universidades, echaron profesores, organizaron quema de libros , y narraron estas acciones como una rebelión apoyada desde el poder, de carácter indispensable, ante los mayores que habían fracasado.

La Studentenschaft nazi se puso como objetivo eliminar de la universidades todo lo “no alemán” donde la idea era un corte abrupto con la construcción de sentido de sus padres y profesores, a favor de profesores que reinvindicaran el rol fundacional de los jóvenes, basado en un pasado mítico, que excedía, temporal, cultural y estructuralmente a sus padres y abuelos.


Relatos ocultos, tensión y antisemitismo estructural



El antisemitismo caló hondo en estos jóvenes alemanes, ya en 1890 una petición presentada al gobierno requiriendo la expulsión de los judíos del país, tuvo más aceptación entre los estudiantes que entre la población en general. La Asociación de Estudiantes Alemanes (Verein Deutscher Studenten – Kyffhauser Bund) , organizada en 1881, tenía como fines en su carta constitutiva; la lucha contra el materialismo, el liberalismo, el racionalismo y los judíos. Los estudiantes sostenían que consideraban “la cuestión judía” imparcial y objetivamente, ya que no existía en ellos “temor a la competencia judía”. En 1901, actuando bajo la presión de los estudiantes, el cuerpo de profesores de la Universidad de Heidelberg prohibió la formación de una asociación estudiantil judía.

Las organizaciones estudiantiles propiciaban el boicot y el uso de la violencia contra los estudiantes judíos.

Y aquí vemos otra vez una pauta de rebelión en función de un proceso histórico. Los judíos como colectivo habían conseguido legitimar su posicionamiento social en europa occidental. Luego de la resolución del affaire Dreyfuss en Francia, y durante los años 20 en Alemania, la burguesía y el establishment en general generó un consenso de “tolerancia” y legitimación hacia las comunidades judías que no se daba en Europa oriental. Este fenómeno coyuntural se apoyaba más en las necesidades financieras y políticas de los poderes fácticos que en un cambio cultural profundo. Esta movida fue percibida por los jóvenes alemanes, italianos y franceses como una rendición ante un grupo de poder, y por eso el antisemitismo operó como catalizador de la pauta de rebelión.

Para los jóvenes que contemporáneos del surgimiento del nazismo, este era “un desarrollo natural y lógico” de los lemas que sus padres habían pregonado desde su juventud. La derrota alemana de la primera guerra mundial le dio fuerza a los argumentos, acerca de la debilidad e ineficacia del establishment socialdemócrata contra el que esos jóvenes se estaban empezando a rebelar.

La crisis económica , el desempleo entre los jóvenes, la inflación y la recesión, hacía que los jóvenes más limitados y con menos formación y capacidad sufrieran más la competencia del mercado laboral. Esos jóvenes vieron en el nazismo una expresión funcionalmente racional de representatividad.



La tensión entre pautas propias y normas ajenas en los segmentos jóvenes, sobredetermina la necesidad de la mutación. El joven pone en emergencia conductas “asociales”, que violan normas, y que muchos viven y practican subterráneamente, por ejemplo los relatos ocultos de la sociedad alemana.



Los relatos culturales, tanto públicos abiertos y difundidos, como los ocultos, privados y subterráneos, conforman las hegemonías dentro de los diferentes segmentos poblacionales. Los relatos ocultos son una parte muy importante en las matrices de construcción de los sistemas de preferencias y determinación del voto.

Son relatos privados, que no se verbalizan en el espacio público, se remiten exclusivamente a los círculos de confianza, de “los nuestros”, a las charlas en familia o con amigos cercanos. Doy un ejemplo de estos relatos ocultos: Muchos argentinos sintieron alivio apenas producido el golpe militar de 1976, algunos y no pocos de ellos siguen sintiendo hasta el presente apoyo y simpatía por ese gobierno militar, sin que les importe los crímenes cometidos por este. Sin embargo la difusión, resignificación y elaboración colectiva, impide hoy una reivindicación abierta de la dictadura en los medios, en la Universidad, en una reunión con gente desconocida, en el espacio público. Por eso la memoria se transforma para este grupo en un hecho privado que retorna a las vías de la oralidad propias de la intimidad.



Muchos de estos relatos ocultos contienen un desprecio por la otredad, por otro grupo o sector social, y si bien no se expresan en público, sobreviven subterráneamente, en lo familiar, entre amigos, allí donde hay redes de confianza, como dadores de sentido, de lo que Bordieu llama: la distinción.



Entre los mayores, funcionaba en Alemania un sistema de relatos ocultos que cultivaban el antisemitismo. Los jóvenes crecieron con estos relatos, que gozaban de la legitimidad del hogar pero asumiendo su carácter de oculto, “de eso en público no se habla”.

Los nazis, en este caso, le dieron una plataforma de legitimidad a este tipo de relatos, que tensó su relación con el establishment y los mayores, pero que exponía la contradicción que esos mayores no podían resolver.



El caso de los jóvenes comunistas alemanes



En el otro extremo del arco, el de los jóvenes comunistas, podemos observar la efímera revolución, que implantó soviets en Baviera en 1919, en lo que se llamó “el Abril rojo de Munich”. Los jóvenes articularon con el movimiento obrero y contra los mayores. Uno de sus líderes, Ernst Toler, alumno de Max Weber, escribía: “Nuestros padres nos han traicionado, y los jóvenes que conocieron la guerra y su dureza, comenzarán la tarea de limpieza”. La pauta de rebelión también era contra los socialdemócratas y liberales, y también contra la democracia liberal, pero el eje lo constituía prevenir y no propiciar futuras guerras, como lo hacían desde la derecha. “La juventud de todos los países debe unírsenos en nuestra lucha contra aquellos a quienes acusamos de ser los causantes de la guerra: ¡nuestros padres!” .

El “Abril rojo de Munich” duró muy poco, Toller fue a la cárcel, y los jóvenes alemanes mayoritariamente expresaron su rebelión hacia sus “mayores fracasados” desde el nazismo.



La posguerra, los jóvenes alemanes y la política


Porqué no surgió ningún movimiento estudiantil y o juvenil en Alemania después de la caída del nazismo? Podríamos pensar que se daba un escenario de desautorización de los mayores clásico para el surgimiento de un movimiento joven. Sin embargo los jóvenes como colectivo apoyaron el nazismo, el objeto de desautorización eran los jóvenes mismos. Los intelectuales veían y narraban a los jóvenes como un grupo de interés real importante en la base de sustentación del nazismo.



Los adultos mayores, conservadores, liberales, socialdemócratas o socialistas, participaron en menor grado que los jóvenes ahora ex nazis en las culpas colectivas del pueblo alemán, porqué además habían sido desplazados por el nazismo. Por eso recién en 1965 aparecen los primeros movimientos juveniles y estudiantiles, claramente anti nazis, involucrados en política.


Pautas de rebelión constantes y coyunturalmente cambiantes



Desde los funcional, pensamos la juventud como la define Roberto Brito Lemus, que plantea que la juventud, comienza cuando se desarrolla la capacidad de reproducir la especie humana, y termina cuando se desarrolla la capacidad de reproducir el orden social. Se es joven mientras se cuestiona, contesta y demanda cambios y se evita reproducir el orden social tal cual está planteado. Cuando se evita “transar”.

La pauta de la rebelión en los jóvenes es funcionalmente constante, es decir, los jóvenes buscan cambiar y sustituir, ya que deben “matar al padre” como estrategia de inserción, proyección y supervivencia, por eso la rebelión y la protesta se mantienen constantes, como la identificación con los factores mas disruptivos de la sociedad, buscando luchas contra enemigos poderosos, con final abierto.

Esa pauta de rebelión es históricamente cambiante, y depende que lo está instituido como conservador, preservador del orden constituido y bloqueador de cambios, sustituciones, y del ingreso de los jóvenes a instancias de potencialidad de acción.



La pauta de rebelión se constituye en función de lo que obtura el recambio, con la impronta de la nueva generación

Rubén Weinsteiner

#VotoJoven: #Deseo y #Microsegmentación por #VariablesBlandas

Por Rubén Weinsteiner 


Los segmentos constituidos por variables blandas se ordenan como el resultado de una articulación de demandas. Las personas demandan cosas y los que demandan las mismas cosas se agrupan funcionalmente en microsegmentos auqnue sean muy diferentes entre sí, determinando cruces a veces disrutptivos, que plantean escenarios novedosos y lleno de oportunidades.



Cambia, todo cambia

Los sujetos de elección jóvenes son volubles y esperan grandes cambios. Los sujetos jóvenes siempre esperan que algo ocurra, que algo cambie, que los represente, sentir consonancia emocional e intelectual y poder identificarse.

Esos cambios esperados, articuados en imágenes, se constituyen en la demandas que los ordenan como microsegmento, y se satisfacen con ideas y emociones que asumen el rol de promesa y perspectiva de futuro de la marca política.

La imagen es a la vez un recuerdo, un deseo y una anticipación (Joseph H. Smith, Duelo e historicidad humana)

Esa imagen-demanda es una re-creación de una satisfacción pasada, vivenciada o no, siempre deseada y añorada, ahora nuevamente querida y anticipada.
Reason why

El sistema de preferencias en el #votojoven no se articula por la autopista prometida, sino por la perspectiva planteada de cómo se van a sentir los votantes con la autopista construida. La autopista sirve para más gente visite tu ciudad, poder visitar nosotros más lugares, estar más cerca, ir más a lugares más rápido, para llegar más temprano a jugar con tu hijo, para conseguir otro trabajo más lejos, aumentar las ventas, que un hotel se llene, que hermanos se vean más, que visites mas a amigos, padres etc.


Nunca confundir el qué, con el para qué. La emoción del reason why (para qué), se constituye en atajo cognitivo vía imagen traducida en perspectiva emocional, para fundamentar la promesa de la marca política

Los jóvenes demandan cosas de un poder determinado, y ese poder determinado no puede absorber todas las demandas de un segmento. Y los jóvenes requieren un poder que satisfaga todas sus demandas, por lo tanto esos poderes no puede constituirse en una contrapartida coherente de esos segmentos. La demanda requiere la totalización y como no la encuentra en un solo segmento se parte, pidiéndole las mismas cosas a diferentes poderes.

Los segmentos jóvenes comienzan a atomizarse y cruzarse, porque le piden cosas similares a diferentes poderes. Algunos le piden al gobierno nacional, otros al provincial, o a la iglesia, a los sindicatos, a las organizaciones ambientales, a la oposición, al tercer sector, a la justicia, a los sindicatos, a las auutoridades de la universidad, club, etc.

Este es el mecanismo que determina la constitución de microsegmentos cruzados definidos por variables blandas.

En ningún sector se observa tan claramente la dinámica de la microsegmentación como hacia el interior del #votojoven. Porque los jóvenes, son más flexibles, adoptan nuevos intereses, cambian, se enamoran más fácilmente y más rápido, se sienten parte de nuevos colectivos ipso facto, se juntan, se agregan, se separan, se vuelven a agregar, se comprometen mucho más rápido que los mayores.

El nuevo escenario impone microsegmentar al interior del voto joven por variables blandas (focos de pertenencia, pertinencia e interés tribal), no tanto por variables duras (edad, años de escolaridad, lugar de residencia, religión), es decir, por lo que los jóvenes hacen más que por lo que los jóvenes son.

El joven quiere ser parte de algo, revelar y ejercer pertenencia y pertinencia, compromiso hacia una agrupación, entorno de un grupo musical, de una tribu urbana, de un grupo de amigos, barra, banda, club, tribu de seguidores, fieles, creyentes, etc.

La cultura que viene propone una microsegmentación transversal, donde se cruzan los microsegmentos y agrupan a personas diferentes a través de diversos aglutinadores , y los ponen en escenarios diferentes a los protagonizados por la generación de sus padres.

Cuando microsegmentamos, más que pensar en lo que decimos debemos enfocarnos en a quien se lo decimos. La microsegmentación por variables blandas debe objetivar lo que los jóvenes hacen, lo que demandan y a quien se lo demandan, para poder interpelar , impactar y acumular con eficacia en el microsegmento objetivo.

En el voto joven, los microsegmentos, los colectivos, las tribus y las agregaciones, se despliegan en forma transversal, priorizando el deseo, por sobre la necesidad. La marca política como intermediaria debe legitimar esos deseos y hacerse cargo de los mismos. El sistema de preferencias en el #votojoven se resuelve por emoción y deseo, mas que por utilidad y necesidad.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues

 Rubén Weinsteiner

Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out in views on race, climate and the role of government





No longer the new kids on the block, Millennials have moved firmly into their 20s and 30s, and a new generation is coming into focus. Generation Z – diverse and on track to be the most well-educated generation yet – is moving toward adulthood with a liberal set of attitudes and an openness to emerging social trends.

On a range of issues, from Donald Trump’s presidency to the role of government to racial equality and climate change, the views of Gen Z – those ages 13 to 21 in 2018 – mirror those of Millennials.1 In each of these realms, the two younger generations hold views that differ significantly from those of their older counterparts. In most cases, members of the Silent Generation are at the opposite end, and Baby Boomers and Gen Xers fall in between.2

It’s too early to say with certainty how the views of this new generation will evolve. Most have yet to reach voting age, and their outlook could be altered considerably by changing national conditions, world events or technological innovations. Even so, two new Pew Research Center surveys, one of U.S. teens ages 13 to 17 and one of adults ages 18 and older, provide some compelling clues about where they may be headed and how their views could impact the nation’s political landscape.

Only about three-in-ten Gen Zers and Millennials (30% and 29%, respectively) approve of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president. This compares with 38% of Gen Xers, 43% of Boomers and 54% of Silents. Similarly, while majorities in Gen Z and the Millennial generation say government should do more to solve problems, rather than that government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals, Gen Xers and Boomers are more evenly divided on this issue. For their part, most Silents would like to see a less activist government.

When it comes to views on race, the two younger generations are more likely than older generations to say that blacks are treated less fairly than whites in the United States today. And they are much more likely than their elders to approve of NFL players kneeling during the national anthem as a sign of protest.

The younger generations are also more accepting of some of the ways in which American society is changing. Majorities among Gen Z and the Millennial generation say increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S. is a good thing for society, while older generations are less convinced of this. And they’re more likely to have a positive view of interracial and same-sex marriage than their older counterparts.

As a recent Pew Research Center report highlighted, Gen Z is the most racially and ethnically diverse generation we have seen, but this isn’t all that’s driving the attitudes of this generation when it comes to issues surrounding race and diversity. There are significant, if more modest, generational differences on these issues even among non-Hispanic whites.
Roughly a third of Gen Zers know someone who uses gender-neutral pronouns

While Generation Z’s views resemble those of Millennials in many areas, Gen Zers are distinct from Millennials and older generations in at least two ways, both of which reflect the cultural context in which they are coming of age. Gen Zers are more likely than Millennials to say they know someone who prefers that others use gender-neutral pronouns to refer to them: 35% say this is the case, compared with a quarter of Millennials. Among each older generation, the share saying this drops: 16% of Gen Xers, 12% of Boomers and just 7% of Silents say this.

The youngest generation is also the most likely to say forms or online profiles that ask about a person’s gender should include options other than “man” or “woman.” Roughly six-in-ten Gen Zers (59%) hold this view, compared with half of Millennials and four-in-ten or fewer Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents.

These findings seem to speak more to exposure than to viewpoint, as roughly equal shares of Gen Zers and Millennials say society should be more accepting of people who don’t identify as either a man or a woman.

Members of Gen Z also stand out somewhat in their views on the role social media plays in modern news consumption. These teens and young adults are much less likely than older generations to say the fact that more people are getting their news from social media is a bad thing for society – 39% of Gen Zers hold this view, compared with about half among each of the older generations.
Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out on some key issues

While they are young and their political views may not be fully formed, there are signs that those in Generation Z who identify as Republican or lean to the Republican Party diverge somewhat from older Republicans – even Millennials – in their views on several key issues. These same generational divides are not as apparent among Democrats.

On views about race relations, Gen Z Republicans are more likely than older generations of Republicans to say that blacks are treated less fairly than whites. Among Republicans, 43% of Gen Zers say this, compared with 30% of Millennials and roughly 20% of Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents. Gen Z Republicans are also much more likely than their GOP counterparts in older generations to say increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S. is a good thing for society. On each of these measures, Democrats’ views are nearly uniform across generations.

In addition, the youngest Republicans stand apart in their views on the role of government and the causes of climate change. Gen Z Republicans are much more likely than Republicans in older generations to say government should do more to solve problems. And they are less likely than their older counterparts to attribute the earth’s warming temperatures to natural patterns, as opposed to human activity.

While younger and older Americans differ in many of their views, there are some areas where generation is not as clearly linked with attitudes. When it comes to the merits of having more women running for political office, majorities across generations say this is a good thing for the country. Majorities in each generation also say that, on balance, legal immigrants have had a positive impact on the U.S.

This analysis is based on a survey of 920 U.S. teens ages 13 to 17 conducted online Sept. 17-Nov. 25, 2018, combined with a nationally representative survey of 10,682 adults ages 18 and older conducted online Sept. 24-Oct. 7, 2018, using Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel.3 Findings based on Generation Z combine data from the teens survey with data from the 18- to 21-year-old respondents in the adult survey.
Gen Zers and Millennials share views on politics and policy; large generational gaps among Republicans

When it comes to views on political issues and the current political climate, younger generations have consistently held more liberal views than older generations in recent years. Today, members of Generation Z hold many similar views to Millennials, and both tend to be more liberal than older generations.

Seven-in-ten Gen Zers say the government should do more to solve problems in this country, while just 29% say the government is doing too many things that are better left to individuals and businesses. Gen Zers are slightly more likely to favor government activism than Millennials, and significantly more likely than older generations: 53% of Gen Xers, 49% of Baby Boomers and 39% of Silents favor government involvement over businesses and individuals.

Among Republicans and those who lean to the Republican Party, the generational divides are even starker. Roughly half (52%) of Gen Z Republicans say they think the government should be doing more to solve problems, compared with 38% of Millennial Republicans and 29% of Gen Xers. About a quarter of Republican Baby Boomers (23%) and fewer GOP Silents (12%) believe the government should be doing more.

Among Democrats, however, these generational divides largely disappear. Roughly eight-in-ten Gen Z (81%) and Millennial Democrats (79%) say the government should do more to solve problems, as do about seven-in-ten Democratic Gen Xers, Boomers and Silents.

Gen Zers’ views about climate change are virtually identical to those of Millennials and not markedly different from Gen Xers. About half in all three generations say the earth is getting warmer due to human activity. Boomers are somewhat more skeptical of this than Gen Zers or Millennials. Members of the Silent Generation are least likely to say this (38%) and are more likely to say the earth is warming mainly due to natural patterns (28%) than are Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers.

Among Republicans, Gen Z stands out from older generations as the least likely to say the earth is warming because of natural patterns – 18% say this. By comparison, 30% of Millennial, 36% of Gen X and roughly four-in-ten Boomer (42%) and Silent Generation Republicans (41%) say the same. Almost no generation gap exists among Democrats in views on this issue.

When it comes to views of Donald Trump, there are sizable generational divides, particularly among Republicans. Nine-in-ten Republicans in the Silent Generation approve of the job the president is doing, as do 85% of Baby Boomer Republicans and 76% of Gen X Republicans; smaller majorities of GOP Millennials (65%) and Gen Zers (59%) think he’s doing a good job.

Younger generations also have a different view of the U.S. relative to other countries in the world. While pluralities of nearly all generations (with the exception of the Silent Generation) say the U.S. is one of the best countries in the world along with some others, Gen Zers and Millennials are the least likely to say the U.S. is better than all other countries. Only 14% and 13%, respectively, hold this view, compared with one-in-five Gen Xers, 30% of Boomers and 45% of Silents.

Roughly three-in-ten Gen Zers and Millennials say there are other countries that are better than the U.S.

In their views about the general direction of the country, Gen Zers are mostly downbeat, but they’re not alone in that assessment. Among Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers, two-thirds or more say things in this country are generally going in the wrong direction. About six-in-ten Boomers (61%) say the same. Members of the Silent Generation have a less negative view (53% say things are going in the wrong direction).

Today’s 13- to 21-year-olds are only slightly more likely than Millennials to say ordinary citizens can do a lot to influence the government in Washington (53% of Gen Zers say this vs. 46% of Millennials). And their views on this issue don’t differ much from those of Gen Xers, Boomers or Silents (50%, 58% and 58%, respectively, say citizens can have a lot of influence on the government).
Stark generational gaps in views on race

Younger generations have a different perspective than their older counterparts on the treatment of blacks in the United States. Two-thirds of Gen Z (66%) and 62% of Millennials say blacks are treated less fairly than whites in the U.S. Fewer Gen Xers (53%), Boomers (49%) and Silents (44%) say this. Roughly half of Silents (44%) say both races are treated about equally, compared with just 28% among Gen Z.

The patterns are similar after controlling for race: Younger generations of white Americans are far more likely than whites in older generations to say blacks are not receiving fair treatment.

Younger generations also have a different viewpoint on the issue of NFL players kneeling during the national anthem as a protest. Majorities among Gen Z (61%) and the Millennial generation (62%) approve of the protests. Smaller shares of Gen Xers (44%) and Baby Boomers (37%) favor these actions. Members of the Silent Generation disapprove of the protests by a more than two-to-one margin (68% disapprove, 29% approve).

Gen Zers and Millennials share similar views about racial and ethnic change in the country. Roughly six-in-ten from each generation say increased racial and ethnic diversity is a good thing for our society. Gen Xers are somewhat less likely to agree (52% say this is a good thing), and older generations are even less likely to view this positively.

Younger Republicans again stand out in this regard. Half of Gen Z Republicans (51%) say increased racial and ethnic diversity is a good thing for the country. This compares with 38% of Millennial, 34% of Gen X, 30% of Boomer and 28% of Silent Generation Republicans. Among Democrats, there is widespread agreement across generations.

Though they differ in their views over the changing racial and ethnic makeup of the country, across generations most Americans agree about the impact that legal immigrants have on society. On balance, all generations see legal immigration as more positive than negative. Across most generations, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say legal immigrants are having a positive impact. However, within Gen Z there is no partisan gap on this issue.

When it comes to views about how careful people should be in using potentially offensive language, members of Gen Z are divided over whether people need to be more careful or if concerns about political correctness have gone too far. Some 46% of Gen Zers say people need to be more careful about the language they use to avoid offending people with different backgrounds, while 53% say too many people are easily offended these days over the language that others use.

Gen Zers’ views are only modestly different from those of Millennials and Gen Xers on this topic: 39% and 38%, respectively, say people need to be more careful about the language they use, while about six-in-ten say people are too easily offended these days. Interestingly, members of the Silent Generation are closer to members of Gen Z in their views on this topic than they are to Boomers, Gen Xers or Millennials.
Gen Z and Millennials have similar views on gender and family

Since they first entered adulthood, Millennials have been at the leading edge of changing views on same-sex marriage. In 2014, when a narrow majority of all adults (52%) said they favored allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally, 67% of Millennials held that view. Today, members of Generation Z are just as likely as Millennials to say allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry has been a good thing for the country (48% of Gen Zers and 47% of Millennials hold this view). One-third of Gen Xers say this is a good thing for the country, as do 27% of Baby Boomers. Members of the Silent Generation are the least enthusiastic (18% say this is a good thing).

Relatively few Gen Zers or Millennials (15%) say same-sex marriage is a bad thing for society. Boomers and Silents are much more likely to view this change negatively (32% and 43%, respectively, say this is a bad thing). Across generations, about four-in-ten say allowing gays and lesbians to marry hasn’t made much of a difference for the U.S.

In other ways, too, Gen Zers and Millennials are similar in their openness to changes that are affecting the institutions of marriage and family. Roughly half (53%) from each generation say interracial marriage is a good thing for our society. Gen Xers are somewhat less likely to agree (41% say this is a good thing), and older generations are much less likely to view interracial marriage positively. Relatively few across generations say this trend is bad for society; majorities of Silents (66%) and Boomers (60%) say it doesn’t make much difference, as do 53% of Xers.

When it comes to couples living together without being married, roughly two-thirds of each generation (with the exception of Silents) say this doesn’t make much of a difference for society. About one-in-five Gen Zers and Millennials say cohabitation is a good thing for society – higher than the shares for older generations. Fully 41% of Silents say this is bad thing for the country, as do about a quarter of Boomers.

Compared with their views on cohabitation, the youngest generations have a more negative assessment of the impact of single women raising children: 35% among Gen Z and 36% of Millennials say this is a bad thing for society; roughly four-in-ten Gen Xers and Boomers and 48% of Silents say the same. About half of Gen Zers and Millennials say this doesn’t make much difference for society, while relatively few (15%) view it as a good thing.
Across generations, majorities say financial and child care responsibilities should be shared

In their views about gender roles within couples, members of Generation Z are virtually identical to Millennials and Gen Xers and quite similar to Baby Boomers. Large majorities in all four groups say that, in households with a mother and a father, the responsibility for providing for the family financially should be shared equally. About one-in-five Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers – and a quarter of Boomers – say this responsibility should fall primarily on the fathers. Very few say mothers should be mostly responsible for this. Silents are the outliers on this issue: 40% say fathers should be mostly responsible for providing for their families financially, while 58% say this responsibility should be shared between mothers and fathers.

For the most part, there are no notable gender gaps in views on this issue; the Silent Generation is the exception. Among Gen Zers, Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers, male and female respondents are largely in agreement that mothers and fathers should share family financial responsibility. Among members of the Silent Generation, roughly half of men (49%) but 33% of women say fathers should be mostly responsible for providing for the family financially.

Large majorities (84% or more) across generations say that responsibility for taking care of children should be shared by mothers and fathers in households with two parents. Some 13% among Gen Z say this responsibility should fall mainly to mothers; similar shares of each of the other generations say the same. Very few say raising children should fall mostly to dads. Male and female respondents across generations have similar views on this issue.
Widespread enthusiasm across generations for more women entering politics

A majority of Americans, regardless of generation, view the increasing number of women running for public office as a positive change for our society. Roughly two-thirds of Gen Zers, Millennials and Gen Xers say this is a good thing, as do 61% of Boomers and 55% of Silents. About four-in-ten in the Silent Generation (39%) say this trend doesn’t make much difference for society, somewhat higher than the share among the three youngest generations (roughly three-in-ten).

There are significant gender gaps on this question, with female respondents expressing much more enthusiasm about the growing number of women running for office in each generation except the Silents. Among Gen Zers, 76% of young women, versus 57% of young men, say the fact that more women are running for office is a good thing for society. The pattern is similar for Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers. However, among Silents, roughly equal shares of men (57%) and women (54%) say this is a good thing.
Gen Zers most likely to say forms or online profiles should offer gender options beyond ‘man’ and ‘woman’

The recognition of people who don’t identify as a man or a woman has garnered increased attention amid changing laws concerning gender options on official documents and growing usage of gender-neutral pronouns.

There are stark generational differences in views on these issues. Generation Z is the most likely of the five generations to say that when a form or online profile asks about a person’s gender it should include options other than “man” and “woman”; a 59% majority of Gen Zers say this. Half of Millennials say forms or online profiles should include additional gender options, as do about four-in-ten Gen Xers (40%) and Boomers (37%) and roughly a third of those in the Silent Generation (32%).

These views vary widely along partisan lines, with generational differences evident within each party coalition, but sharpest among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. About four-in-ten Republican Gen Zers (41%) think forms should include other gender options, compared with 27% of Republican Millennials, 17% of GOP Gen Xers and Boomers and 16% of Republican Silents. Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, half or more in all generations say this, including 71% of Gen Zers and 55% of Silents.
Gen Zers and Millennials have similar views on treatment of people who don’t identify as a man or woman

When it comes to how accepting society in general is of people who don’t identify as either a man or a woman, the views of Gen Zers and Millennials differ from those of older generations. Roughly half of Gen Zers (50%) and Millennials (47%) think that society is not accepting enough. Smaller shares of Gen Xers (39%), Boomers (36%) and those in the Silent Generation (32%) say the same.

A plurality of the Silent Generation (41%) say society is too accepting of people who don’t identify as a man or woman. Across all generations, roughly a quarter say society’s acceptance level is about right.

Again, there are large partisan gaps on this question, and Gen Z Republicans stand apart to some extent from other generations of Republicans in their views. Among Republicans, about three-in-ten Gen Zers (28%) say that society is not accepting enough of people who don’t identify as a man or woman, compared with 20% of Millennials, 15% of Gen Xers, 13% of Boomers and 11% of Silents. Democrats vary little by generation in shares holding this view.
Generations differ in their familiarity and comfort with using gender-neutral pronouns

Gen Zers and Millennials are much more familiar than their elders with the idea that some people may prefer gender-neutral pronouns: 74% of Gen Zers and 69% of Millennials say they have heard “a lot” or “a little” about people preferring that others use gender-neutral pronouns such as “they” instead of “he” or “she” when referring to them, with about three-in-ten saying they have heard a lot about this. Most Gen Xers (62%) also have heard a lot or a little about people preferring gender-neutral pronouns.

There is less awareness of this among older generations. Still, half of Boomers and 45% of Silents say they have heard at least a little about gender-neutral pronouns.

Gen Zers are also the most likely among the five generations to say they personally know someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns, with 35% saying so, compared with 25% of Millennials. Each of these younger generations is more likely than Gen Xers (16%), Boomers (12%) and Silents (7%) to say they personally know someone who prefers that others use gender-neutral pronouns when referring to them. This generational pattern is evident among both Democrats and Republicans.

In addition to their greater familiarity with gender-neutral pronouns, Gen Zers and Millennials express somewhat higher levels of comfort with using gender-neutral pronouns, though generational differences on this question are more modest. Majorities of Gen Zers (57%) and Millennials (59%) say they would feel “very” or “somewhat” comfortable using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone if asked to do so, including about three-in-ten (32% of Gen Zers, 31% of Millennials) who say they would be very comfortable doing this. By comparison, Gen Xers and Boomers are evenly divided: About as many say they would feel at least somewhat comfortable (49% and 50%, respectively) as say they would be uncomfortable.

Silents are the only group in which more say they would feel uncomfortable (59%) than say they would feel comfortable (39%) using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone.

There are wide party gaps on this measure across generations. Within each generation, Democrats come down on the side of feeling comfortable, rather than uncomfortable, using a gender-neutral pronoun to refer to someone if asked to do so. In contrast, for each generation of Republicans, majorities say they would feel uncomfortable doing this.

Across generations, knowing someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns is linked to comfort levels in using these pronouns. Three-quarters of Millennials and about two-thirds of Gen Zers, Gen Xers and Boomers who personally know someone who goes by gender-neutral pronouns say they would feel very or somewhat comfortable referring to someone with a gender-neutral pronoun. Those who don’t know someone are roughly 20 percentage points less likely to say the same (51% of Gen Zers, 54% of Millennials, 46% of Gen Xers and 48% of Boomers who don’t know someone say this).

Rubén Weinsteiner

The marketing of political marketing

Rubén Weinsteiner

Abstract 

 

Has political marketing been over-marketed? This article ± taking a definition of political marketing that (controversially) excludes news management and ``spin’’ control ± does not seek to ``prove’’ that it has, merely to suggest that the impact of marketing in politics is not directly analogous to its effectiveness in business because of differences between a business context and a political one. We argue specifically that political marketing programmes can sometimes do harm, and two case studies ± from Canada and Britain ± are examined to illuminate this. The claim is that marketing is thus less relevant in politics, both at the level of description and prescription. The broader aim of the article is to sensitise students and researchers alike to the differences in commercial and political contexts, differences of which practitioners must be aware if they are to utilise political marketing to its best advantage.

Has political marketing been over marketed?

To question whether the field of political marketing has itself been over- marketed may seem untimely, both since political marketing is far from being universally accepted among political scientists at the conceptual level, and because of its obvious attractions as a normative-rational model of what is occurring in electioneering to-day, particularly in the USA. But its advocates such as Kotler (1999) have a tendency to perceive the political and commercial contexts as essentially similar. We, however, seek to suggest that media and the press, with their own agendas of information manufacture, are often more influential on public opinion than political advertising and other communication techniques of commercial derivation. Marketing is a business discipline whose relevance lies primarily in business: we should not assume that political contexts are invariably analogous to business to the extent that methods can be imported and used with equal effect.

However, the genre ``political marketing’’ may be seen to function at several levels, since it is both descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive, in that political marketing analyses provide us with a structure of business derived labels to explain, map, nuance and condense the exchange dynamics of an election campaign; offering the possibility of new perspectives for interpreting elections. But it is also prescriptive. Implicitly or explicitly, many academics have been saying that this is something parties and candidates ought to do if they are to fulfil their mission of winning elections. ``Political marketing’’ may now be a recognised sub-discipline, but it is also a recommendation.

It is this prescriptive status that this article questions, not in the sense of doubting that the application of political marketing has clear value as an organising concept, but rather to claim that this value has certain limitations. ``Political marketing’’ is seldom, alone, a panacea. The claim of this article is that its proponents may sometimes downplay the fact that they advocate a volatile weapon that can on occasion harm those who employ it. The foundation, though not the proof, of such a claim is established through the use of two historically significant case studies, the British General Election of 1992 and the Canadian General Election of 1993.

Politics and the marketing concept

There are of course many apparent parallels between the selling of politicians and the selling of certain products. Most obviously, politics sell an abstract and intangible product; it is value laden; it embodies a certain level of promise about the future, some kind of attractive life vision, or anything whose satisfactions are not immediate but long-term, vague and uncertain. Vendors of products which share the above characteristics will have legitimate things to say to politicians and the analogies are with promise-based offers. Many of the methods used correlate with those used to sell products where information is complex or contradictory and not easily retained by the audience like insurance or finance. Thus Harrop (1990) sees political marketing as essentially a form of services marketing: marketing a party consists in projecting belief in its ability to govern (and political parties are service organisations). But there is scepticism about services and therefore parties need to reassure: they must eliminate all perception of risk. The ideal party, he claims, would be a political version of a Holiday Inn.

The rise of political marketing

Political marketing, using a definition of commercial marketing by GroÈnroos (1990) can be defined as ``seeking to establish, maintain and enhance long-term voter relationships at a profit for society and political parties, so that the objectives of the individual political actors and organisations involved are met. This is done by mutual exchange and fulfillment of promises’’ (Henneberg, 1996). The political ``product’ is some amalgam of policy, leader image, inherited memory, promise, and it is also a referendum on past performance.

Political marketing would appear to be distinguished from propaganda by its conceptualisation of voters as customers and its consequent stress on market-research-driven policy. For consumer marketers, there is no value independent of what the customer determines. The ideological turnaround of the Clinton administration in his first term is an example: ``Clinton gave people what they wanted to hear, with just the right language, words and phrases that would resonate with the American public’’ (Johnson, 1997). Nor is it something that is done just at election periods. Early in the Reagan years observers began to speak of a new political phenomenon, the permanent campaign (Blumenthal, 1982): that is, that the methods used to gain office would now be used to sustain it. Thus political marketing was accorded a new credibility: it was not merely the corpus of tricks that got government elected; it had become, in a sense, the government ± the organising principle round which policy was constructed.


Far from being universally accepted, some political scientists have treated
the concept of political marketing with condescension, Philo (1993) dismissing
what he calls a ``shallow science of imagistics’’, while for Bowler and Farrel
(1992) the marketing literature is ``an exercise in rationalising success or failure
in hindsight’’ rather than offering any theoretical insight. One does not have to
embrace political marketing in every respect to notice that most criticism is
grounded in normative models, in ideals of democratic behaviour (Jamieson, 1049 1992; Franklin, 1994).These models sometimes seem out of touch with reality,
for example the normative model of voting decision making based on objective
information and full deliberation. Voters cannot follow this model because of
the intrinsic complexity of the decision-making task; therefore they use
cognitive short-cuts and cues in order to facilitate a decision (Newman and
Sheth, 1987).


But a small group of political scientists have embraced the concept, arguing that its analyses bring distinctive strengths lacking in orthodox political science treatments. For Bartle and Griffith (2001), marketing’s contribution lies in the broader theories of demand it introduces, such as voter aspiration, and applied tools like segmentation. They argue that consumer-behaviour related models seem to grasp the complexities of voter decision-making best, although other political scientists are hostile to this approach. Scammell (1999) echoes their further argument: ``curiously, however, political science voting models seem reluctant to build in image/reputation as a major element. The standard voting model continues to rely on party identification, issue perceptions and to a lesser extent leader evaluations.’’ Harrop (1990) also stresses the importance of image in marketing’s potential contribution to political science: most studies of voting behaviour, such as Himmelweit’s consumer model, stress policy and ideology. But Harrop has argued that image is also critical ± such as competence or trustworthiness ± and it is here that the tools of marketing analysis help. Scammell (1999) also believes, following on, that an even more important contribution is the strategic focus that marketing brings, ``the prime distinctive contribution of the marketing literature . . . .it shifts the focus from the techniques of promotion to the overall strategic objectives of the party/ organisation.’’

Values and ethos

The work of these critics has value both in interpreting marketing to the political science profession and focusing our attention on what its special contribution to the study and practice of politics can be. Yet there remain differences between the political and consumer ``product’’, which lead to distinctions in the content of their marketing. Politics is concerned with affirmation of values. Thus, a political issue is not merely a product to be merchandised, but a vibrant value symbol connecting with an individual’s sense of who and what they are. In such cases, political views and decisions are part of the social self construction of the individual. Voting for a particular party can be, and certainly has been historically, a source of social identity.



Indeed this is one reason why the emotional appeal to values can be more effective politically than almost any other kind of appeal (Etzioni, 1984).

Ultimately the proposition that values in the political ``product’ are more important than those in a manufactured product can neither be proved nor disproved. Buying a consumer product is not value neutral either: with the ascent of branding, values have become more important as products/brands cease (if ever they were) to be defined by their utility function alone, and became endowed with the symbolic meanings and lifestyle associations that advertising has poured into them. Values enter many purchase decisions ± for example, environmental ones.

But it is possible nevertheless to argue that political debate today has become largely one of values. What we often mean by a political issue is a value symbol, and many such issues would not have an identity independent of what has been called the ``civil war of values’’. ``Issues’’ gain momentum because of their value symbolism. If political argument were simply about utilitarian appeals, most such debate would have been silenced long ago. The strength of this value orientation means that political partisanship is often affirmed by a moral ethos which is different from that of consumer marketing, which contains little for example that is really like negative advertising (so-called comparative advertising is a mere echo). Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996) point out that in 1992, 50 US states with 62 per cent of the voting age population suffered full negative campaigns. And what is called political marketing sometimes goes beyond even attack and distortion to actual invention. Technological resources are being used to edit truth. A 1996 study found 28 per cent of the 188 commercials scrutinised contained questionable usage of technology: ``news conferences that were never held, debates that never took place, use of audio or video to stereotype or ridicule opponents’’ (USA Today, 1996). In reality the phrase ``political marketing’’ may appear to be used as a convenient shorthand for a host of loosely related activities .

Media, complexity and turbulence

Political marketing, and political communication phenomena, are distinguished from consumer marketing also by the arbitration of an independent communications power centre, the mass or ``free’’ media which they may be able to influence but cannot control. Yet the availability of such free media is limited in most business situations: indeed many business schools do not even run courses on public relations. In politics, free media are more important. Thus political marketing has to be viewed as a complex two-step communication process that influences the consumer directly, but also indirectly through the medianship of the free media. Such media ± as with the ad-watches which have become an institutionalised feature of the US press ± comment on political marketing but in the process relay its imagery: in this dialogue between political marketing and the mainstream media the advertisements and such become political occurrences themselves. Political marketing texts may thus stand in their own right as autonomous historical events with political consequences of their own, such as the ``Daisy’’ advertisement of 1964 (O’Shaughnessy, 1990).

What is inscribed in a piece of political communication is merely the
beginning of a journey which could end anywhere, even having the reverse
consequences to those anticipated. This degree of turbulence in the political
environment ± especially during elections, the primary focus of political
marketers ± make the problem of control greater than in the business 1051 environment. In this sense, consumer marketing as an analogy may be overly static, since a business can control its image, as a party cannot: one only has to study the conservative administration of John Major in Britain (1992-1997) with its circa 50 scandals (of very varying degrees of magnitude). The fluidity of political situations is enhanced also by new communications media that have energised political pace, particularly in the condensed space of an election, so that parties and politicians can post immediate replies on the Web site when once there would have a one or two day delay for a measured response (Johnson, 1997).

Spin, rhetoric and symbolism

The British (Labour) Government has often been cited in debates on the practice, and the ethics, of political marketing. But the phenomenon of the Blairite regime also offers us the chance to seek to define the parameters of political marketing. Here we have chosen to operate a definition that places it in the realm of primarily commercially derived persuasion techniques and concepts, an organising paradigm immigrated from commerce. The term ``political marketing’’ can be used too loosely, to refer to anything from rhetoric to spin doctoring, or simply to every kind of political communication that has its genesis in public opinion research. It has become a useful hold-all for disparate entities which at an earlier phase in history would have been termed ``populism’’ or ``propaganda’, or, when used in the strictly business context, would go under headings like ``corporate communications’’ or public relations.

But what is being done to communicate the policies of the British government actually bears limited resemblance to anything which would be described by the textbooks of consumer marketing, or inscribed in its practice. Labour are specialists, certainly, in the manipulation of free media or ``spin’’, the art of affixing a desirable interpretation on to a still mobile situation, and the rhetorical and symbolic strategies that might further such manipulation. But it is comparatively rare that a business will need the arts of ``spin’’ in communicating with its public. What I think critics really mean by calling this marketing is ``political corporatism’’, with its associated activities of co- ordinating party spokespersons to be `` on message’’, the clearing of ministerial speeches with communications officers, the issuing of MPs with pagers, etc.

The suggestion in this article that news management and ``spin’’ cannot properly be called political marketing is bound to be a controversial one. For critics they are a clear part of conventional marketing, either subsumed under the category of positioning or in the related conceptual domain of public relations. In one respect in particular they have a case. To wear a contemporary brand is to make a public announcement of affiliation and therefore of trust, and when the brand seems to betray that trust ± as in the case of Nike, Gap and others who were accused of exploiting under-age labour in the third world ± public disenchantment has ultimately entailed, at least for the CEOs of some companies, the kind of public pressures and visibility more naturally 1052 associated with politics. But the level of press interrogation facing a senior politician to-day on an almost daily basis, is generally less apparent in business. To survive, a politician must also exploit the public visibility of his office by organised appeals to the media. It is those appeals that matter in terms of the political impact made, more so than the more ritualised political marketing effort: to call them the same thing is to stretch conceptual elasticity .

Participation

Marketing may not help the politicians. It may be argued that reliance on commercially derived political marketing techniques to win elections helps undermine the role of active participation in politics to-day, to the future detriment of those who employ them. Britain’s ``new’’ Labour Party, which created a substantial ``credit card’’ membership through advertising ± their membership telephone number was showcased in all its communications (O’Shaughnessy, 1999) ± was later to discover the fickleness of its new membership base. Under this argument, the virtues of political marketing for a party could be more short term than long term. Marketing may fail to engender the kind of proselytising organisation which Ellul (1973) reckons to be central to the successful working of propaganda. A part of the theory of persuasion is that we internalise our adherence by working for a cause, therefore engaging in self-persuasion and retrospectively justifying our actions. The lack of active participation in politics today (Richardson, 1995) makes for a superficiality of support, and less direct link between governors and governed. An extreme case of this was Forza Italia.

What marketers neglect

It is possible to argue that political marketers have tended to neglect some relevant concepts and techniques on offer from consumer marketing. ``Relationship marketing’’, for example, is a useful concept: it is not that politicians do not seek to build relationships with party members, or with voters, merely that the concept of relationship marketing and the literature on it would both sensitise political practitioners to the importance of that dimension and educate them with a litany of procedures and ideas for its implementation. Politicians might realise that their parties, indeed they themselves, function as brands. Again, the writings on brand loyalty (Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1993) could be of benefit ± how are brands, essentially a form of condensed meaning, sustained and how is loyalty to them kept alive?

Political marketing is offered not only as an analytic framework but also as a problem-solving tool. But its evangelists should be aware of generic criticisms of consumer marketing, for example, that research-led marketing is constricted
by the limitations of the consumer’s imagination and may not surface their
latent, unarticulated wants. Yet some original products, such as the Sony
Walkman under the leadership of Akito Mori, were actually created in defiance
of market research findings. Research convergence and producer bureaucracy
may tend to make for a uniformity in product forms and functions: the political
equivalency would be unadventurous leadership and bland policies, and both 1053 are perhaps based on an economist’s image of the consumer as having complete self-knowledge and an established and stable hierarchy of preferences.
Political marketing methodologies may also tempt us to use communication to fill the space vacated by ideas and ideology (Sherman, 1987) as with the Tories in Canada 1993: but the combination of marketing acumen and intellectual vacuity is one voters might recognise.

Two case studies: control and interpretation

Two case studies have been chosen to illuminate the potential problems of political marketing. In the first place political marketing always carries a risk factor. We cannot control the destination of a communication text but merely initiate that voyage, for what is encoded is not necessarily what is decoded. Political marketing can provide material for a party’s enemies, including its enemies in the media, who can fix an interpretation on a text which is quite different to that which the party intended. It is through the media’s role as self- appointed election referee that much political advertising is viewed. But when, say, television news shows a slice of a political advertisement, it is framed by a comment; as, of course, are the multiple ``ad watches’’ orchestrated by the American press. It may be the case then that we can speak not of political marketing but of a media-arbitered image of political marketing.

A political marketing text can also receive unintentional readings; a message will give a content, but it can also give off a tone which undermines intent. Thus a projection of ``slickness’’ may be persuasive in a commercial context: but in politics it might suggest manipulation. In the environment of another culture the meaning might be different again ± in Peru, for example the polished, American style campaign advertisements made for Vargas Llosa were interpreted by Peruvians (most of them poor) as an index of a rich, out-of-touch candidate (Siegel, 1991). A political context complicates the interpretation of a message: a ``bold’’ attack ad might be seen not as courageous but as desperate, for example. Political advertising may be viewed as an index of a party’s corporate personality, but in the process providing unintentional reinforcement of people’s half-articulated fears about candidate or party. A text can act as a symbol to trigger inconvenient memories: thus the rejection of the Canadian Tory advertising in the case described below occurred partly because it was perceived as symbolic of the uncaring political ethos of the 1980s: the Tories were viewed as part of an era and an ethos Canadians felt they had outgrown.

The aim of the Canadian Tory advertising in their general election of 1993 was to stigmatise the leadership qualities of Liberal leader Jean Chretien: a sequence of photographs depicted him becoming increasingly confused, with the comment ``I personally would be very embarrassed if (Chretien) were to become the Prime Minister of Canada’’ (Whyte, 1994). One of these images revealed the right side of Chretien’s face, his mouth crooked from nerve injury sustained in youth. Yet the media chose to affix an interpretation on the text that said the advertisement was an attack on physical disability; thus, to be Tory was to hate people with disabilities. Television reports chose the ugliest parts of the images and the script. For most voters, their only exposure to the advertisements was through the interpretative framework attached by television. An experiment at Simon Fraser University found people reacted far more negatively to the broadcasts than to the advertisements themselves. The result of this election was devastating (Globe, 1993), and the Tories were left with just two parliamentary seats. It had become ``politically incorrect to be a Tory’’ (Whyte, 1994).

Our second case is ``Jennifer’s ear’’, an advertisement that used the story of a

sick child to attack the British Conservative Government’s NHS policy, and was shown in the second week of the 1992 UK general election campaign. Again the strategy seemed to make sense. The Conservatives were probably at their least believable when they claimed that ``the NHS is safe in our hands’’, and it was natural for Labour to seek to exploit their area of perceived greatest vulnerability. A powerful ``attack’’ advertisement at the start of the campaign would put them on the defensive where they had least to defend. Such an advertisement should not be rational but emotional, seeking to achieve the kind of resonance with viewers and media reduplication that the sinister ``Willie Horton’ had achieved in the USA. This resonance would be gained by a human story and not abstract argument. If the story was also true, grounded in fact, the power of its symbolism could sustain the entire Labour campaign.

As with the anti-Chretien advertisement in Canada, the broadcast further alienated an already suspicious media that was determinedly fault-finding. They criticised ``Jennifer’’ for accuracy, undermining that claim to truthfulness that was central to its power to persuade. Moreover the charge of ``exploitation’’ of a sick child was what actually resounded with the public, not the attack on the NHS: the child’s vulnerability worked against, not for, Labour’s advocacy. Two child actresses portrayed the allegedly true story of two little girls with ``glue ear’’, one immediately treated privately, the other repeatedly delayed on the NHS. But newspapers discovered the identity of the real child and pursued the family: nor was it clear whether the failure to treat was due to lack of resources or incompetence (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992). That week, ``Jennifer’’ constituted nearly 20 per cent of stories on both main television news programmes. ``Jennifer Bennett and her glue ear received more coverage than housing, transport, pensions, law and order, defence, foreign affairs or Europe ± indeed, than several of those put together’’ (Harrison, 1992). Harrison further argues that ``before the election the NHS had seemed Labour’s strongest suit. However, the momentum the party had built up by the middle of the campaign was never regained after the Jennifer Bennett affair broke on 25 March’’.


Thus in 1992 a political campaign that was to some observers impressive in orthodox marketing terms failed against one that appeared almost to embrace a species of anti-marketing. In particular, an apparently uncontrived gesture by Tory leader John Major, where he addressed voters in one town by standing on a soapbox, did appear to achieve that critical connectedness with the public. The soap box was conscripted as his symbol.


The marketing of political marketing



These cases suggest that television and the press are still potentially more 1055 powerful agents of political influence than political marketing via the paid or
free media. At times even a free press can conspire to present a powerful
``dominant view’’ against which all other opinion is perceived as deviant. When

opinion becomes universal among major press protagonists like this, no quantity of shrewd political marketing can probably rectify the situation. In 1992 the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock was leading at the polls. The British press ``decided to crucify him’’. From December 1991-April 1992 the relatively apolitical Sun readers registered an 8.5 per cent swing to the Tories (Mckie, 1995). Techniques used by the press to demonise the Labour Party and its leader Neil Kinnock (Seymour-Ure, 1995) included the Sun newpaper’s eight page pre-election special ``Nightmare on Kinnock Street’’, where, for example, readers were warned that loft conversions would need the approval of lesbian and gay groups on left wing councils: on election day itself the front page featured Mr Kinnock’s head within a light bulb and the headline ``If Kinnock wins to-day will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights’’ (Harrop and Scammell, 1992). Propaganda-like distortions were the order of the day. For example, The Sun in the critical ``Jennifer’s Ear’’ case presented Jennifer’s father as being opposed to Labour’s use of the story when the reverse was true.

Thus the press had become direct participants in the creation of partisan information and not mere conduits of it. The demonstrable impact of this kind of news manufacture may seem to transcend any attempts of parties to ``market’’ themselves. Under this argument, political marketing may be seen as the junior relative of press activism: this would not negate its importance, merely that its impact must be seen in the context of often more significant drivers of political influence.

Conclusion

Case studies, of course, ``prove’’ nothing, merely establish a foundation for further argument. What this article has sought to achieve is a sensitising ± for both researchers and students alike ± of the differences between contexts in which political and business managers operate. They are separate ecologies, and the aim of this piece has been to challenge notions of political marketing as universal panacea: there is no one simple, easy transport from a business context, where social values are one of a number of considerations, to the political one, where values are the core of the process. Important conceptual similarities do of course exist and the same techniques criss-cross the two domains, but this makes them related, not identical. These points are not irrelevant, since while language directs perception it also limits it. Political marketing is not exactly like commodity marketing. When we use the term ``political marketing’’ as a convenient shorthand, we see as a result some things in political exchange relationships with great clarity, but perhaps miss other significant features in the complex environment of political communication, since perception is directed only to those areas common to political and consumer marketing. The phrase is an analogy rather than an accurate scientific term, and perhaps this has been somewhat overlooked in the enthusiasm to create a new field.

Has political marketing been over-marketed? The question cannot be proven and is perhaps trivial. What is ultimately important is perhaps less the establishment of the stature of political marketing along some hierarchy, than an understanding of the contexts in which it succeeds and fails, and why.

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The marketing of political marketing

Rubén Weinsteiner